William Pitt and the Great War by John Holland Rose (e book reader for pc .TXT) 📖

of Trafalgar." Mr. Corbett

has kindly helped me to fix the probable date of Castlereagh's letter.

 

[733] Pitt MSS., 121. In Pitt MSS., 111, is a hasty and undated note of

Pitt to Middleton (probably of February 1805) asking him to consider

"whether it might not be expedient to direct Sir John Warren to proceed

to Cape de Verde, and if he there found that Sir James Duckworth was

gone to the West Indies, but not upon certain information of the enemy

having preceded him, that Sir J. Warren should be ordered on to the

Cape, unless he received intelligence that the enemy had taken another

course." He adds that this suggestion arises out of the news received

from the Cape, where French troops were expected. In that case the

operations would be protracted. Pitt hoped that Warren would be back in

five months, that is by 1st June, before which time the French

preparations for the invasion of England would not be far advanced.

Evidently, then, Pitt sought Middleton's advice direct on the complex

problem of defending England and guarding the overland and the sea

routes to India at the same time. On this see Corbett, "Trafalgar

Campaign," 236-8.

 

[734] Wellington in 1834 told Croker that they met in the anteroom of

the Secretary of State, Castlereagh (Croker, "Diaries," ii, 234).

 

CHAPTER XXIV (THE LAST STRUGGLE)

 

    Heavens! What has Prussia to answer for! For nothing less, in my

    mind, than every calamity which has befallen Europe for more

    than ten years.--GENERAL PAGET TO SIR ARTHUR PAGET, _24th

    January 1806_.

 

 

The opening moves in the great game between Pitt and Napoleon were

divided with a curious evenness. As we have seen, the French Emperor's

defiant annexation of Genoa obliterated the anger of the Czar at Pitt's

insistence on the retention of Malta; and if Pitt's high-handed conduct

forced Spain to declare against England, yet, on the other hand,

Napoleon wantonly challenged Austria and Russia to a conflict. The first

events of the war showed a similar balance. On 20th October the French

Emperor compelled the Austrian commander, General Mack, to surrender at

or near Ulm in Swabia with almost the whole of an army of some 70,000

men. On the next day Nelson destroyed the French and Spanish fleets at

Trafalgar. So quickly did the forcefulness or ineptitude of four

commanders determine the course of events. By the end of October the

tricolour waved triumphant over Central Europe; but the Union Jack was

thenceforth scarcely challenged by sea; and Britain began to exert that

unseen but resistless pressure upon her enemy which gradually edged him

to his ruin. Consequently the appalling failures of the Third Coalition

on land only delayed the final triumph on which the serene genius of

Pitt surely counted.

 

At first everything seemed to favour his designs. Part of Napoleon's

army in its hurried march from North Germany towards Ulm violated the

neutrality of the Prussian principality of Anspach, apparently by

command of the Emperor. This short cut to success nearly entailed

disaster; for it earned the sharp resentment of Prussia at a time when

he especially valued her friendship. Indeed, so soon as he resolved to

turn the "Army of England" against Austria, he despatched his most

trusted aide-de-camp, Duroc, to Berlin, to tempt that Court with that

alluring bait, Hanover. Russia and England were, however, making equal

efforts in the hope of gaining the help of the magnificent army of

Frederick William III. For a time Pitt also hoped to add the South

German States, and in all to set in motion a mass of 650,000 men against

France, Austria contributing 250,000, Russia 180,000, Prussia 100,000

(later on he bargained for 180,000), Sardinia 25,000, Naples 20,000,

Sweden 16,000, and the small German States the remainder. Napoleon, on

the other hand, strove to paralyse the efforts of the Coalition by

securing the alliance or the friendly neutrality of Prussia. With

200,000 hostile or doubtful troops on her frontier, Austria could do

little, and Russia still less. Further, as he still had French troops in

one or two fortresses of Hanover, he could utter the words so often on

the lips of Bismarck--_Beati possidentes_. Hanover belonged of right to

George III; but Napoleon could will it away to Prussia.

 

Thus the fortunes of Europe depended largely on Frederick William.

Unfortunately he was incapable of rising to the height of the situation;

for he utterly lacked the virile qualities which raised the House of

Hohenzollern above petty compeers in Swabia to fame and prosperity.

Essentially mediocre, and conscious of his slender endowments, he, like

Louis XVI, nearly always hesitated, and therefore generally lost. His

character was a dull compound of negations. Prone neither to vice nor to

passion, he was equally devoid of charm and graciousness. Freezing men

by his coldness, he failed to overawe them by superiority; and, with a

weak man's dislike of genius and strength, he avoided great men,

preferring trimmers like Haugwitz and Lombard, who played upon his

foibles, and saved him from disagreeable decisions. The commanding

personality of Stein inspired in him nervous dislike which deepened into

peevish dread. Only in the depths of disaster, into which his own

weakness was to plunge him, did he have recourse to that saviour of

Prussia.

 

By the side of Frederick William was that radiant figure, Queen Louisa,

who recalls the contrast between Marie Antoinette and her uninteresting,

hapless spouse. For Louisa, too, had ambition and the power of inspiring

devotion, though etiquette and jealousy forbade her intervention in

affairs of State;[735] otherwise the Prussian Government would have

shaken off that paralysing indecision which left its people friendless

and spiritless on the bursting of the storm a year later. For the

present, the King's chief adviser, Hardenberg, sought to impart to

Prussian policy a trend more favourable to England and Russia. Conscious

of the need of a better frontier on the west and of the longing of his

master for the greater part of Hanover, he sought to attain this end by

means not wholly opposed to the feelings of George III and the policy of

Pitt. Above all, he strove to end the humiliating subservience of his

Court to France, which galled the spirit of all patriotic Prussians.

Their great desire was to join the new Coalition even though such a step

entailed war with Napoleon. They rejoiced at the news of Admiral

Calder's victory off Finisterre, and hailed every sign of war at St.

Petersburg and Vienna.[736] On the other hand, the French party was

strong at Court. Haugwitz, its head, was still nominally Minister for

Foreign Affairs, and, though often absent for long periods on his

Silesian domain, resumed the control of them when he returned to Berlin.

This singular arrangement enabled the King to keep up the game of

political see-saw which brought relief to him, disgust to his would-be

allies, and ruin to his country.

 

To tilt the balance in favour of the Coalition was now the chief aim of

Pitt. And who shall say that, if Prussia, with strength still

unimpaired, had played the part which her enfeebled people insisted on

taking up in 1813, the doom of Napoleon might not have been assured in

the autumn and winter which we associate with the names of Ulm and

Austerlitz? All this was possible, nay, probable, had Frederick William

surveyed the situation with the sound judgement of Pitt. But the British

statesman laboured under one great disadvantage. He could not offer to

Prussia what she most wanted. He could do no more than promise to extend

her western confines to Antwerp and Ostend; and she far preferred

Hanover, as solidifying her straggling western lands, without bringing

her near to France. Here was an almost insuperable obstacle; and we can

imagine that, like his father, he cursed Britain's connection with

Hanover. His chief hope was, that Prussia would discern her true

interest in acquiring less by honourable means than very much from

Napoleon, whose gifts were often perilous. Russia, too, at that time

seemed to adopt the British view of the Hanoverian question; and in the

early autumn that Power mustered her second army on the borders of

Prussia in a highly threatening manner. Finally, the Czar declared that

if his troops were refused a passage through Silesia, he would make his

way by force, the Pitt Cabinet informing him that, in that case, the

liberal subsidies intended for Prussia, would be added to those already

on their way to St. Petersburg. But even threats failed to bring

Frederick William to a decision; and Hardenberg announced that a

forcible entry of the Russians would involve war with Prussia.[737]

 

While Frederick William fumed at the Muscovite threats, came news of the

violation of his Anspach domain on 3rd October. At once he declared his

intention to avenge the insult and to expel Duroc from Prussian

territory. He also raised high the hopes of the Allies by allowing the

Russians to enter Silesia, and by favouring Pitt's plan of a joint

expedition of the Allies to Hanover with a view to the liberation of

Holland; and when he ordered the mobilization of the whole Prussian

army, there appeared good grounds for expecting the speedy accession of

at least 150,000 troops trained in the school of Frederick the Great.

Even Haugwitz now suggested that if war came England must give Prussia a

subsidy.[738] The Anglophil party at Berlin raised its head in triumph

at the approach of the Russian Emperor; and when on 28th October he

entered Berlin with enthusiastic greetings from the populace, Europe

seemed about to be leagued against Napoleon. Chivalry and prudence alike

counselled such a union, for on the morrow arrived news of the

annihilation of Mack's army. Nothing but prompt action could save

Germany from the Napoleonic deluge.

 

The first rumours of the disaster at Ulm did not reach London until 2nd

November. Lord Malmesbury was dining with Pitt and mentioned the report

to him, whereupon the Prime Minister exclaimed in loud and angry tones,

"Don't believe a word of it: it is all a fiction."[739] But on the

morrow a Dutch newspaper was brought, and Malmesbury translated the

account, which was so clear and detailed as to leave little room for

doubt. Pitt's countenance changed. There came over him that look which

his friends saw imprinted more deeply with every week of deepening

gloom. For a brief space it passed away. On 6th November London heard

the joyful yet painful news of Trafalgar. It reached Downing Street at 3

a.m. Pitt was so moved by conflicting emotions that he, the soundest of

sleepers, could not find repose, but roused himself for work. The Stock

Exchange registered the swift oscillations from confidence to doubt, for

though all fear of the French and Spanish fleet was at an end, yet, as

Nelson perished, national security seemed imperilled, and Consols sank.

 

The contrast between the victorious constancy of Britain and the

wavering and hapless counsels of the Germanic States inspired Pitt with

one of the most magnanimous utterances of that age. At the Lord Mayor's

banquet on 9th November, that dignitary proposed his health as the

Saviour of Europe. Pitt concentrated his reply into these two memorable

sentences: "I return you many thanks for the honour you have done me;

but Europe is not to be saved by any single man. England has saved

herself by her exertions, and will, as I trust, save Europe by her

example." In its terseness and strength, its truth and modesty, its

patriotism and hopefulness, this utterance stands unrivalled. The effect

must have been all the greater because Pitt then bore on his countenance

signs of that anxious forethought in which now lay the chief hope of

European independence.

 

Six days before the arrival of news of the Austrian disaster, Pitt had

sought to expedite a union with Prussia. In view of the urgency of the

case, he decided to send his trusted friend, the Earl of Harrowby, the

Dudley Ryder of former days. Harrowby's great abilities have never met

with due recognition, probably owing to the persistent ill health which

impaired alike his equanimity and his power of work; but Wilberforce had

good cause for commending Pitt's choice; and he added in a letter of

25th October