William Pitt and the Great War by John Holland Rose (e book reader for pc .TXT) 📖

in April 1792, which

disgusted him with the forward section of the Whigs; and their

subsequent action completed the breach. Pitt's endeavour to form a

national Administration must have gained a new significance from the

terrible news from Paris. We may be sure, then, that the youth of

twenty-two years gazed with eager interest on the stately form before

him as at the embodiment of political wisdom, purity, and patriotism.

 

They shook hands. Then for a time they ambled coyly around the subject

at issue, and talked of "France and Jenkinson, and other equally

important concerns." Indeed Pitt seems to have been as nervous and

awkward as the novice. At length he plunged into business. "It is your

wish, I believe, Mr. Canning (and I am sure it is mine), to come in,

etc." On Canning bowing assent, Pitt remarked that it was not easy to

find an inexpensive seat, and commented on his expressed desire not to

tie himself to any borough-owner. Whereupon the young aspirant, with

more pride than tact, threw in the remark that he would not like to be

personally beholden to such an one, for instance, as Lord Lonsdale (who

first brought Pitt into Parliament). The Prime Minister seemed not to

notice the _gaucherie_, and stated that the Treasury had only six seats

at its disposal, but could arrange matters with "proprietors of

burgage-tenures." Thereupon Canning broke in more deftly. In that case,

he said, it must be made clear that he bound himself to follow, not the

borough-owner, but the Prime Minister. Here he more than recovered lost

ground, if indeed he had lost any. Pitt expressed his sense of the

compliment, and said that this could be managed, unless the young member

came to differ absolutely from his patron. Canning then frankly

confessed his inability to follow Pitt in maintaining the Test Act.

Equally frank and cordial was the reply, that he (Pitt) did not claim

exact agreement, especially on "speculative subjects," but only "a

general good disposition towards Government," which might be

strengthened by frequent contact.

 

Such was the course of this memorable interview. It sealed for ever the

allegiance of the youth to his self-chosen leader. He had prepared

Sheridan, and through him Fox and Bouverie, for this change of front.

The openness, the charm, the self-effacing patriotism of the Minister

thenceforth drew him as by an irresistible magnet. The brilliance and

joviality of Fox and Sheridan counted as nothing against the national

impulse which the master now set in motion and the pupil was destined to

carry to further lengths. There was a natural sympathy between these men

both in aim and temperament. It is a sign of the greatness of Pitt that

from the outset he laid the spell of his genius irrevocably upon

Canning.

 

                  *       *       *       *       *

 

Deferring to the next chapter a study of the democratic movement in

Great Britain, we now turn our attention to the relations of Pitt to

France, a topic which thenceforth dominates his life story and the

destinies of mankind.

 

In the month of January 1792, there arrived in London an envoy charged

with important proposals from the French Government. It was Talleyrand,

ex-bishop of Autun. Pitt had become acquainted with him during his

residence at Rheims in the summer of 1783; but the circumstances of the

case now forbade anything more than passing intercourse with that most

charming of talkers and subtlest of diplomatists. Talleyrand, having

been a member of the first, or Constituent, Assembly, was prevented by

the constitution of September 1791 from holding any office for two

years after that date. Therefore his visit to London was ostensibly on

private affairs. The Duc de Biron was the envoy, and Talleyrand merely

his adviser. He was instructed to seek "to maintain and strengthen the

good understanding which exists between the two Kingdoms."[58]

 

This was only the official pretext for the mission, the secret aim of

which was to win the friendship, if not the alliance, of England in case

of a Franco-Austrian war. In the early days of January 1792 the

constitutional Ministry, holding office, though not power, at Paris,

seemed to be working for a rupture with the Hapsburgs, partly in order

to please the Jacobins, and partly to escape the ever increasing

difficulties of its position. The earlier causes of dispute do not

concern us here. As we have seen, the Emperor Leopold was far from

desirous of war; but the provocative attitude of the Legislative

Assembly at Paris and the humiliations of his sister, Marie Antoinette,

aroused his resentment; and, early in January, he was heard to say "that

if the French madmen were determined to force him into a war, they

should find that the pacific Leopold knew how to wage it with the

greatest vigour, and would oblige them to pay its expenses in something

more solid than assignats." Our ambassador, Sir Robert Keith, was,

however, convinced that this outburst and the westward march of troops

were but "empty parade."[59]

 

On the other hand Earl Gower, British ambassador at Paris, reported that

the Ministry, the Assembly, and the Jacobins Club (with the exception of

Robespierre and his clique) desired war.[60] In truth, there seemed

little risk in a struggle with the exhausted Hapsburg States, provided

that they had support neither from Prussia nor from England. De Ségur

therefore set out for Berlin, and Talleyrand for London, to secure the

friendly neutrality or support of those Governments. The latter envoy

was specially suited for his mission, as he carried on the traditions of

Mirabeau, who in the closing months of his life urged the need of an

Anglo-French _entente_.[61]

 

Talleyrand and Biron reached London on 24th January 1792. Before

reaching the capital they read in the English papers that they had

arrived there, and had been very coldly received by Pitt--a specimen of

the arts by which the French _émigrés_ in London sought to embitter the

relations between the two lands. Talleyrand had the good fortune to

occupy a seat in the Strangers' Gallery at the opening of Parliament

close to two ardent royalists, Cazalès and Lally-Tollendal. What must

have been their feelings on hearing in the King's speech the statement

of his friendly relations to the other Powers and his resolve to reduce

the army and navy?

 

Already Pitt had seen Talleyrand. He reminded him in a friendly way of

their meeting at Rheims, remarked on the unofficial character of the

ex-bishop's "mission," but expressed his willingness to discuss French

affairs, about which he even showed "curiosity." Grenville afterwards

spoke to the envoy in the same courteous but non-committal manner.

Talleyrand was, however, charmed. He wrote to Delessart, the Foreign

Minister at Paris: "Your best ground is England; ... Believe me the

rumours current in France about the disposition of England towards us

are false."[62] He urged the need of showing a bold front; for "it is

with a fleet that you must speak to England."

 

Talleyrand throughout showed the sagacity which earned him fame in

diplomacy. He was not depressed by the King's frigid reception of him at

St. James's on 1st February, or by the Queen refusing even to notice

him. Even the escapades of Biron did not dash his hopes. That envoy ran

up debts and bargained about horses _avec un nommé Tattersall, qui tient

dans sa main tous les chevaux d'Angleterre_, until he was arrested for

debt and immured in a "sponging house," whence the appeals of the

ex-bishop failed to rescue him. As Biron had come with an official order

to buy horses with a view to the impending war with Austria, we may

infer that his arrest was the work of some keen-witted _émigré_.

 

Even this, however, was better than the fortunes of Ségur, who found

himself openly flouted both by King and courtiers at Berlin. For

Frederick William was still bent on a vigorous policy. On 7th February

his Ministers signed with Prince Reuss, the Austrian envoy, a secret

treaty of defensive alliance, mainly for the settlement of French

affairs, but also with a side glance at Poland. The Prussian Ministers

probably hoped for a peaceful but profitable settlement, which would

leave them free for a decisive intervention in the Polish troubles now

coming to a crisis; but Frederick William was in a more warlike mood,

and longed to overthrow the "rebels" in France. Ségur's mission to

Berlin was therefore an utter failure. That of Talleyrand, on the other

hand, achieved its purpose, mainly because Pitt and Grenville never had

any other desire than to remain strictly neutral. It was therefore

superfluous for Talleyrand to hint delicately at the desirability of the

friendship of France for England, in view of the war with Tippoo Sahib

in India, and the increasing ferment in Ireland.[63]

 

On 1st March Grenville again assured him of the earnest desire of the

British Government to see the end of the troubles in France, and

declared that Pitt and he had been deeply wounded by the oft-repeated

insinuations that they had sought to foment them. All such charges were

absurd; for "a commercial people stands only to gain by the freedom of

all those who surround it." We may reasonably conclude that these were

the words of Pitt; for they recall that noble passage of the "Wealth of

Nations": "A nation that would enrich itself by trade is certainly most

likely to do so when its neighbours are all rich, industrious, and

commercial nations."[64] For the rest, Grenville defied the calumniators

of England to adduce a single proof in support of their slanders, and

requested Talleyrand to remain some time in England for the purpose of

observing public opinion. He warned him, however, that the Cabinet could

not give an answer to his main proposal.

 

More than this Talleyrand could scarcely expect. He had already divined

the important secret that the Cabinet was divided on this subject, the

King, Thurlow, and Camden being hostile to France, while Pitt,

Grenville, and Dundas were friendly. When Talleyrand ventured to ascribe

those sentiments to Pitt and Grenville, the latter did not deny it, and

he at once echoed the desire expressed by the envoy for the conclusion

of an Anglo-French alliance. That the greater part of the British people

would have welcomed such a compact admits of no doubt. On the walls were

often chalked the words: "No war with the French." Talleyrand advised

the Foreign Minister, Delessart, to send immediately to London a fully

accredited ambassador; for the talk often was: "We have an ambassador at

Paris. Why have not you one here?" Nevertheless, a despatch of Grenville

to Gower, on 9th March, shows that Pitt and he keenly felt the need of

caution. They therefore enjoined complete silence on Gower. In truth,

Grenville's expressions, quoted above, were merely the outcome of the

good will which he and Pitt felt towards France. But these words from

the two powerful Ministers meant safety for France on her coasts,

whatever might betide her on the Meuse and the Rhine.

 

On the day when Grenville spoke these words of peace, two events

occurred which portended war. Leopold II died; and an irritating

despatch, which he and Kaunitz had recently sent to Paris, was read out

to the Legislative Assembly. Thereafter a rupture was inevitable.

Francis II, who now ascended the throne of his father, was a shy, proud,

delicate youth of twenty-four years, having only a superficial knowledge

of public affairs, scarcely known to the Ministers, and endowed with a

narrow pedantic nature which was to be the bane of his people. He lacked

alike the sagacity, the foresight, and the suppleness of Leopold.

Further, though his inexperience should have inspired him with a dread

of war for his storm-tossed States, yet that same misfortune subjected

him to the advice of the veteran Chancellor, Kaunitz. That crabbed old

man advised the maintenance of a stiff attitude towards France; and

this, in her present temper, entailed war.

 

The last despatch from Vienna to Paris contained strongly worded advice

to the French Government and Assembly to adopt a less provocative

attitude, to withdraw its troops from the northern frontier, and, above

all, to rid itself of the factious minority which controlled its

counsels. If Leopold had hoped to intimidate France or to strengthen the

peace-party at Paris, he made the greatest mistake of his reign. The war

party at once gained the ascendancy, decreed the arrest of Delessart for

his tame reply to Vienna, and broke up the constitutional Ministry.

Their successors were mainly Girondins. The most noteworthy are Roland,

who took the Home Office; Clavière, Finance; and Dumouriez, Foreign

Affairs. The last was a man of great energy and resource. A soldier by

training, and with a dash of the adventurer in his nature, he now leapt

to the front, and astonished France by his zeal and activity. He was not

devoid of prudence; for, as appears from Gower's despatch of 30th March,

he persuaded the Assembly to postpone action until an answer arrived to

his last despatch to Vienna. Gower found from conversation with

Dumouriez that a rupture must ensue if a satisfactory reply