For Name and Fame; Or, Through Afghan Passes by G. A. Henty (little red riding hood ebook free .txt) 📖

to Brigadier General Massy--at that time commanding the field force in the Khurum valley--to move the 23rd Punjaub Pioneers, the 5th Ghoorkas, and a mountain battery to the crest of the Shatur-Gardan Pass, and to entrench themselves there.

A day or two later, the 72nd Highlanders and the 5th Punjaub Infantry ascended the Peiwar-Khotal, to Ali-Kheyl, to secure the road between the Khotal and the pass. The 72nd then moved forward, and joined the 23rd Pioneers and 5th Ghoorkas on the Shatur-Gardan; and on the 13th General Baker arrived there, and took the command, but some time was needed before the advance could commence.

As is usual with the British, the great transport train--which had, with such pains, been collected and organized for the war--had been dispersed, immediately peace was signed; and the whole work had now to be recommenced. Vast numbers of animals had been used up, during the campaign; and there was the greatest difficulty in obtaining the minimum number which was required before the troops could move. At last, General Roberts managed to collect, in the Punjaub, 2000 mules and 700 camels and bullocks. The tribes in the Khurum valley, too--who had been kindly treated, and were well satisfied with the change of masters--furnished many animals for the transport of stores, as far as the Shatur-Gardan.

The news had thrown the Gilgis, and other tribes among the mountains beyond the Peiwar-Khotal, into a state of ferment; and several determined attacks were made, by them, upon convoys on their way up to the head of the pass. These, however, were always successfully repulsed by the baggage guards, with considerable loss to the assailants and, on the 26th September--three weeks from the date of the massacre--General Roberts joined the troops at Ali-Kheyl, and moved forward to the Shatur-Gardan.

During this time two or three letters had been received from the Ameer, who wrote to General Roberts deprecating any advance of the British troops, and saying that he was trying to restore order, to put down the mutinous Heratee troops, and to punish them for their conduct. As, however, the details which had been received of the massacre showed that the Ameer had behaved in a most suspicious--if not in a most treacherous--manner, at the time of the massacre; and that if he possessed any authority, whatever, over the troops, he had not attempted to exercise it, no attention was paid to his letters.

The advanced party of the invading force moved down from the Shatur-Gardan Pass. It consisted of the 12th and 14th Bengal Cavalry, two guns of the Royal Horse Artillery, two companies of the 72nd Highlanders, and the 5th Punjaub Native Infantry. The road was found to be extremely steep and difficult, and much labor was necessary before it could be made practicable for guns and wheeled carriages. No enemy was encountered, and the little force encamped at night in the Logan valley; over which the cavalry skirmished, far ahead, but found no foes awaiting them.

On the following day they made another march forward, the brigades of Generals Baker and Macpherson from the pass into the valley. The advance force halted at Zerghun-Shah and, soon after they had done so, some of the cavalry rode in, with the surprising news that the Ameer was close at hand.

Half an hour later Yakoob Khan, attended by some of his principal nobles, rode into camp. He was received with the honor due to his rank but, personally, General Roberts greeted him with great coldness. The Ameer stated that he came into camp because he could not control the soldiery of Cabul; and that, therefore, he had left the place and come in, to show his friendship for the English. Whatever may have been the motives for his coming, they were never fully explained. Circumstances which afterwards occurred strongly confirmed the suspicion that he meditated treachery.

He was treated honorably; but the guard of honor which was assigned to him was, in fact, a guard over him and, from that time, he was virtually a prisoner. General Roberts declined, altogether, to discuss with him the events of the massacre of Cabul; saying that this was a matter which could not now be entered into, but would be fully investigated on the arrival at the Afghan capital.

The following day, the brigades of Generals Baker and Macpherson joined the advance at Zerghun-Shah. The amount of transport available was only sufficient for half the baggage of the army; and it was necessary, therefore, to move forward in two divisions--the one advancing a day's march, and then halting; while the animals went back to bring up the baggage of the second division, on the following day.

A proclamation was now issued by the general, and sent forward among the people of the valley; saying that the object of the expedition was only to punish those concerned in the massacre at Cabul, and that all loyal subjects of the Ameer would be well treated.

On the 3rd of October Macpherson's brigade, with the cavalry, reached Suffed-Sang. Here they halted, while the baggage animals went back to bring up General Baker's brigade. The attitude of the people of the valley had now become very threatening. Great numbers of hill tribesmen had come down; and on this day an attack was made upon the rear guard, but was beaten off with loss.

That the natives were bitterly hostile was undoubted; but they were, for the most part, waiting to see the result of the approaching fight. The Heratee and Cabul regiments were confident that they would defeat the approaching column. They had a great advantage in numbers, had been drilled in European fashion, were armed with Enfields, and had an enormous park of artillery at their disposal. They were able to choose their own fighting ground, and had selected a spot which gave them an immense advantage. They were, therefore, confident of victory.

Had the British troops been beaten, the inhabitants of the Logan valley were prepared to rise, to a man. The Ghilzais and other hill tribes would have swept down upon the line of retreat; and few, if any, of the British force would have returned to tell the tale.

The next day Baker's division had the post of honor, and made a short march to Chaurasia. Beyond this village, the enemy had taken up their position. Three miles beyond the village the valley ends--a mass of hills shutting it in, with only a narrow defile leading, through them, to the plain of Cabul beyond. Upon both sides of the defile the enemy had placed guns in position, and lined the whole circle of the hills commanding the approach to it.

Mountaineers from their birth, they believed that--although the British infantry might possess a superiority in the plain--they could be no match for them on the steep hillside; and they no doubt thought that no attempt would be made to storm so strong a position, but that the British column would march straight up the valley into the defile, where they would be helplessly slaughtered by the guns and matchlock men on the heights.

Judging from their own tactics, they had reason for the belief that their position was an impregnable one. In their hill fights the Afghans never come to close quarters. Posted behind rocks and huge boulders, the opposing sides keep up a distant musketry duel--lasting, sometimes, for days--until one side or the other becomes disheartened with its losses, or has exhausted its ammunition. Then it falls back, and the other claims the victory. The idea that English soldiers would, under a heavy fire from their concealed force, steadily climb up the broken mountainside, and come to close quarters, probably never entered into their calculations.

At daybreak on the 6th, a working party were sent forward to improve the road towards the defile. But they had scarcely started when the cavalry patrol in advance rode in, and announced that the enemy were in great strength on the hills, and had guns in position to command the road.

General Roberts had now a choice of two courses--he could either attack the whole Afghan force, with the one division at hand; or he could wait until joined by Macpherson's brigade, next morning. The feat of carrying such a position in face of an immensely superior force, with only half of his little command, was a very serious one but, upon the other hand, every hour added to the number of hillmen who swarmed upon the flanks of the army, just beyond musket range. A delay of twenty-four hours would bring the whole fighting force of the tribesmen into the valley and, while attacking the enemy's position in the front, he would be liable to an assault upon his rear, by them.

Confident in the valor of his soldiers, he chose the first alternative and, at eleven o'clock, his little force marched out from the camp to attack the Afghan army. By this time the enemy's position had been reconnoitered, and it was found to be too strong for a direct attack. It was therefore resolved to ascend the hills on both flanks, and so to drive their defenders back beyond the defile. This, in any case, would have been the best mode of assault; but against semi-savage enemies, flank attacks are peculiarly effective. Having prepared for an assault in one direction, they are disconcerted and disheartened by finding themselves attacked in a different manner; and the fear of a flank being turned, and the line of retreat thereby menaced, will generally suffice to cause a rapid retreat.

General Baker, himself, took the command of the left attack. His force consisted of four guns of Number 2 Mountain Battery, two Gatling guns, the 7th company of Sappers and Miners, a wing of the 72nd Highlanders, six companies of the 5th Ghoorkas, 200 men of the 5th Punjaub Infantry, and 450 of the 23rd Pioneers. This was the main column of attack.

The right column--under the command of Major White, of the 72nd Highlanders--consisted of a wing of that regiment, 100 men of the 23rd Pioneers, three guns of the Royal Artillery, and two squadrons of cavalry. This attack was intended only as a feint, and to distract the attention of the Afghans from the main attack. A strong reserve was left in Chaurasia, to guard the baggage and to overawe the tribesmen.

As General Baker's column reached the foot of the hills, the 23rd--who led the advance, thrown out in skirmishing line--began to climb the ascent. The enemy were armed with Sniders and Enfields, and their fire was rapid and continuous; fortunately it was by no means accurate, and our losses were small. The Afghans, in their hill fighting, are accustomed to fire very slowly and deliberately--taking steady aim, with their guns resting on the rocks--and, so fighting, they are excellent shots. It is probable, however, that the steady advance of our men towards them flurried and disconcerted them; and that they thought more of firing quickly, than of taking a correct aim.

The 72nd, pressing up the hill, were assisted by the fire of the mountain guns and Gatlings, and by that of the Punjaubees in their rear. Gradually the upper slopes of the hills were gained; and the British troops, pressing forward, drove the Afghans back along the crest. Several times they made obstinate stands, holding their ground until the 72nd were close to them.

These, however, would not be denied. The massacre of the mission at Cabul had infuriated the soldiers, and each man was animated with a stern determination to avenge our murdered countrymen. For an hour and a half the fight continued; and then the Afghans abandoned the ridge, and fled in confusion. They rallied upon some low hills, 600 yards from the rear; but the mountain guns and Gatlings opened upon them and, the whole line advancing to the attack, the enemy fell back.

Major White's column had been doing excellent service, on the right. Although the attack had been intended only as a feint, it was pushed forward so vigorously that it met with a success equal to that which had attended the main column, on the left. The enemy were driven off the hills on the right of the defile. Twenty guns were captured, and the direct road cleared of the enemy.

Unfortunately, our cavalry was in the rear. The road through the pass was difficult and, before they could get through into the plain on the other side, the masses of Afghans had fallen back into the strong villages scattered over it; and could not be attacked by cavalry, alone. The enemy had from 9000 to 10,000 men upon the ridge, including thirteen regiments of regular troops. They left 300 dead upon the field and, besides these, carried off large numbers of killed and wounded, during the night. Upon our side only 20 were killed, and 67 wounded.

Had General Roberts had his whole force with him, he could--after capturing the hills--have at once pushed forward, and have attacked the enemy on the plain; and the Afghans, disheartened and panic stricken, would have been completely crushed. With so small a force in hand, and the possibility of a