Forty-Six Years in the Army by John McAllister Schofield (e ink ebook reader .txt) 📖

ceased to exist from disuse. They could plan and direct a campaign with absolute accuracy, according to the teachings of the great masters, for the well-defined purpose upon which those teachings had been based. But when a wholly new problem was presented to them, they had no conception of the right mode of solving it. The plan of one great campaign was based absolutely upon the best-approved method of capturing a certain place, without any reference to what damage might or might not be done to the opposing army in that operation. The plan of another great campaign had for its sole object the conquest and permanent occupation of a great territory, and was so conducted as to avoid the possibility of seriously hurting the enemy in that operation. Yet the theory upon which this last plan was based, as well as the first, governed the policy of the government more than two years. GENERAL GRANT WITHOUT MILITARY BOOKS

It was not until Grant took command of "all the armies" that the true strategic principle governed the general military policy. In this connection, the story told by Grant himself about his military studies is very instructive. When asked by the representative of some friends who wished to present him a library for his new house in Washington, what military books he then had, so that they might not duplicate them, he replied that he did not have any military books, and never had any, except the West-Point text-books. No doubt Grant might have profited from some additional study, but none at all was far better than so much as to have dwarfed his mind into that of an imitator of former commanders.

The development of great military ability in Grant, as the result of his own experience and independent thought,—that is, the independent development of his own native military genius,—is by far the most interesting part of his history.

In short, the great lesson taught by our own experience is that elementary military training should be universal, because every young man may be called upon the perform the duties of a soldier; that general military reading, and habits of independent thought upon all great military subjects, should be cultivated by all who aspire to any high place in life, because they may be called upon to discharge the highest possible duties of good citizens in peace or in war, namely, those connected with the national defense; that due preparation for defense ought to be made without delay, and the requisite means kept always ready; and, above all, that the best method of making the quickest possible effective use of those means ought to be fully matured and understood by all who may be called upon to execute the orders of the government.

It now seems to me amazing that the affairs of an enlightened nation could have been so badly managed as to leave the secession issue in doubt almost to the last moment of a four years' contest, as it is now well known it was. Probably the one saving fact in all those years was that the young soldiers of the republic—and they were nearly all young then—knew little and cared less about the wrangling of self-seeking politicians and visionary doctrinaires in the rear, but fought steadily on to the end, never doubting for a moment the final triumph. I have never been able to recall a single instance of doubt manifested by any soldier in the field, though I did know a very few cases of officers of considerable rank, who thought they ought to have had more rank, who went to the rear and said something about failure in the field.

I believe now that it required only some real emergency, such, for instance, as the capture of Washington in July, 1863, to call forth the power of the North and crush the rebellion in six months. If any man thinks a great disaster would have disheartened the North, he knows nothing of the people of our country. It was the slow waste of enormous resources and of latent military strength that at length made many even of the stoutest hearts begin to feel despondent. I do not believe there was any time when the people would not have responded with unanimity and enthusiasm to an appeal to put forth all their strength and end the rebellion at a single blow.

The one lesson of reason and experience that I would impress upon my countrymen in every possible way is, when war or insurrection comes or is threatened, do not trifle with it. Do not invoke judicial proceedings, or call for 75,000 men; but call for men, and let them come as many as will! If some of them do not get there in time, before it is all over, it will not cost much to send them home again! The services of the Pennsylvania reserve, though ready for the field, were actually, positively refused until after the disaster of Bull Run! The greatest wonder in the history of this wonderful republic is that the government actually survived such a military policy as that!

In this connection, it ought to be distinctly understood that the great object of education at West Point and other military schools in not to make high commanders, but to make thorough soldiers, men capable of creating effective armies in the shortest possible time, and of commanding comparatively small bodies of men. If great commanders are ever again required in this country, they will come to the front in due time. They cannot be selected in advance of the actual trial in war. Even West Point, though one of the best schools in the world, can at the most only lay the foundation of a military education. Each individual must build for himself upon that foundation the superstructure which is to mark his place in the world. If he does not build, his monument will hardly appear above the surface of the ground, and will soon be covered out of sight.

It is of vital importance that the necessity of providing for calling into active service a very large army in the shortest possible time be fully understood. It is assumed that every important seaport will in time be so fortified as to be safe against any unsupported naval attack. Modern science has rendered this easy and certain. Hence a naval attack must necessarily be supported by the landing of a military force upon the open coast, to attack the land defenses in reverse; and such defenses are now far more vulnerable to attack in rear than those of former times.

MEASURES NECESSARY TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE

The sea-coasts of the United States are many thousand miles in extent, and an attack may be made at any one or several of the many important seaports in these long lines of coast. No one can anticipate where the blow or blows may fall. Hence it is necessary to be prepared to resist an attempt to land at any one of those many points which are of such importance as to tempt an enemy to attack them. The railroad facilities of the country are such that the necessary armies can be moved to all exposed points in time to meet any emergency. But the armies must be ready to move almost at a moment's notice. There will be no time to organize, much less to drill, new troops. Before that could be done, any one or two or three of our largest seaport cities could be captured and destroyed, and the invading forces get back again on their transports, and under the protection of the guns of their own fleet. And even if we had a navy more powerful than that of our enemy, it alone could give us no adequate protection; for the enemy would be sure to select a point of attack where our navy was not at the time, and which it could not reach until too late. Indispensable as a navy is to this country, it cannot act any very important part in the defense of so extended a sea-coast unless it is many times more powerful than any fleet which an enemy may send to attack us. The enemy being free to choose his point of attack, we would required at or near every one of the exposed points a fleet at least as large as his, or in the aggregate at least five times as large. No one, it is presumed, contemplates the creation of any such navy as that in this country.

Indeed, it would be the height of folly to require the navy to take part in the defense. In a country having the situation of the United States, the navy is the aggressive arm of the national military power. Its function is to punish an enemy until he is willing to submit to the national demands. For this purpose entire freedom of action is essential; also secure depots where supplies may be drawn and where necessary repairs may be made, and harbors where cruisers or other vessels may seek safety if temporarily overpowered. Hence arises one of the most important functions of the land defense: To give the aggressive arm secure bases of operation at all the great seaports where navy-yards or depots are located. It may be that in special cases military forces may be needed to act in support of naval operations, or to hold for a time important points in a foreign country; but such service must be only auxiliary, not a primary object. Foreign conquest and permanent occupation are not a part of the policy of this country. There is no division of opinion among standard naval and military authorities on this great subject; such standard authors as Rear-Admiral Walker and Captain Mahan have clearly set forth the relative functions of the army and navy in enforcing the military policy of the United States. The military problem which this country must solve is to provide such means of aggressive and defensive action as to be able to enforce a due observance of American public law on this continent, and, while doing this, to defend itself against insult and spoilation. The land defenses, including torpedoes and in a few cases floating batteries, should be entirely independent of the active navy, so that the latter may be free to act in one compact mass against any enemy which may anywhere oppose it.

There will be another important necessity for very large forces of infantry and light artillery,—that is, large in the aggregate,— in the event of war with even a second- or third-class naval power: To protect our long lines of open coast and small unfortified harbors from destruction from the guns and landing-parties of the enemy's light-draft cruisers. This would require a "picket-line" with considerable "reserves," several thousand miles in length. The national pride, if not the material interests involved, would not permit the government to submit to such destruction or spoilation without making every possible effort to prevent it. In short, unless the government and the people of the United States are willing to prepare in advance for putting into the field at a moment's notice a very large and effective army, as well as to fortify all important seaports, they may as well make up their minds to submit, at least for a time, to whatever indignity any considerable naval power may see fit to inflict upon them. No half- way measures will do any good. Fortifications without an army would be worth no more, against any country having a considerable army and navy, than an army without fortifications.

CHAPTER XXX The Financial Lesson of the Civil War—Approaching Bankruptcy of the Government near the Close of the War—The Legal-Tender Notes an Injury to the Public Credit—A Vicious Clause in the Constitution —No Prejudice in the Army Against Officers Not Educated at West Point—The Need of a Law Reforming the Relations Between the President and the Commander of the Army—Devotion to the Chosen Leader in Times of Public Peril.

Another great lesson taught by our Civil War, perhaps even more important than any other, is the financial lesson. An established government which has a place to maintain among the commercial nations of