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from his own experience, as well as I, whether the pursuing force was larger or smaller, Hood was about the easiest man in the world to "catch," even by a "single" army. But Sherman had under his command at that time, in Georgia and Tennessee, as he said with great emphasis and confidence, two armies, each larger than Hood's, even assuming the largest estimate then made of the strength of Hood's army. It appears that Sherman gave Hood credit at that time for only thirty thousand infantry, besides cavalry.( 4) If that was his estimate, then he had at least three or four armies (including the reinforcements he counted on for Thomas in Tennessee), each equal in strength to Hood's. Is it possible Sherman thought he could not catch Hood with three or four armies? But another despatch from Sherman, dated November 2, seems to show that his estimate of Hood's army was more than 50,000, instead of 30,000; for in that despatch he said in substance that unless he drew Slocum's corps back from Atlanta, and abandoned that place, his army would be inferior to Hood's.( 5) Now Slocum's corps numbered 10,000 men, and Sherman marched to the sea with 60,000 after stripping down to the best possible fighting condition. Hence Sherman, after sending back the Fourth and Twenty-third corps to Thomas, and leaving out Slocum's corps, had 50,000 men, and therefore according to this reckoning Hood had more than 50,000. Forty thousand would have been a reasonable estimate for Sherman to have made of Hood's strength, with his more accurate knowledge than any of his subordinate commanders could have. But, somehow, the estimate of Hood's force at that time accepted by Thomas and his subordinates in Tennessee was 45,000, besides cavalry, which as understood to be 10,000, or even 12,000 including Forrest's separate command. But even this was less than half of Sherman's two armies.

Sherman made no attempt to "catch" Hood during his raid in Sherman's rear in September, 1864, nor to interfere with his movement to the west. In his "Memoirs,"( 6) Sherman says: "At first I thought of interposing my whole army in the Chattooga Valley, so as to prevent Hood's escape south. . . . He would be likely to retreat eastward by Spring Place, which I did not want him to do." Even thus early in the game Sherman saw the opportunity Hood was probably going to give him to make his projected change of base to Savannah, and hence he took care not to prevent Hood from completing his "co- operative" movement.

Sherman determined to destroy Atlanta and his railroad back to Chattanooga, abandon entirely his former base of operations and line of supply, and assume a new base of future operations on the Atlantic or the gulf. In other words, Sherman decided that he could not attempt to hold any part of the territory he had conquered in the Atlanta campaign; that conquest was valuable only in the opportunity it gave him to destroy everything of military importance in that territory—that is, Atlanta and the railroads. The question then arises, What possible difference could it make in which direction he moved after having decided not to hold any part of that territory, but to destroy it? Why would a move toward the west any more than a move toward the east have the appearance of losing all that had been gained, after he had destroyed it? The simple fact is, the Confederate commander had abandoned Georgia to its fate in the vain hope of putting Sherman on the defensive, not realizing, apparently, that Sherman had ample force for defensive purposes, besides an army superior to Hood's for aggressive operations. The Southern army was thus placed where Sherman could operate against it by a much shorter line, and hence with a much larger force, if that was what he wished to do. He could at the same time, if he thought it necessary or desirable, inflict upon Georgia the destruction which the Confederate commander wanted to prevent, but had in fact invited by abandoning that State, and that without materially impairing the strength of his (Sherman's) main army operating against the main force of the enemy. As suggested by Grant, a cavalry raid through Georgia would have accomplished that destruction as well as a march of 60,000 men. Hence, in the light of all that appears in the records up to the time when Sherman actually started on his march, no valid military reason had been given why Sherman should not have sent a cavalry raid into Georgia, as Grant suggested, to destroy everything there, and thus negative Mr. Davis's promise of protection, while he (Sherman) pursued relentlessly the strictly military plan Grant had prescribed for him to break up Hood's army or capture it, which Sherman had yet failed to accomplish.

Manifestly some other motive besides the motives stated in Sherman's telegraphic despatches must have decided him to carry out his plan to make the march to the sea.

The boastful assurance and threat of the Confederate commander-in- chief,( 7) referred to by Sherman, gave at least some reason for Sherman's defiant response by himself marching through Georgia instead of sending a subordinate; and the partial execution of that threat by Forrest's cavalry, referred to in Sherman's despatch of November 1 to Grant, gave a strong reason for Sherman's eager determination to march at once, without waiting for anything but his own preparations. In his article, "The Grand Strategy of the Last Year of the War,"( 8) Sherman reveals one of the reasons for his haste in starting on his march. "How free and glorious I felt," he says, "when the magic telegraph was cut, which prevented the possibility of orders of any kind from the rear coming to delay or hinder us!" A letter written by Sherman to Grant, November 6, on the eve of his start for the sea, also gave reasons, other than military, for his famous march. In Sherman's "Memoirs" no quotation is made from this letter,( 9) and it is referred to very briefly without giving any suggestion of its important contents.

General Sherman thus stated his reasons for writing that letter:
"I have heretofore telegraphed and written you pretty fully, but
I still have some thoughts in my busy brain that should be confided
to you as a key to future developments."

DID IT INVOLVE WAR OR STATESMANSHIP?

Then Sherman explained, with the art of which he was master, clearly, logically, and convincingly, the reasons for the operations of his army from the fall of Atlanta down to the time of his writing, by which he had completely defeated his adversary's designs, closing with the following language:

"Now, as to the second branch of my proposition, I admit that the first object should be the destruction of that army; and if Beauregard moves his infantry and artillery up into that pocket about Jackson and Paris, I will feel strongly tempted to move Thomas directly against him, and myself move rapidly by Decatur and Purdy to cut off his retreat. . . . These are the reasons which have determined my former movements."

General Sherman then continues by explaining the reasons which induced him not to carry out the movement above suggested.

Now come the reasons for the future movements upon which Sherman had then fully decided, after having obtained General Grant's consent, and which he was about to begin. After stating what he had done "in the last ten days" to prepare for his march, he said:

"Then the question presents itself what shall be done? On the supposition always that Thomas can hold the line of the Tennessee, and very shortly be able to assume the offensive as against Beauregard, I propose to act in such a manner against the material resources of the South as utterly to negative Davis's boasted threat and promises of protection. If we can march a well-appointed army right through his territory, it is a demonstration to the world, foreign and domestic, that we have a power which Davis cannot resist. This may not be war, but rather statesmanship; nevertheless it is overwhelming to my mind that there are thousands of people abroad and in the South who will reason thus: If the North can march an army right through the South, it is proof positive that the North can prevail in this contest, leaving only open the question of its willingness to use that power."

It was, perhaps, not war, but rather statesmanship upon which Sherman was about to enter—not to defeat and destroy or capture the Confederate armies, but to demonstrate in the most positive manner that the "North can prevail in this contest," provided only it is willing to use its power. And by what means was this demonstration to be made? By marching a large army through the South where there was and could be no Confederate army able to oppose it, destroying everything of military value, including food, and continuing this operation until the government and people of the Southern States, and people abroad, should find the demonstration convincing. Again I quote:

"Now, Mr. Lincoln's election, which is assured, coupled with the conclusion thus reached, makes a complete, logical whole. Even without a battle, the result, operating upon the minds of sensible men, would produce fruits more than compensating for the expense, trouble, and risk."

The election of Mr. Lincoln meant, of course, continued ascendancy of the "war party" at the North, and that, coupled with the conclusion above reached, made, as Sherman so forcibly stated it, "a complete, logical whole."

General Sherman then went on to give in his masterly way the advantages and disadvantages of the several objectives open to him as the goal of his march, reserving to himself finally the choice between three,—Savannah, Mobile, and Pensacola,—trusting to Richmond papers to keep Grant well advised of his movements and of his final choice of the objective; and then, near the close of this letter, in discussing the military aspects of his proposed march, upon which he was about entering, he reverted to the old theory of the line of the Tennessee—"on the supposition always that Thomas can hold the line of the Tennessee, and very shortly be able to assume the offensive as against Beauregard."

DID IT INVOLVE WAR OR STATESMANSHIP?

It is impossible not to admire the thoroughness with which Sherman had considered all possible or even imaginary difficulties in his way, nor to suppress a smile at the supreme confidence with which he set out, with sixty thousand of the best soldiers in the world, upon a march through a fine healthy country laden with abundance of supplies for men and animals, at a time when only two armies in the South were strong enough to offer him any serious opposition, both of them farther from his line of march than he was from his goal when he started, one besieged by Grant in Petersburg, and the other already commencing an aggressive campaign against Thomas in Tennessee! It is equally impossible to speak seriously of the apprehension of some geographers and logisticians that Hood would interfere in some way with Sherman's march through Georgia. Hood could not have got within two hundred miles of Sherman before the latter had destroyed as much of Georgia as he wished, and then captured Savannah. Of course Sherman was not disturbed by any apprehension that Hood might possibly oppose the march to Savannah. He could have meant by what he said in his despatches on the subject only that Hood would be compelled by "public clamor" to return to Georgia to defend that State against Sherman's further operations. Hence his strong insistence that Thomas pursue Hood with energy, and thus keep him out of his (Sherman's) way.

It had never occurred to me, if the fact ever existed, that the rebellion could not be suppressed by crushing or capturing the Confederate armies, or that our vastly superior military strength must necessarily be employed in crushing the Southern people, however much they might deserve crushing, or else that we must give up the contest. Yet while I never saw the necessity for what Sherman called "statesmanship" rather than "war," I would never have hesitated for a moment to say, what I now repeat, if it really was

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