Forty-Six Years in the Army by John McAllister Schofield (e ink ebook reader .txt) 📖

Smith's troops should be placed with reference to the proposed point of concentration."

And again, at 6 P. M.:

"The enemy's cavalry in force has crossed the river on the Lewisburg pike, and is now in possession of Rally Hill.

"Wilson is trying to get on to the Franklin road ahead of them. He thinks the enemy may swing around in behind him and me, and strike Spring Hill, and wants Hammond's brigade to halt there. Please give it orders if you know where it is. Also, I think it would be well to send A. J. Smith's force to that place."

In the night of November 28-9, about 2 A. M., I received the report of the cavalry commander, conveying the information given him by prisoners that the enemy had commenced to bridge the river near Huey's Mill, and urging the necessity of immediate retreat to Franklin.(13) The staff officer who handed me the despatch called my attention especially to the words urging immediate action, and I considered the subject quite a long time. But there did not seem to me to be any necessity for such haste. The enemy could not accomplish much before morning. It would then be early enough to decide what must be done. Besides, it was not yet certain that Hood was attempting to cross his infantry at Huey's Mill. The vigorous action of his cavalry might be intended only to induce me to fall back, and thus give him the use of the crossing at Columbia, and of the turnpike from that place, for the movement of his infantry, artillery, and trains.

In the morning, November 29, I sent a brigade of infantry toward Huey's Mill to reconnoiter and report the enemy's movements. At the same time Stanley was ordered to Spring Hill, with two divisions of his corps, to occupy and intrench a good position commanding the roads at that place and protecting the trains and reserve artillery which had been ordered to be parked there. Ruger's division of the Twenty-third Corps, except one regiment, was ordered to follow Stanley. The army was ready to occupy Spring Hill in full force, and in ample time to meet any possible movement of the enemy either on that place or, by the Lewisburg pike, on Franklin.

In my orders to Ruger, dated 8 A. M., directing him to move at once to Spring Hill, he was ordered to leave one regiment to guard the river until dark and then join him at Spring Hill. It was then intended, in any event, to hold Spring Hill until the morning of November 30. At the same time Ruger was directed to order his troops guarding the river below to march at once for Franklin.

DELAYING THE RETREAT FROM DUCK RIVER

But very soon after these orders were issued—that is, soon after 8 A. M.—a courier from Franklin brought me the two following despatches from General Thomas:

  "Franklin, November 28, 1864.
  "(By telegraph from Nashville, 9 P. M.)
"To Major-General Schofield:

"If you are confident you can hold your present position, I wish you to do so until I can get General Smith here. After his arrival we can withdraw gradually and invite Hood across Duck River, and fall upon him with our whole force, or wait until Wilson can organize his entire cavalry force, and then withdraw from your present position. Should Hood then cross river, we can surely ruin him. You may have fords at Centreville, Bean's [Beard's] Ferry, Gordon's Ferry, and Williamsport thoroughly obstructed by filling up all the roads leading from them with trees, and then replace your infantry by cavalry. Send an intelligent staff officer to see that the work is properly done. As soon as relieved, concentrate your infantry; the cavalry will be able to retard, if not prevent, Hood's crossing, after the roads are thoroughly obstructed, if they do their duty. The road leading from Centreville to Nashville should be thoroughly obstructed. I am not sure but it would be a good plan to invite Hood across Duck River if we can get him to move toward Clarksville. Is there no convenience for unloading beyond Thompson's Station?

"Geo. H. Thomas, Major-General, Commanding."(14)

The published records give this despatch as having been sent at "8 P. M." The Department of the Cumberland records say that it was telegraphed in cipher to Franklin at 9 P. M., and there deciphered and sent by courier to my position near Columbia. The records do not show the hour of receipt by me; but my reply to General Thomas of 8:30 A. M., November 29, and my orders to Ruger of 8 and 8:45 A. M., and to Stanley before and after 8 A. M., and my despatch to Wilson of 8:15 A. M., fix the time of the receipt by me of this despatch from General Thomas at a few minutes after 8 A. M., November 29.

The other despatch was as follows:

  "(U. S. Military Telegraph.)
  "Franklin, Tenn., November 28, 1864.
  "(By telegraph from Nashville. 9:30 P. M.)
"To Major-General Schofield:

"Your despatch of 3:30 [2:30] P. M. just received. If Wilson cannot succeed in driving back the enemy, should it prove true that he has crossed the river, you will necessarily have to make preparation to take up a new position at Franklin, behind Harpeth, [while] immediately, if it become necessary, to fall back.

"(Signed) Geo. H. Thomas, Major-General, Commanding."

The records of the Department of the Cumberland merely state that this despatch was sent in "cipher." The appendix to my report gives the hour "9:30 P. M." The appendix to General Thomas's report fixes it at "10:30 P. M." The despatch from General Thomas to General Halleck of 10 P. M., November 28, forwarding my despatch of "8:45 A. M.," indicates that at 10 P. M. Thomas had not received my report of "2:30 P. M." Hence "10:30 P. M.," as given by General Thomas, must be the correct hour of the above despatch. It was answered by me, together with the preceding telegram, at 8:30 A.M., November 29; and was probably received by me at the same time as the previous despatch,—very soon after 8 A. M.,—as indicated by my despatch to Wilson of 8:15 A. M.

I thus learned, a short time after eight o'clock on the morning of the 29th, that A. J. Smith had not yet arrived at Nashville, and that the position behind the Harpeth River at Franklin was that to which I must retire when compelled to fall back.

DELAYING THE RETREAT FROM DUCK RIVER

(Another despatch from Thomas, dated November 28, 10 A. M., appears in the records, in which he said: ". . . General Smith will certainly be here in three days. . . ." But when that despatch reached my headquarters in the field, the cipher-operator had left his post and gone to Franklin. Hence the despatch could not be read by me in time to be of any service. The records do not show when I received it.)

I was then confronted with the grave question, How long might it be possible to hold Hood back, and thus gain time for Thomas to get up his reinforcements? By holding on to the crossing of Duck River at Columbia until dark that night, and thus preventing Hood from using the turnpike for the movement of his artillery and trains until the next day, we would practically gain twenty-four hours; for he could not move them readily over his mud road from Huey's Mill. To do this, I must not only head Hood off at Spring Hill, but defeat any attempt he might make to dislodge me from the north bank of Duck River.

Early on November 29, I sent the following brief despatch in reply to both of those which had been received a few minutes before from General Thomas:

"The enemy's cavalry has crossed in force on the Lewisburg pike, and General Wilson reports the infantry crossing above Huey's Mill, about five miles from this place. I have sent an infantry reconnaissance to learn the facts. If it proves true, I will act according to your instructions received this morning. Please send orders to General Cooper,(15) via Johnsonville. It may be doubtful whether my messenger from here will reach him."

The appendix to General Thomas's report says that I sent this despatch at "8:30 A. M." The appendix to my report says "8:20 A.M." This despatch was evidently in answer to those from General Thomas of 8 P. M. and 10:30 P. M., November 28, as indicated by my orders to Stanley and Ruger, and my despatch of 8:15 A. M. to Wilson.

Soon after 10 A. M., November 29, the first report from the brigade sent toward Huey's Mill showed that the enemy's infantry was crossing the river at that place. That report is not found in the records, and I do not recollect its words. But it did not produce the impression upon my mind that Hood's movement was so rapid or energetic as to prevent me from doing what seemed of such vital importance. Therefore I decided not to yield my position unless compelled by force to do so. While considering this question I had detained one of Stanley's two divisions (Kimball's), and had suspended the orders for Ruger's division to march to Spring Hill. When the decision was reached, I put Kimball's and Wood's divisions in position between Duck River and Rutherford's Creek, and Ruger's north of that creek, to resist any attempt the enemy might make upon our position. I then sent the following to Stanley at Spring Hill:

  "Near Columbia, Tenn., November 29, 1864, 10:45 A. M.
"Major-General Stanley, Commanding Fourth Army Corps.

"General: General Wood's reconnoissance shows a considerable force, at least, on this side of the river. I have halted Kimball's division this side of the creek and put it in position. I will try to hold the enemy until dark, and then draw back. Select a good position at Spring Hill, covering the approaches, and send out parties to reconnoiter on all roads leading east and southeast. Try to communicate with Wilson on the Lewisburg pike. Tell him to cover Franklin and Spring Hill, and try not to let the enemy get between us.

  "Very respectfully,
  "J. M. Schofield, Major-General."

NO SERIOUS DANGER AT SPRING HILL

The situation early in the morning had been a very simple one, free from any embarrassment or unusual danger. If the plan then decided on and ordered had been carried out, three divisions of infantry and nearly all the artillery of the army would have been in position at Spring Hill and well intrenched long before the head of Hood's infantry column, without any artillery, came in sight of that place late in the afternoon. That position would have been secured beyond doubt until the next morning. The other two divisions (Cox's and Wood's) would have withdrawn from Duck River and marched to Spring Hill early in the afternoon, before the enemy could seriously interfere with them. Ruger's one regiment, without impedimenta, was directed to march along the railway track to Spring Hill, and thus avoid any interference from the enemy. The army would have marched to Franklin early in the night of the 29th, instead of after midnight as it actually did. That would have given the enemy the afternoon and night in which to lay his pontoons and cross his artillery and trains at Columbia. But that would not have been a serious matter, in view of the situation as it was understood by me up to about 8 A. M. of the 29th; for the information I had received up to that hour justified the belief that both A. J. Smith's troops and those concentrated at Murfreesboro' would meet me