Narrative of Services in the Liberation of Chili, Peru and Brazil, from Spanish and Portuguese Domination by Earl of Dundonald Thomas Cochrane (speed reading book txt) 📖

The command of the frigate had been given to Captain Guise; and after her change of name, his officers wrote to him a letter deprecating the name, and alleging, that as they had nothing to do with the conquest of Valdivia, it ought to be withdrawn, and one more consonant with their feelings substituted. This letter was followed by marked personal disrespect towards myself, from the officers who had signed it, who made it no secret that the name of Guise was the one sought to be substituted.

As the conversations held by these officers with the rest of the squadron were of such a derogatory nature as regarded my character and authority, as might lead to serious disorganization, I brought the whole of the officers who had signed the letter to a court-martial, two being dismissed the service, the remainder being dismissed the ship, with a recommendation to General San Martin for other appointments.

During the arrest of these officers, I had determined upon an attack upon the fortifications of Callao, intending to carry them by a coup de main, similar to that which had succeeded at Valdivia, and having, on the 18th, taken soundings in the Potrillo, was convinced of the feasibility of the plan.

On the 20th, this intention was notified by an order, stating that on the following day I should make the attack with the boats of the squadron and the San Martin, the crew of which received the order with loud cheers, volunteers for the boats eagerly pressing forward from all quarters.

In place of preparing to second the operations, Captain Guise sent me a note refusing to serve with any other but the officers under arrest—stating that unless they were restored, he must resign his command. My reply was that I would neither restore them nor accept his resignation, without some better reason for it than the one alleged. Captain Guise answered, that my refusal to restore his officers was a sufficient reason for his resignation, whereupon I ordered him to weigh anchor on a service of importance; the order being disobeyed on the ground that he could no longer act, having given over the command of the ship to Lieutenant Shepherd. Feeling that something like a mutiny was being excited, and knowing that Guise and his colleague, Spry, were at the bottom of the matter, I ordered the latter to proceed with the Galvarino to Chorillos, when he also requested leave to resign, as "his friend Captain Guise had been compelled so to do, and he had entered the Chilian navy conditionally to serve only with Captain Guise, under whose patronage he had left England." Such was the state of mutiny on board the Galvarino, that I deputed my flag-captain, Crosbie, to restore order, when Spry affected to consider himself superseded, and claimed exemption from martial law. I therefore tried him by court-martial, and dismissed him from the ship.

The two officers now made their way to head-quarters, where General San Martin immediately made Spry his naval aide-de-camp, thus promoting him in the most public manner for disobedience to orders, and in defiance of the sentence of the court-martial; this being pretty conclusive proof that they had been acting under the instructions of General San Martin himself, for what purpose will appear in the course of the narrative. The course now pursued by General San Martin sufficiently showed that the disturbance previously made at Valparaiso emanated also from himself, and that in both cases the mutinous officers felt quite secure in his protection; though I will do both the credit of supposing them ignorant at the time of the treacherous purposes of which they were afterwards the instruments.

Knowing that I should take their punishment into my own hands if they returned to the squadron, General San Martin kept both about his own person at head-quarters, where they remained.

So dissatisfied were the Spanish troops at Lima with the government of their Viceroy, Pezuela, to whose want of military capacity they absurdly attributed our successes, that they forcibly deposed him, after compelling him to appoint General Lacerna as his successor. The deposed Viceroy wishing to send his lady and family to Europe, applied to General San Martin for a passport, to avoid capture by the Chilian squadron. This was refused; but Lady Cochrane having arrived at Callao in the British frigate Andromache, to take leave of me previous to her departure for England, the Viceroy's lady, Donna Angela, begged of her Ladyship to use her influence with the General to obtain leave for her departure for Europe. Lady Cochrane immediately proceeded to Haura, and effected the object; after which she remained for a month at head-quarters, residing at the house of a Peruvian lady, Donna Josefa Monteblanco.

A passage was also, by Lady Cochrane's influence, procured for the lady in the Andromache, on board which ship Captain Sherriff politely invited me to meet her. At this interview the ex-Vicequeen expressed her surprise at finding me "a gentleman and rational being and not the ferocious brute she had been taught to consider me!" A declaration, which, from the unsophisticated manner in which it was made, caused no small merriment in the party assembled.

As I was determined not to be idle, General San Martin was with some difficulty prevailed upon to give me a division of 600 troops, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Miller. On the 13th of March we sailed for Pisco, of which, on its previous abandonment by the army, after a useless sojourn of fifty days, the enemy had again taken possession. On the 20th it was retaken, when it was found that the Spaniards had severely punished the alleged defection of the inhabitants for contributing to the supplies of the patriot force during its stay. Not imagining that we should return, the Spanish proprietors of estates had brought back their cattle, of which we managed to seize some 500 head, besides 300 horses for the use of the Chilian forces, the squadron thus supplying their wants instead of remaining in total inaction.

Previous to going to Pisco, I had again urged on General San Martin to advance on Lima, so convinced was I of the goodwill of the inhabitants. On his refusal, I begged him to give me 2,000 men, with whom I offered to take the capital, but this was also declined. I then offered to undertake the capture of Lima with 1,000 men, but even this was refused, and the detachment under Colonel Miller was only given to me to get rid of my importunity. Of this detachment I however determined to make the most before our return.

The only way of accounting for this indisposition on the part of General San Martin to place an adequate military force at my disposal, was the reason current amongst the officers of the army, who were all eager to place themselves under my orders; viz. the violent jealousy which caused him to look upon me as a rival, though without reason, as I should certainly not have attempted to interfere with him in the government of Peru when its reduction was complete. Suspicious himself he could not trust me, employing every effort to lessen my reputation amongst his officers, and endeavouring to the utmost to prevent the squadron from gathering fresh laurels; even sacrificing his own reputation to this insane jealousy, by preventing anything being done in which I could take part.

On the 18th I shifted my flag into the San Martin, and leaving the O'Higgins and Valdivia at Pisco to protect the troops, sailed for Callao, where we arrived on the 2nd of April. On the 6th, we again attacked the enemy's shipping under the batteries, and did them considerable damage, but made no further attempt to gain possession of them, as I had other aims in view. After this demonstration, the object of which was to deter them from quitting their shelter, we returned to Pisco.

General San Martin having now given me discretionary power to do what I pleased with the few troops placed at my disposal, I determined on attacking Arica, the southernmost port of Peru. Reimbarking the troops, and abandoning Pisco, we sailed on the 21st, and on the 1st of May arrived off Arica, to the Governor of which I sent a summons to surrender, promising to respect persons and personal property. As this was not complied with, an immediate bombardment took place, but without any great effect, as, from the difficulties of the port, it was impracticable to get sufficiently near to the fortifications.

After a careful survey, the San Martin was on the 6th, hauled nearer in shore, and some shells were thrown over the town by way of intimidation. As this had not the desired effect, a portion of the troops was landed at Sama, to the northward of the town, being followed by Colonel Miller with the remainder, and Captain Wilkinson with the marines of the San Martin; when the enemy fled, and the patriot flag was hoisted on the batteries. We took here a considerable quantity of stores, and four Spanish brigs, besides the guns of the fort and other detached artillery. A quantity of European goods, belonging to the Spaniards at Lima, was also seized and put on board the San Martin.

On the 14th Colonel Miller, with the troops and marines, advanced to Tacna, and by my directions took possession of the town, which was effected without opposition, two companies of infantry deserting the royalist cause and joining his force. These I ordered to form the nucleus of a new regiment, to be called the "Tacna Independents."

Learning that the Spanish General Ramirez had ordered three detachments from Arequipa, Puno, and La Paz, to form a junction at Tacna, to execute the usual Spanish order—to "drive the insurgents into the sea"—Miller determined on attacking them separately. The Arequipa detachment, under Colonel Hera, was fallen in with at Maribe, and immediately routed, the result being that nearly the whole were killed or taken prisoners, together with four hundred mules and their baggage. In this affair we lost a valued officer, Mr. Welsh, an assistant surgeon, who had volunteered to accompany the detachment. This gentleman was sincerely mourned by all, and his early death was a great loss to the patriot service.

This action was fought none too soon, for before it was over the other detachments from Puno and La Plaz appeared in sight, so that the patriots had to face a fresh enemy. With his usual promptness Miller despatched Captain Hind, with a rocket party, to oppose their passage of a river; when, finding that the Arequipa detachment had been cut up, the royalists remounted their mules and decamped, in the direction of Moquega.

On the 22nd Miller pursued the runaway royalists, and, on the 24th, entered Moquega, by a forced march of nearly a hundred miles, where he found the enemy, deserted by their colonel. Notwithstanding the fatigue of the Chilenos, an instant attack was made, when the whole, with the exception of about twenty killed, were made prisoners. The inhabitants at once gave in their adherence to the cause of independence, their Governor, Colonel Portocarrera, being the first to set the example.

On the 25th Colonel Miller learned that a Spanish force was passing Torata, about fifteen miles distant, when, coming up with them on the following day, they were all taken prisoners or dispersed, as were also those who had fled from Arica, numbering four hundred men; so that in less than a fortnight after landing at Arica, the patriot forces had killed and made prisoners upwards of one thousand of the royalist army, by a series of difficult forced marches, and amidst hunger and privations of every kind, which were cheerfully borne by the Chilenos, who were no less inspired by a love of country than with attachment to their commander. The result was the complete submission of the Spaniards from the sea to the Cordilleras, Arica forming the key to the whole country.

Having ascertained that Colonel Miller was at Moquega, I took the San Martin to Ilo, from which anchorage the patriot force was supplied with everything requisite. The sick were taken on board the brigs captured at Arica, as were also the Spanish colonels, Sierra and Suares, who had been taken prisoners, but whom I liberated on their parole, not to serve again until regularly exchanged.

It has been said that, before sailing to Arica, I had procured from General San Martin discretionary powers to do as I pleased with the troops placed at my disposal. My object was believed to be to create a diversion in favour of the general, but this was the least part of my intention; for, as the army had remained inactive from its first landing in Peru—with the exception of the detachment under Colonel Arenales,—no diversion would have been of much use. I wrote to the Government at Santiago