William Pitt and the Great War by John Holland Rose (e book reader for pc .TXT) 📖

with the Queen, whose conduct, said Villiers, was

such as to aggravate these troubles and check the course of recovery.

Indeed, the King's violent headaches seemed to Dr. Milman to presage an

attack of apoplexy. At all times he showed a marked preference for the

company of servants and workmen, declaring the higher officials to be

"Court nuisances." Villiers therefore begged Pitt to request an

interview with the King, now at Kew, for he took no notice of letters.

On Midsummer day Villiers suggested means for assuring the veto of the

physicians on the projected visit to Weymouth, in view of the

extravagance and inconvenience of the plans to which it gave rise.

 

Among them was the collection of a large military force in Dorset,

George being convinced that the French would land there rather than in

Kent or Essex. Fortunately, the Duke of York dissuaded him from a step

so eminently favourable to Napoleon; for about this time the King wrote

to the Duke: "As I am no friend to obstinacy, I will agree to lessen the

demand from other districts" (_i.e._, for an "Army of Reserve" in

Dorset). The visit to Weymouth was also postponed; and Camden, Secretary

at War, countermanded the construction of huge barracks at that town,

which the King had ordered without consulting the Cabinet or the Duke of

York. On 1st August Villiers reported the refusal of the King to see the

Prince of Wales, with whom no complete reconciliation was possible.

George wished Villiers to come and reside near Windsor and manage all

his private affairs, and would take no refusal. But how, asked Villiers,

was he to do this on £330 a year? He therefore requested the advice and

help of Pitt.[684]

 

At Weymouth, late in the summer, the quarrels between the King and Queen

again became acute, as appears from confidential letters which Lord

Hawkesbury wrote to Pitt. The latter sided with the Queen and Princes on

some points; and indeed through these months the conduct of George seems

to have been so exasperating that the Princesses almost sank under the

ceaseless strain, for Queen Charlotte, too, was "ill and cross." In vain

did Pitt seek to effect a reconciliation between the King and the

Prince of Wales. The only result of his efforts was a formal and

fruitless interview. Last but not least of Pitt's Court worries was the

conduct of the Princess of Wales. Her wayward and extravagant habits

increased the aversion of the Prince, and produced scandals so serious

that Pitt urgently but ineffectually remonstrated with her at her

residence in Blackheath. Such were the diversions of a Minister on whom

almost singly rested the burden of defending his country at this crisis.

 

The eccentricities of the King seriously hampered British diplomacy. For

how could Russia and Austria bind themselves to an Administration which

might at any time be succeeded by one which was under the domination of

the Prince of Wales, Fox, and Sheridan? True, offers of a defensive

alliance were mooted at St. Petersburg to our ambassador, Admiral

Warren. But it was obvious even to that misplaced sailor, whom Pitt soon

recalled, that Russia merely aimed at securing English subsidies and

help for her garrison at Corfu, now threatened by Soult. The timid

conduct of Francis II, who, as if in imitation of Napoleon, assumed the

title of Hereditary Emperor of the Austrian Empire, further prescribed

caution; and only by slow degrees did the Czar Alexander feel his way

towards an understanding with England. His jealousy respecting Malta,

and the uncertainties at London and Windsor, held these natural allies

apart for many months. Pitt did not hurry matters, doubtless from a

conviction that the conduct of Napoleon must before long bring both

Russia and Austria into the field. Meanwhile, he withheld subsidies

which would have helped them to arm for an almost inevitable

struggle.[685] We need not therefore trace the course of these coy

advances until they led to definite overtures. Here as always Pitt

showed a dignified reserve and a cautious regard for British finances,

which refute the stories officially circulated at Paris as to his

lavishly bribing the Continental States to attack France. As usually

happens, the prosaic truth long remained hidden in British despatches,

while the piquant slander gained all but universal acceptance.

 

Pitt's first thought was to enhance the value of England's friendship by

strengthening her navy and enabling her to take the offensive if an

occasion offered. The French royalist refugee, General Dumouriez, in a

long Memoir which he drew up for the Cabinet, pointed out that nothing

was more perilous than a perpetual defensive, as it allowed the enemy

quietly to perfect his plans for attack at any point over the whole

field.[686] Pitt was well aware of this danger. In fact, his policy of

military pinpricks, while apparently wasteful and inconclusive, had

prevented that concentration of the enemy's force which alone could

ensure the capture of London. Once more, then, he aimed at strengthening

the regular army, reducing the Militia to its usual quota, and raising a

large force of Volunteers. On 5th June 1804 he brought forward his

proposal for repairing the defects of Yorke's Army of Reserve Act. They

arose from the following provisions. A man, when drawn to serve in that

force, must either come forward, find a substitute, or pay a fine of £20

for each year of default. A penalty also fell on every parish failing to

supply its quota. The consequence was that parishes and individuals

offered high bounties in order to escape the fine--sometimes as much as

£40 or £60 per man.[687] These bounties naturally drew the best recruits

to the Army of Reserve, to the detriment both of the army and navy.

Another source of loss to the line regiments was the addition to the

strength of the Militia, the net result being that 9,000 more recruits

were required annually for the regular forces. These therefore suffered

from the competition of the second and third lines of defence; and in

this competition (then unusually severe) has always lain the crux of the

British military problem.

 

Pitt sought to solve the problem by reducing the Militia (now 74,000

strong) to the old standard of 52,000 men, transferring the surplus to

the Army of Reserve. He also suggested various inducements to men in the

latter force to enter the line regiments. Further, he proposed to lessen

the penalties levied on defaulters. While maintaining the principle of

compulsory service, at least for a considerable part of the population,

he lessened the inducements which told in favour of the Army of Reserve

and against the Line. Further, in place of the irritating plan of

recruiting by the compulsion of the ballot, Pitt made the parish

authorities responsible for the supply of their quota. If, even so, the

parishes could not find the men, the commander of the district was

empowered to raise them by the ordinary means of recruiting. He further

proposed to associate in each district the battalions of the Army of

Reserve with those of the Line, in the well-grounded hope of increasing

_esprit de corps_ and stimulating the flow of men into the first line of

defence.

 

The chief critic of these proposals was Sheridan who, on 18th June

brilliantly declaimed against the formation of a great Regular Army, as

alien to the spirit of our people, and by all the arts of rhetorical

necromancy sought to raise the spectre of a Standing Army. When others

bemoaned the threatened increase of taxation and Windham and Craufurd

("Craufurd of the Light Division") criticized the measure severely, the

Opposition cherished the hope of defeating the Ministry. The debate

dragged on till 4 a.m. when 265 members supported Pitt against 223 Noes.

The Bill became law on 29th June. Undoubtedly it failed to answer his

hopes. Recruits did not come in, probably because most parishes were

thenceforth content to pay the smaller fines now imposed. Grenville even

ventured to assert that the Regular Army was smaller at the beginning of

1805 than a year earlier. Certainly the numbers were deficient; and Pitt

accordingly on 31st March 1805 brought in a Bill to attract men from the

Supplementary Militia into the Regular Army by a bounty of ten guineas

per man. This brought forward 11,000 men, but at the expense of the

Militia.[688] Thus Pitt did not solve the military problem. Who indeed

has solved it?

 

Most fortunately for England, the Emperor had made serious

miscalculations respecting the flotilla now preparing at the ports

between Ostend and Etaples. First he armed his gun-boats heavily so that

they might fight their way across against a fleet. On finding this to be

impossible, he had to face the delay and expense of reconstruction. Next

the harbours at and near Boulogne proved to be too shallow and too small

for the enlarged flotilla. The strengthening of the French fleet was

also a work of time. England therefore gained a year's respite. Indeed

not a few experienced naval officers scouted an invasion by the flotilla

as impossible. General Moore also believed that Napoleon would never be

so mad as to make the attempt, which must end in our glory and his

disgrace. Only by continuing to threaten us could he do harm.[689]

Another sceptic was Lord Melville, First Lord of the Admiralty, who, in

a letter of 14th October, urged Pitt during his stay at Weymouth to

represent to the King the importance of attacking the flotilla at

Boulogne, if only in order to show the impracticability of Napoleon's

scheme. Experienced officers, said Melville, reported that the flotilla

must embark the troops in the outer road; yet the work of getting that

vast concourse of boats out of the inner harbour could not be

accomplished in less than four, five, or perhaps even six tides. We must

therefore attack them during this tedious operation. "Our officers and

seamen," he continues, "have a perfect confidence that they can attack

them under their own batteries, and put them into immediate

confusion.... Their confidence is founded on the experiment they have

already made of entering in the night the Bay of Boulogne and sustaining

for many hours the whole fire of the enemy's batteries without a single

man being hurt." Moreover, the British fire-ships, being like ordinary

ships, will take the enemy by surprise and cause irremediable

confusion.[690] Apparently the King and Pitt thought an attack not only

too risky, in view of the failures at Boulogne in 1801 and on 3rd

October 1804, but also needless, if the flotilla were no more formidable

than Melville pronounced. While inspecting the "Royal Sovereign" at

Portsmouth on 6th October the King wrote to Pitt enjoining great

caution, as a failure would be very discreditable.[691]

 

I do not propose to discuss here the much debated question whether

Napoleon intended to invade England, or to wear us out by threats of

invasion.[692] Suffice it to say that no responsible Minister could

ignore those formidable preparations. Pitt therefore strove might and

main to raise martial enthusiasm by attending drills and reviews of

Volunteers. A cynical phrase in Grenville's letter of 25th August 1804

dwells on the ridiculous figure which he cut, riding from Downing Street

to Wimbledon Common and thence to Cox Heath in Kent "to inspect military

carriages, impregnable batteries, and Lord Chatham's reviews. Can he

possibly be serious in expecting Bonaparte now?" The sneer is a sign of

the strained relations between the cousins. Assuredly, if Bonaparte had

come, Grenville and his Foxite allies would have impeached a Minister

who left his country defenceless. Pitt showed a good example to country

gentlemen by drilling his corps of Volunteers at Walmer, so that it

became a model of efficiency. There was the greatest need at that point,

for the coast between Ramsgate and Dungeness presented exceptional

facilities for a landing except under the guns of Sandown, Deal, Walmer,

and Dover. Pitt's attention was specially directed to the open shelving

beach between Folkestone and Dungeness.

 

In truth, the district of Romney Marsh, which is not normally marshy,

offered the maximum of attractions to an invader, who, after beaching

his boats and entrenching himself behind a fosse, would find few, if

any, physical obstacles to his advance into the level tract between

Ashford and Tonbridge. As this route was undefended, Pitt and Camden, by

the month of October 1804, decided on the construction of the Hythe

Military Canal. On 24th October Pitt attended a meeting of the

"surveyors, lords, bailiffs and jurats" of Romney Marsh held at

Dymchurch, Generals Sir David Dundas and Moore, and Colonel Brown being

also present. It was agreed that the proposed canal from Sandgate to Rye

would be beneficial to Romney Marsh, and landlords were urged forthwith

to put their property at the disposal of Government, trusting to receive

compensation assessed by a duly qualified local jury. On Pitt's

recommendation the matter was passed at once, and he returned to Walmer

Castle.[693] By the end of 1804 the work was well in hand, the expense

of cutting the fosse of ten feet deep being estimated at