William Pitt and the Great War by John Holland Rose (e book reader for pc .TXT) 📖

Pitt should leave it to another Prime Minister to frame a

peace. But whatever happened, Pitt must not lower his dignity by

conceding Reform and Catholic Emancipation in Great Britain and Ireland.

If those measures were inevitable, others must carry them. The latter

would only satisfy the Irish Catholics for a time, their aim being to

rule the country. The only way of escaping these difficulties was a

Union of the Parliaments; but he (Camden) could not undertake to carry

it, still less Catholic Emancipation. Finally he declared the

Presbyterians of Ulster to be Republicans who would rise _en masse_ if

the French landed; but if Cornwallis were sent over to lead the troops,

even that crisis might be overcome.[487]

 

Pitt received this letter at the height of the mutiny at the Nore. He

seems to have sent no answer to it: indeed, silence is the best reply to

such an effusion. Camden's letters to Pitt show that he longed for his

recall. In that of 16th November 1796 he concluded with the significant

remark that he looked forward to the time when they would once more live

as country gentlemen in Kent. Pitt had the same longing; but he never

wrote a line expressing a desire to leave the tiller at the height of

the storm. Obviously Camden was weary of his work. Fear seems to have

been the motive which prompted his proclamation of martial law in

several counties and the offer of an amnesty to all who would surrender

their arms before Midsummer 1797. Those enactments, together with the

brutal methods of General Lake and the soldiery in Ulster and Leinster,

crushed revolt for the present but kindled a flame of resentment which

burst forth a year later. As the danger increased, so did the severities

of the Protestant Yeomanry and Militia. Thus, fear begot rage, and rage

intensified fear and its offspring, violence. The United Irishmen had

their revenge. In the summer of 1797 their two delegates, Lewins and

McNevin, did their utmost to defeat the efforts of Pitt to bring about

peace with France; and the former had the promise of the Director,

Barras, that France would never sheathe the sword until Ireland was

free.[488]

 

Again Camden begged Pitt to seek the first opportunity of freeing him

from his duties in order to disentangle his private affairs which were

in much confusion, the excess of expenditure over income at Dublin being

a further cause of embarrassment. In fact nothing but a sense of public

duty, in view of a hostile invasion, kept him at his post. So far from

the truth are those who, without knowledge of the inner motives of

statesmen, accuse them of delight in cruelty and of intriguing to

provoke a revolt.

 

Early in the year 1798 the hopes of malcontents centred in the naval

preparations progressing at Brest and Toulon.[489] Bonaparte also seemed

about to deal a blow at London. In February he surveyed the flotilla at

Dunkirk and neighbouring ports; and the hearts of English Jacobins beat

high at the thought of his landing in Kent or Sussex. The London

Corresponding Society, after a time of suspended animation, had now

become a revolutionary body. On 30th January its new secretaries,

Crossfield and Thomas Evans, issued an encouraging address to the United

Irishmen. Somewhat later Evans and Binns formed a society, the United

Englishmen, which imposed on its members an oath to learn the use of

arms, its constitution in local, or baronial, committees being modelled

on that of the United Irishmen. A society of United Scotsmen was founded

about the same time; a society of United Britons also came to being, and

issued a fraternal address to the United Irishmen on 5th January.

 

Most significant of these effusions is one, dated 6 Pluviôse An VI [25th

January 1798], by "the Secret Committee of England" to the French

Directory, containing the assurance that Pitt had come to the end of his

borrowing powers and that the people were ready to throw off his yoke.

"United as we are," it concluded, "we now only await with impatience to

see the Hero of Italy and the brave veterans of the great Nation.

Myriads will hail their arrival with shouts of joy: they will soon

finish the glorious campaign." This address was drawn up fourteen days

before Bonaparte set out for Dunkirk. It is clear, then, that its

compilers were not so ignorant as that consequential tailor, Francis

Place, represented them. Their chief mistake lay in concluding that

Bonaparte intended to "leap the ditch." As we now know, his tour on the

northern coast was intended merely to satisfy the Directors and

encourage the English and Irish malcontents to risk their necks, while

he made ready his armada at Toulon for the Levant.[490] Meanwhile the

United Britons and United Irishmen sought to undermine Pitt's Government

so that it might fall with a crash at the advent of the hero of Italy.

They knew not that the chief efforts of the "soldiers of liberty" were

then being directed to the pillage of Rome and of the cantonal

treasuries of Switzerland in order to provide funds for Bonaparte's

oriental adventure.

 

Already Irish, English, and French democrats had been fraternizing. In

January 1798 the United Englishmen sent over two delegates to Dublin to

concert action, and about the same time a priest of Dundalk, named

O'Coigly (_Anglicé_ Quigley), came over from Ireland as a delegate from

the United Irishmen to Evans's Society. Place asserts that his plan of

proceeding to France was not known. But, as Place habitually toned down

or ridiculed the doings of that Society, this is doubtful. Owing to

secret information (probably from Turner, a British spy at Hamburg) the

Government arrested Quigley, Arthur O'Connor, and Binns, a leading

member of the London Corresponding Society, at Margate as they were

about to board a hoy for France (28th February). A little later Colonel

Despard, Bonham, and Evans were arrested. The evidence against all but

Quigley was not conclusive, and they were released. The case against

Quigley depended on a paper found by a police officer in his pocket,

urging a French invasion of England. He was therefore condemned for high

treason and was hanged on 7th June 1798. Probably Quigley had that paper

from a London Society; but if so, why were not its officials seized? In

some respects the Quigley affair still remains a mystery. Certainly it

added fuel to the hatred felt for Pitt by British and Irish

Jacobins.[491]

 

The evidence against O'Connor was weighty. It was proved that he was the

leader of the party and that he knew Quigley well. He had a cipher in

his possession, which was surely superfluous if, as he stated, he was

travelling on private business. Probably his acquittal was due to his

relationship to Lord Longueville, an influential Irish peer. Fox,

Sheridan, and the Duke of Norfolk also proceeded to Maidstone to answer

for the virtuous and patriotic character of O'Connor, a fact which

probably led the judge to give a strangely favourable summing-up. The

conduct of the Opposition leaders in this matter led their former

comrade, the Earl of Carlisle, to declare that they had now sunk to a

lower political hell than any yet reached. The Government, however, had

not done with O'Connor. He was at once arrested at Maidstone on another

charge (22nd May), and was in prison in Dublin during the rebellion. He

then confessed that he had done more than any one to organize Leinster

for revolt, also that he had had conferences with French generals with a

view to invasion so far back as 1793; and he stated that he knew the

member of the United Irishmen who in the winter of 1796 advised the

French not to come until the spring of 1797.[492] There certainly was

some misunderstanding between the Irish rebels and their would-be

helpers; but the full details are not known. Finally O'Connor was

allowed to retire to France; he became a French general, and helped

Napoleon to concert plans for the invasion of Ireland, assuring him

that, after the work of liberation was done, 200,000 Irishmen would help

him to conquer England.

 

Meanwhile further news respecting the Franco-Irish plans reached Pitt

through a man named Parish at Hamburg. An American friend of his at

Brussels, while waiting at the municipal office for passports, saw those

of two young Irishmen, named O'Finn, delegates of the United Irishmen of

Cork. They had a large packet for the Directory at Paris, which

contained the plans of the United Irishmen, the numbers and positions of

the British troops and of the British warships between Dungeness and the

North Foreland. The O'Finns stated this to the commissary of the

Brussels bureau, who heard it with joy. The American secretly forwarded

the news to Parish. The fact that the O'Finns had a list of the forces

on the Kentish coast implied information from the English malcontents.

Accordingly, on 19th April, Government seized the papers of the London

Corresponding Society. They contained nothing of importance except the

constitution of the Society, the oath to learn the use of arms, and the

address to the United Irishmen. The Parliamentary Committee of Secrecy

also believed that a plan was afoot for bringing to London a band of

Irish fanatics to strike a blow which would paralyse Government while

the French landed and Ireland revolted. This inference seems

far-fetched; but the evidence at hand warranted the suspension of the

Habeas Corpus Act, which Pitt procured from Parliament on the following

day. Place, with his usual perverse ingenuity, argued that Pitt nursed

the conspiracy in order to be able to create alarm and govern

despotically.[493]

 

Events were now moving fast in Ireland. Chief among the exciting causes

were the repressive measures of Camden and the licence of the Militia

and Yeomanry. So able and active a commander as General Abercromby

failed to keep discipline and prevent military outrages. Not long after

his return from the West Indies he reluctantly accepted these thankless

duties (November 1797). His dislike of the work appears in the following

letter, addressed probably to one of Pitt's colleagues:

 

                                    Bantry, _Jan. 28, 1798_.[494]

    DEAR SIR,

 

    ... I have found the country everywhere quiet, but there exists

    among the gentlemen the greatest despondency: they believe, or

    affect to believe, that there is a plot in every family, and a

    conspiracy in every parish, and they would abandon the country

    unless the troops were dispersed over the face of it for their

    protection. I believe the lower ranks heartily hate the

    gentlemen because they oppress them, and the gentlemen hate the

    peasants because they know they deserve to be hated. Hitherto

    rents have been paid, tithes have not been refused or taxes

    withheld. No arms or ammunition have anywhere been introduced,

    and there are no tumultuous assemblings of the people. I have

    often heard of disaffection among the militia; it may perhaps

    exist among a few individuals; but it cannot exist to any

    considerable amount. My inquiries have been unremitted in this

    particular. Were, however, a landing of the enemy to take place,

    I cannot say what might happen to a people dissatisfied with

    their situation and naturally of great levity; the new doctrines

    would give activity. We are preparing for whatever may happen

    and no labour or exertion shall be wanting.

 

Abercromby soon proclaimed his disgust at the excesses of his troops in

unmeasured terms. True, he had much provocation. The militia officers

under him were a loose swaggering set, whose cruelties to the peasantry

during the prolonged search for arms were unpardonable. Further, their

powers had been enlarged by Camden's order of May 1797, allowing them to

use armed force without the requisition of magistrates, a step deemed

necessary to screen the civil authorities from outrage or murder. Seeing

that officers often put these powers to a brutal and arbitrary use,

exasperating to the peasants and demoralizing to the soldiery,

Abercromby determined publicly to rescind the viceregal mandate. The

language in which he announced his decision was no less remarkable than

the decision itself. On 26th February 1798 he stated in a general order:

"That the frequency of courts-martial, and the many complaints of

irregularities in the conduct of the troops in this kingdom having too

unfortunately proved the army to be in a state of licentiousness which

must render it formidable to everyone but the enemy, the

commander-in-chief" forbids officers ever to use military force except

at the requisition of magistrates.

 

That the army and militia did not assault their commander after this

outrageous insult shows that their discipline had not wholly vanished.

In face of the vehement outcries of the Irish loyalists against

Abercromby, Camden showed much forbearance. He issued a guarded

statement that Abercromby had been accustomed to command troops abroad,

and did not realize the impression which would be caused in Ireland by

his censure of the soldiery. Portland, however, openly blamed the

commander-in-chief. Pitt's letter of 13th March to Camden shows that,

had