The History of England, from the Accession of James the Second - Volume 1 by Thomas Babington Macaulay (red scrolls of magic .TXT) 📖

/> party opposed to the court revived in an instant. During the

night which followed the outrage the whole city of London was in

arms. In a few hours the roads leading to the capital were

covered with multitudes of yeomen spurring hard to Westminster

with the badges of the parliamentary cause in their hats. In the

House of Commons the opposition became at once irresistible, and

carried, by more than two votes to one, resolutions of

unprecedented violence. Strong bodies of the trainbands,

regularly relieved, mounted guard round Westminster Hall. The

gates of the King's palace were daily besieged by a furious

multitude whose taunts and execrations were heard even in the

presence chamber, and who could scarcely be kept out of the royal

apartments by the gentlemen of the household. Had Charles

remained much longer in his stormy capital, it is probable that

the Commons would have found a plea for making him, under outward

forms of respect, a state prisoner.


He quitted London, never to return till the day of a terrible and

memorable reckoning had arrived. A negotiation began which

occupied many months. Accusations and recriminations passed

backward and forward between the contending parties. All

accommodation had become impossible. The sure punishment which

waits on habitual perfidy had at length overtaken the King. It

was to no purpose that he now pawned his royal word, and invoked

heaven to witness the sincerity of his professions. The distrust

with which his adversaries regarded him was not to be removed by

oaths or treaties. They were convinced that they could be safe

only when he was utterly helpless. Their demand, therefore, was,

that he should surrender, not only those prerogatives which he

had usurped in violation of ancient laws and of his own recent

promises, but also other prerogatives which the English Kings had

always possessed, and continue to possess at the present day. No

minister must be appointed, no peer created, without the consent

of the Houses. Above all, the sovereign must resign that supreme

military authority which, from time beyond all memory, had

appertained to the regal office.


That Charles would comply with such demands while he had any

means of resistance, was not to be expected. Yet it will be

difficult to show that the Houses could safely have exacted less.

They were truly in a most embarrassing position. The great

majority of the nation was firmly attached to hereditary

monarchy. Those who held republican opinions were as yet few, and

did not venture to speak out. It was therefore impossible to

abolish kingly government. Yet it was plain that no confidence

could be placed in the King. It would have been absurd in those

who knew, by recent proof, that he was bent on destroying them,

to content themselves with presenting to him another Petition of

Right, and receiving from him fresh promises similar to those

which he had repeatedly made and broken. Nothing but the want of

an army had prevented him from entirely subverting the old

constitution of the realm. It was now necessary to levy a great

regular army for the conquest of Ireland; and it would therefore

have been mere insanity to leave him in possession of that

plenitude of military authority which his ancestors had enjoyed.


When a country is in the situation in which England then was,

when the kingly office is regarded with love and veneration, but

the person who fills that office is hated and distrusted, it

should seem that the course which ought to be taken is obvious.

The dignity of the office should be preserved: the person should

be discarded. Thus our ancestors acted in 1399 and in 1689. Had

there been, in 1642, any man occupying a position similar to that

which Henry of Lancaster occupied at the time of the deposition

of Richard the Second, and which William of Orange occupied at

the time of the deposition of James the Second, it is probable

that the Houses would have changed the dynasty, and would have

made no formal change in the constitution. The new King, called

to the throne by their choice, and dependent on their support,

would have been under the necessity of governing in conformity

with their wishes and opinions. But there was no prince of the

blood royal in the parliamentary party; and, though that party

contained many men of high rank and many men of eminent ability,

there was none who towered so conspicously above the rest that he

could be proposed as a candidate for the crown. As there was to

be a King, and as no new King could be found, it was necessary to

leave the regal title to Charles. Only one course, therefore, was

left: and that was to disjoin the regal title from the regal

prerogatives.


The change which the Houses proposed to make in our institutions,

though it seems exorbitant, when distinctly set forth and

digested into articles of capitulation, really amounts to little

more than the change which, in the next generation, was effected

by the Revolution. It is true that, at the Revolution, the

sovereign was not deprived by law of the power of naming his

ministers: but it is equally true that, since the Revolution, no

minister has been able to retain office six months in opposition

to the sense of the House of Commons. It is true that the

sovereign still possesses the power of creating peers, and the

more important power of the sword: but it is equally true that in

the exercise of these powers the sovereign has, ever since the

Revolution, been guided by advisers who possess the confidence of

the representatives of the nation. In fact, the leaders of the

Roundhead party in 1642, and the statesmen who, about half a

century later, effected the Revolution, had exactly the same

object in view. That object was to terminate the contest between

the Crown and the Parliament, by giving to the Parliament a

supreme control over the executive administration. The statesmen

of the Revolution effected this indirectly by changing the

dynasty. The Roundheads of 1642, being unable to change the

dynasty, were compelled to take a direct course towards their

end.


We cannot, however, wonder that the demands of the opposition,

importing as they did a complete and formal transfer to the

Parliament of powers which had always belonged to the Crown,

should have shocked that great party of which the characteristics

are respect for constitutional authority and dread of violent

innovation. That party had recently been in hopes of obtaining by

peaceable means the ascendency in the House of Commons; but every

such hope had been blighted. The duplicity of Charles had made

his old enemies irreconcileable, had driven back into the ranks

of the disaffected a crowd of moderate men who were in the very

act of coming over to his side, and had so cruelly mortified his

best friends that they had for a time stood aloof in silent shame

and resentment. Now, however, the constitutional Royalists were

forced to make their choice between two dangers; and they thought

it their duty rather to rally round a prince whose past conduct

they condemned, and whose word inspired them with little

confidence, than to suffer the regal office to be degraded, and

the polity of the realm to be entirely remodelled. With such

feelings, many men whose virtues and abilities would have done

honour to any cause, ranged themselves on the side of the King.


In August 1642 the sword was at length drawn; and soon, in almost

every shire of the kingdom, two hostile factions appeared in arms

against each other. It is not easy to say which of the contending

parties was at first the more formidable. The Houses commanded

London and the counties round London, the fleet, the navigation

of the Thames, and most of the large towns and seaports. They had

at their disposal almost all the military stores of the kingdom,

and were able to raise duties, both on goods imported from

foreign countries, and on some important products of domestic

industry. The King was ill provided with artillery and

ammunition. The taxes which he laid on the rural districts

occupied by his troops produced, it is probable, a sum far less

than that which the Parliament drew from the city of London

alone. He relied, indeed, chiefly, for pecuniary aid, on the

munificence of his opulent adherents. Many of these mortgaged

their land, pawned their jewels, and broke up their silver

chargers and christening bowls, in order to assist him. But

experience has fully proved that the voluntary liberality of

individuals, even in times of the greatest excitement, is a poor

financial resource when compared with severe and methodical

taxation, which presses on the willing and unwilling alike.


Charles, however, had one advantage, which, if he had used it

well, would have more than compensated for the want of stores and

money, and which, notwithstanding his mismanagement, gave him,

during some months, a superiority in the war. His troops at first

fought much better than those of the Parliament. Both armies, it

is true, were almost entirely composed of men who had never seen

a field of battle. Nevertheless, the difference was great. The

Parliamentary ranks were filled with hirelings whom want and

idleness had induced to enlist. Hampden's regiment was regarded

as one of the best; and even Hampden's regiment was described by

Cromwell as a mere rabble of tapsters and serving men out of

place. The royal army, on the other hand, consisted in great part

of gentlemen, high spirited, ardent, accustomed to consider

dishonour as more terrible than death, accustomed to fencing, to

the use of fire arms, to bold riding, and to manly and perilous

sport, which has been well called the image of war. Such

gentlemen, mounted on their favourite horses, and commanding

little bands composed of their younger brothers, grooms,

gamekeepers, and huntsmen, were, from the very first day on which

they took the field, qualified to play their part with credit in

a skirmish. The steadiness, the prompt obedience, the mechanical

precision of movement, which are characteristic of the regular

soldier, these gallant volunteers never attained. But they were

at first opposed to enemies as undisciplined as themselves, and

far less active, athletic, and daring. For a time, therefore, the

Cavaliers were successful in almost every encounter.


The Houses had also been unfortunate in the choice of a general.

The rank and wealth of the Earl of Essex made him one of the most

important members of the parliamentary party. He had borne arms

on the Continent with credit, and, when the war began, had as

high a military reputation as any man in the country. But it soon

appeared that he was unfit for the post of Commander in Chief. He

had little energy and no originality. The methodical tactics