Essays On Education And Kindred Subjects (Fiscle Part- 11) by Herbert Spencer (best mobile ebook reader TXT) 📖
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- Author: Herbert Spencer
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Conception Of A _Serial_ Arrangement Of The Sciences Is A Vicious One.
It Is Not Simply That The Schemes We Have Examined Are Untenable; But It
Is That The Sciences Cannot Be Rightly Placed In Any Linear Order
Whatever. It Is Not Simply That, As M. Comte Admits, A Classification
"Will Always Involve Something, If Not Arbitrary, At Least Artificial;"
It Is Not, As He Would Have Us Believe, That, Neglecting Minor
Imperfections A Classification May Be Substantially True; But It Is That
Any Grouping Of The Sciences In A Succession Gives A Radically Erroneous
Idea Of Their Genesis And Their Dependencies. There Is No "One
_Rational_ Order Among A Host Of Possible Systems." There Is No "True
_Filiation_ Of The Sciences." The Whole Hypothesis Is Fundamentally
False. Indeed, It Needs But A Glance At Its Origin To See At Once How
Baseless It Is. Why A _Series_? What Reason Have We To Suppose That The
Sciences Admit Of A _Linear_ Arrangement? Where Is Our Warrant For
Assuming That There Is Some _Succession_ In Which They Can Be Placed?
There Is No Reason; No Warrant. Whence Then Has Arisen The Supposition?
To Use M. Comte's Own Phraseology, We Should Say, It Is A Metaphysical
Conception. It Adds Another To The Cases Constantly Occurring, Of The
Human Mind Being Made The Measure Of Nature. We Are Obliged To Think In
Sequence; It Is The Law Of Our Minds That We Must Consider Subjects
Separately, One After Another: _Therefore_ Nature Must Be
Serial--_Therefore_ The Sciences Must Be Classifiable In A Succession.
See Here The Birth Of The Notion, And The Sole Evidence Of Its Truth.
Men Have Been Obliged When Arranging In Books Their Schemes Of Education
And Systems Of Knowledge, To Choose _Some_ Order Or Other. And From
Inquiring What Is The Best Order, Have Naturally Fallen Into The Belief
That There Is An Order Which Truly Represents The Facts--Have Persevered
In Seeking Such An Order; Quite Overlooking The Previous Question
Whether It Is Likely That Nature Has Consulted The Convenience Of
Book-Making.
For German Philosophers, Who Hold That Nature Is "Petrified
Intelligence," And That Logical Forms Are The Foundations Of All Things,
It Is A Consistent Hypothesis That As Thought Is Serial, Nature Is
Serial; But That M. Comte, Who Is So Bitter An Opponent Of All
Anthropomorphism, Even In Its Most Evanescent Shapes, Should Have
Committed The Mistake Of Imposing Upon The External World An Arrangement
Which So Obviously Springs From A Limitation Of The Human Consciousness,
Is Somewhat Strange. And It Is The More Strange When We Call To Mind
How, At The Outset, M. Comte Remarks That In The Beginning "_Toutes Les
Sciences Sont Cultivées Simultanément Par Les Mêmes Esprits_;" That
This Is "_Inevitable Et Même Indispensable_;" And How He Further Remarks
That The Different Sciences Are "_Comme Les Diverses Branches D'un Tronc
Unique_." Were It Not Accounted For By The Distorting Influence Of A
Cherished Hypothesis, It Would Be Scarcely Possible To Understand How,
After Recognising Truths Like These, M. Comte Should Have Persisted In
Attempting To Construct "_Une Échelle Encyclopédique_."
The Metaphor Which M. Comte Has Here So Inconsistently Used To Express
The Relations Of The Sciences--Branches Of One Trunk--Is An
Approximation To The Truth, Though Not The Truth Itself. It Suggests The
Facts That The Sciences Had A Common Origin; That They Have Been
Developing Simultaneously; And That They Have Been From Time To Time
Dividing And Subdividing. But It Does Not Suggest The Yet More Important
Fact, That The Divisions And Subdivisions Thus Arising Do Not Remain
Separate, But Now And Again Reunite In Direct And Indirect Ways. They
Inosculate; They Severally Send Off And Receive Connecting Growths; And
The Intercommunion Has Been Ever Becoming More Frequent, More Intricate,
More Widely Ramified. There Has All Along Been Higher Specialisation,
That There Might Be A Larger Generalisation; And A Deeper Analysis, That
There Might Be A Better Synthesis. Each Larger Generalisation Has Lifted
Part 2 Chapter 3 (On The Genesis Of Science) Pg 106Sundry Specialisations Still Higher; And Each Better Synthesis Has
Prepared The Way For Still Deeper Analysis.
And Here We May Fitly Enter Upon The Task Awhile Since Indicated--A
Sketch Of The Genesis Of Science, Regarded As A Gradual Outgrowth From
Common Knowledge--An Extension Of The Perceptions By The Aid Of The
Reason. We Propose To Treat It As A Psychological Process Historically
Displayed; Tracing At The Same Time The Advance From Qualitative To
Quantitative Prevision; The Progress From Concrete Facts To Abstract
Facts, And The Application Of Such Abstract Facts To The Analysis Of New
Orders Of Concrete Facts; The Simultaneous Advance In Generalisation And
Specialisation; The Continually Increasing Subdivision And Reunion Of
The Sciences; And Their Constantly Improving _Consensus_.
To Trace Out Scientific Evolution From Its Deepest Roots Would, Of
Course, Involve A Complete Analysis Of The Mind. For As Science Is A
Development Of That Common Knowledge Acquired By The Unaided Senses And
Uncultured Reason, So Is That Common Knowledge Itself Gradually Built Up
Out Of The Simplest Perceptions. We Must, Therefore, Begin Somewhere
Abruptly; And The Most Appropriate Stage To Take For Our Point Of
Departure Will Be The Adult Mind Of The Savage.
Commencing Thus, Without A Proper Preliminary Analysis, We Are Naturally
Somewhat At A Loss How To Present, In A Satisfactory Manner, Those
Fundamental Processes Of Thought Out Of Which Science Ultimately
Originates. Perhaps Our Argument May Be Best Initiated By The
Proposition, That All Intelligent Action Whatever Depends Upon The
Discerning Of Distinctions Among Surrounding Things. The Condition Under
Which Only It Is Possible For Any Creature To Obtain Food And Avoid
Danger Is, That It Shall Be Differently Affected By Different
Objects--That It Shall Be Led To Act In One Way By One Object, And In
Another Way By Another. In The Lower Orders Of Creatures This Condition
Is Fulfilled By Means Of An Apparatus Which Acts Automatically. In The
Higher Orders The Actions Are Partly Automatic, Partly Conscious. And In
Man They Are Almost Wholly Conscious.
Throughout, However, There Must Necessarily Exist A Certain
Classification Of Things According To Their Properties--A Classification
Which Is Either Organically Registered In The System, As In The Inferior
Creation, Or Is Formed By Experience, As In Ourselves. And It May Be
Further Remarked, That The Extent To Which This Classification Is
Carried, Roughly Indicates The Height Of Intelligence--That While The
Lowest Organisms Are Able To Do Little More Than Discriminate Organic
From Inorganic Matter; While The Generality Of Animals Carry Their
Classifications No Further Than To A Limited Number Of Plants Or
Creatures Serving For Food, A Limited Number Of Beasts Of Prey, And A
Limited Number Of Places And Materials; The Most Degraded Of The Human
Race Possess A Knowledge Of The Distinctive Natures Of A Great Variety
Of Substances, Plants, Animals, Tools, Persons, Etc., Not Only As
Classes But As Individuals.
What Now Is The Mental Process By Which Classification Is Effected?
Manifestly It Is A Recognition Of The _Likeness_ Or _Unlikeness_ Of
Things, Either In Respect Of Their Sizes, Colours, Forms, Weights,
Textures, Tastes, Etc., Or In Respect Of Their Modes Of Action. By Some
Special Mark, Sound, Or Motion, The Savage Identifies A Certain
Four-Legged Creature He Sees, As One That Is Good For Food, And To Be
Caught In A Particular Way; Or As One That Is Dangerous; And Acts
Accordingly. He Has Classed Together All The Creatures That Are _Alike_
In This Particular. And Manifestly In Choosing The Wood Out Of Which To
Form His Bow, The Plant With Which To Poison His Arrows, The Bone From
Which To Make His Fish-Hooks, He Identifies Them Through Their Chief
Sensible Properties As Belonging To The General Classes, Wood, Plant,
And Bone, But Distinguishes Them As Belonging To Sub-Classes By Virtue
Of Certain Properties In Which They Are _Unlike_ The Rest Of The General
Classes They Belong To; And So Forms Genera And Species.
And Here It Becomes Manifest That Not Only Is Classification Carried On
By Grouping Together In The Mind Things That Are _Like_; But That
Classes And Sub-Classes Are Formed And Arranged According To The
_Degrees Of Unlikeness_. Things Widely Contrasted Are Alone
Distinguished In The Lower Stages Of Mental Evolution; As May Be Any Day
Observed In An Infant. And Gradually As The Powers Of Discrimination
Increase, The Widely Contrasted Classes At First Distinguished, Come To
Be Each Divided Into Sub-Classes, Differing From Each Other Less Than
The Classes Differ; And These Sub-Classes Are Again Divided After The
Same Manner. By The Continuance Of Which Process, Things Are Gradually
Arranged Into Groups, The Members Of Which Are Less And Less _Unlike_;
Ending, Finally, In Groups Whose Members Differ Only As Individuals, And
Not Specifically. And Thus There Tends Ultimately To Arise The Notion Of
_Complete Likeness_. For, Manifestly, It Is Impossible That Groups
Should Continue To Be Subdivided In Virtue Of Smaller And Smaller
Differences, Without There Being A Simultaneous Approximation To The
Notion Of _No Difference_.
Let Us Next Notice That The Recognition Of Likeness And Unlikeness,
Which Underlies Classification, And Out Of Which Continued
Classification Evolves The Idea Of Complete Likeness--Let Us Next Notice
That It Also Underlies The Process Of _Naming_, And By Consequence
_Language_. For All Language Consists, At The Beginning, Of Symbols
Which Are As _Like_ To The Things Symbolised As It Is Practicable To
Make Them. The Language Of Signs Is A Means Of Conveying Ideas By
Mimicking The Actions Or Peculiarities Of The Things Referred To. Verbal
Language Is Also, At The Beginning, A Mode Of Suggesting Objects Or Acts
By Imitating The Sounds Which The Objects Make, Or With Which The Acts
Are Accompanied. Originally These Two Languages Were Used
Simultaneously. It Needs But To Watch The Gesticulations With Which The
Savage Accompanies His Speech--To See A Bushman Or A Kaffir Dramatising
Before An Audience His Mode Of Catching Game--Or To Note The Extreme
Paucity Of Words In All Primitive Vocabularies; To Infer That At First,
Attitudes, Gestures, And Sounds, Were All Combined To Produce As Good A
_Likeness_ As Possible, Of The Things, Animals, Persons, Or Events
Described; And That As The Sounds Came To Be Understood By Themselves
The Gestures Fell Into Disuse: Leaving Traces, However, In The Manners
Of The More Excitable Civilised Races. But Be This As It May, It
Suffices Simply To Observe, How Many Of The Words Current Among
Barbarous Peoples Are Like The Sounds Appertaining To The Things
Signified; How Many Of Our Own Oldest And Simplest Words Have The Same
Peculiarity; How Children Tend To Invent Imitative Words; And How The
Part 2 Chapter 3 (On The Genesis Of Science) Pg 107Sign-Language Spontaneously Formed By Deaf Mutes Is Invariably Based
Upon Imitative Actions--To At Once See That The Nation Of _Likeness_ Is
That From Which The Nomenclature Of Objects Takes Its Rise.
Were There Space We Might Go On To Point Out How This Law Of Life Is
Traceable, Not Only In The Origin But In The Development Of Language;
How In Primitive Tongues The Plural Is Made By A Duplication Of The
Singular, Which Is A Multiplication Of The Word To Make It _Like_ The
Multiplicity Of The Things; How The Use Of Metaphor--That Prolific
Source Of New Words--Is A Suggesting Of Ideas That Are _Like_ The Ideas
To Be Conveyed In Some Respect Or Other; And How, In The Copious Use Of
Simile, Fable, And Allegory Among Uncivilised Races, We See That Complex
Conceptions, Which There Is Yet No Direct Language For,
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