Forty-Six Years in the Army by John McAllister Schofield (e ink ebook reader .txt) 📖

coveted by the ranchmen of that region. Hence the Modocs were induced in some way to leave their homes and go upon the Klamath reservation. There they were starved and generally abused until they could stand it no longer. They went back to their old place, and declared they would die rather than go to live with the Klamaths again. Repeated requests were made by the Indian Bureau to the War Department to force the Modocs to go back to the Klamaths; but this was firmly opposed by General Canby, commanding the department; by me, who then commanded the Division of the Pacific; and by General Sherman, commanding the army. No such order could be obtained in the regular way. Resort was had to an innocent old army regulation which directed department commanders to render such military assistance as might be necessary to enable the Indian superintendents to carry out their orders from Washington. Without the knowledge of the President, or the Secretary of War, or the general of the army, an order was sent from the Indian Bureau in Washington to send the Modocs back to the Klamath reservation, and to call on the department commander for troops to enforce the order. General Canby, honorable and simple-hearted man that he was, never imagined that such an order could come from Washington, after all that had been said about it, unless with the sanction of the highest authority and the knowledge of the War Department. He did not even think it necessary to report to the division commander the requisition which had been made upon him for troops, but loyally obeyed the old regulation. The first information that came to me was that the troops had been beaten with heavy loss, and that many of the surrounding settlers had been killed by the Indians. A long and bloody war ensued, with some results which were deplorable in the extreme. General Canby's confiding nature had led him into a terrible mistake. He had executed an unwise regulation which placed military power in unworthy hands, without waiting to inquire whether that power was not, in fact, about to be unlawfully abused, and thus had become a party to the sacrifice of many innocent lives. The brave and noble- hearted Canby strove in every possible way to make peace with the Modocs without further shedding of innocent blood. But the savage red man, who had never been guilty of breaking faith with a civilized white man, would no longer trust any one of the "treacherous race." He paid them back "in their own coin," according to his traditional method. Though warned of the danger, Canby went calmly into the trap they had laid for him, in the hope that his confidence might inspire their respect; but he was the very man whose troops had been ordered to drive them out from their happy homes, and they treacherously killed him. And I doubt not, if more blood must be shed, he preferred to be the first to die. This is the true history of the "Canby massacre." THE CANBY MASSACRE

After a long contest, costing many lives, the Modocs were subdued and made prisoners. Those Indians who had been engaged in the massacre were tried and justly executed according to the laws of civilized war, while those white men who, in no less flagrant disregard of the laws of civilization, brought on the war were not called to any account for their crime. But President Grant, when I called his attention to the abuse of that old regulation, promptly abolished it. Since that time, as I understand it, no man but the head of the nation can order the army to kill unless necessary in defense, nor determine for what purposes the army may be employed. The people of the United States are advancing, though slowly, in civilization. Their fundamental law has very wisely always provided that Congress alone should have power to "declare war"; but for many years any Indian agent, or any bloodthirsty white man on the frontier, who chose to kill an Indian in cold blood, could inaugurate a war without waiting to declare it, and that without the slightest danger of punishment. A little military justice, in the absence of any possible civil government, in what was so long called the "Indian country" would have saved many hundreds of millions of dollars and many thousands of lives. But the inherited prejudice against "military despotism" has hardly yet been eradicated from the minds of the millions of freemen who inhabit this country—as if seventy or fifty, or even thirty, millions of people could not defend their liberties against a little standing army! A white murderer was long regarded as so much better than an honest Indian that the murderer must go free because there was no judge or jury to try him, while the Indian must be shot by the soldiers, without trial, for trying to protect himself from murder. If the innocent could be separated from the guilty, "plague, pestilence, and famine" would not be an unjust punishment for the crimes committed in this country against the original occupants of the soil. And it should be remembered that when retribution comes, though we may not understand why, the innocent often share the fate of the guilty. The law under which nations suffer for their crimes does not seem to differ much from the law of retribution which governs the savage Indian.

No possible plea of the demands of civilization, or of the interests of a superior race, can be held to justify such a policy as that long pursued by the people of this country. The natural law of the "survival of the fittest" may doubtless be pleaded in explanation of all that has happened; but that is not a law of Christianity, nor of civilization, nor of wisdom. It is the law of greed and cruelty, which generally works in the end the destruction of its devotees. In their greedy and blind pursuit of their own prey, they lose sight of the shark that is waiting to devour them. It is still the "fittest" that survives. It were wiser to remember that the shark is always well armed, and if you would survive him you must be fitter than he. If the benign law of civilization could be relied upon always to govern, then all would be well. But as long as sharks still live, the cruel law of nature cannot be ignored. The highest principles and the highest wisdom, combined, would seem to suggest the higher law as the rule of action toward the weaker, and the natural law as the rule for defense against the stronger. This country has, happily, already made some progress in both directions. If that is continued a few more years, then all, strong as well as weak, will be glad to "arbitrate" if we ask them to.

CHAPTER XXIV Superintendent at West Point—General Sherman's Ulterior Reasons for the Appointment—Origin of the "Department of West Point"—Case of the Colored Cadet Whittaker—A Proposed Removal for Political Effect—General Terry's Friendly Attitude—A Muddle of New Commands —Waiting Orders, and a Visit to Europe—Again in Command in the West—The Establishment of Fort Sheridan at Chicago.

In the centennial year, 1876, I committed the mistake of my life by consenting, in deference to the opinions and wishes of my superiors and in opposition to my own judgment and interests, to give up the command of a military division appropriate to my rank of major-general, and accept a position which by law and custom was appropriate to the rank of colonel. The following extracts from correspondence will sufficiently explain the reasons for this extraordinary action, and the assurances which induced it:

  "(Telegram.)
  "Washington, D. C., March 28, 1876.
"General John M. Schofield, San Francisco, California:

"Will you accept the superintendency of the military academy at West Point? I advise it. Your rank and history will elevate it and solve all trouble. Admiral Porter's example at Annapolis is suggested as precedent. The President, Secretary Taft, and I are unanimous on the wisdom and propriety of it. Advise me of your decision as early as you can—certainly this week. You will be subject to no supervision except by the usual board of visitors and the general commanding the army.

"W. T. Sherman, General."

  "(Telegram.)
  "San Francisco, Cal., March 29, 1876.
"General Sherman, Washington, D. C.:

"I appreciate the importance of the superintendency of the academy, and the compliment paid me by the President, Secretary of War, and yourself in desiring me to accept it. Under the circumstances I cannot decline. . . .

"J. M. Schofield, Major-General."

  "(Telegram.)
  "Headquarters of the Army,
  "Washington, D. C., March 30, 1876.
"General J. M. Schofield, San Francisco, California.

"Despatch received, and am much pleased; think you could add new luster to the old academy. It has always needed a head with rank and experience, and now I am sure that the whole country will be satisfied. . . . I am not yet resolved on my own course of action, but will be governed by events to occur in this week.

"W. T. Sherman, General."

SUPERINTENDENT AT WEST POINT

  "Headquarters Mil. Div. of the Pacific,
  "San Francisco, Cal., March 30, 1876.
"General Sherman, etc., Washington, D. C.

"My dear General: I was not taken entirely by surprise by your despatch relative to the West Point superintendency. General Grant mentioned the subject to me soon after the war, and army officers since that time have spoken of it often enough to keep me in mind of the fact that I might some time be called upon to assume that responsibility. Yet it is with a strong feeling of reluctance that I have brought myself to regard it as a thing to be done. This feeling results from several causes, which I desire to explain to you, while I know you will give me credit for a desire to do what appears best for the public service, and satisfactory to all concerned, without too much concern for my own personal preference.

"In the first place, I have no little doubt of the possession of any special fitness for that position, and have pretty strong appreciation of its difficulties and importance. I do not feel at all confident that the flattering expectations of my friends will be realized from my management of the academy.

"I have been there enough to know pretty well how difficult a post that of superintendent is, and how varied the good qualities a man ought to possess to fit him in all respects for it.

"Rank and reputation will of course be of some assistance, but their good effect will be greatly impaired without the dignity of command belonging to them. To transfer an officer of rank from a high command and post of great responsibility and trust to one heretofore regarded as appropriate to an inferior grade, may be regarded as elevating the dignity of the new command, but looks much more like degrading the officer, and to that extent impairs the good effect desired to be produced. Besides, it is impossible for any officer not to feel that in taking such inferior command, although it is even for the avowed purpose of raising its dignity, that he is stooping to do so. Especially must both these effects be produced when the assignment is only an executive act. If it was done in pursuance of law, the case would be materially different. . . .

"We were all delighted at the news of your return to Washington and the prospect of your restoration to the proper duties and authority of general of the army; and I sincerely hope the events to occur this week, alluded to in your telegram to-day, may be such as to justify you in taking the course universally desired by the army. We want our general where he can best look after all the interests of the military service, with power to