A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1 by Surendranath Dasgupta (best e reader for manga .TXT) 📖

is the movement (spandita) of consciousness that appears as the perceiving and the perceived. All the attributes (e.g. straight or curved) are imposed upon the charcoal fire, though in reality it does not possess them; so also all the appearances are imposed upon consciousness, though in reality they do not possess them. We could never indicate any kind of causal relation between the consciousness and its appearance, which are therefore to be demonstrated as unthinkable (acintya). A thing (dravya) is the cause of a thing (dravya), and that which is not a thing may be the cause of that which is not a thing, but all the appearances are neither things nor those which are not things, so neither are appearances produced from the mind (citta) nor is the mind produced by appearances. So long as one thinks of cause and effect he has to suffer the cycle of existence (sa@msâra), but when that notion ceases there is no sa@msâra. All things are regarded as being produced from a relative point of view only (sa@mv@rti), there is therefore nothing permanent (s'âs'vata). Again, no existent things are produced, hence there cannot be any destruction (uccheda). Appearances (dharma) are produced only apparently, not in reality; their coming into being is like mâyâ, and that mâyâ again does not exist. All appearances are like shoots of magic coming out of seeds of magic and are not therefore neither eternal nor destructible. As in dreams, or in magic, men are born and die, so are all appearances. That which appears as existing from an imaginary relative point of view (kalpita sa@mv@rti) is not so in reality (para-mârtha), for the existence depending on others, as shown in all relative appearance, is after all not a real existence. That things exist, do not exist, do exist and not exist, and neither exist nor not exist; that they are moving or steady, or none of those, are but thoughts with which fools are deluded.

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It is so obvious that these doctrines are borrowed from the Mâdhyamika doctrines, as found in the Nâgârjuna's kârikâs and the Vijñânavâda doctrines, as found in La@nkâvatâra, that it is needless to attempt to prove it, Gau@dapâda assimilated all the Buddhist S'ûnyavâda and Vijñânavâda teachings, and thought that these held good of the ultimate truth preached by the Upani@sads. It is immaterial whether he was a Hindu or a Buddhist, so long as we are sure that he had the highest respect for the Buddha and for the teachings which he believed to be his. Gau@dapâda took the smallest Upani@sads to comment upon, probably because he wished to give his opinions unrestricted by the textual limitations of the bigger ones. His main emphasis is on the truth that he realized to be perfect. He only incidentally suggested that the great Buddhist truth of indefinable and unspeakable vijñâna or vacuity would hold good of the highest âtman of the Upani@sads, and thus laid the foundation of a revival of the Upani@sad studies on Buddhist lines. How far the Upani@sads guaranteed in detail the truth of Gau@dapâda's views it was left for his disciple, the great S'a@nkara, to examine and explain.

Vedânta and S´a@nkara (788-820 A.D.).

Vedânta philosophy is the philosophy which claims to be the exposition of the philosophy taught in the Upani@sads and summarized in the Brahma-sûtras of Bâdarâya@na. The Upani@sads form the last part of the Veda literature, and its philosophy is therefore also called sometimes the Uttara-Mîmâ@msâ or the Mîmâmsâ (decision) of the later part of the Vedas as distinguished from the Mîmâ@msâ of the previous part of the Vedas and the Brâhma@nas as incorporated in the Pûrvamîmâ@msâ sûtras of Jaimini. Though these Brahma-sûtras were differently interpreted by different exponents, the views expressed in the earliest commentary on them now available, written by S'a@nkarâcârya, have attained wonderful celebrity, both on account of the subtle and deep ideas it contains, and also on account of the association of the illustrious personality of S'a@nkara. So great is the influence of the philosophy propounded by S´a@nkara and elaborated by his illustrious followers, that whenever we speak of the Vedânta philosophy we mean the philosophy that was propounded by S'a@nkara. If other expositions are intended the names of the exponents have to be mentioned (e.g. Râmânuja-mata, Vallabha-mata, etc.), In this

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chapter we shall limit ourselves to the exposition of the Vedânta philosophy as elaborated by S'a@nkara and his followers. In S'a@nkara's work (the commentaries on the Brahma-sûtra and the ten Upani@sads) many ideas have been briefly incorporated which as found in S'a@nkara do not appear to be sufficiently clear, but are more intelligible as elaborated by his followers. It is therefore better to take up the Vedânta system, not as we find it in S'a@nkara, but as elaborated by his followers, all of whom openly declare that they are true to their master's philosophy.

For the other Hindu systems of thought, the sûtras (Jaimini sûtra, Nyâya sûtra, etc.) are the only original treatises, and no foundation other than these is available. In the case of the Vedânta however the original source is the Upani@sads, and the sûtras are but an extremely condensed summary in a systematic form. S'a@nkara did not claim to be the inventor or expounder of an original system, but interpreted the sûtras and the Upani@sads in order to show that there existed a connected and systematic philosophy in the Upani@sads which was also enunciated in the sûtras of Bâdarâya@na. The Upani@sads were a part of the Vedas and were thus regarded as infallible by the Hindus. If S'a@nkara could only show that his exposition of them was the right one, then his philosophy being founded upon the highest authority would be accepted by all Hindus. The most formidable opponents in the way of accomplishing his task were the Mîma@msists, who held that the Vedas did not preach any philosophy, for whatever there was in the Vedas was to be interpreted as issuing commands to us for performing this or that action. They held that if the Upani@sads spoke of Brahman and demonstrated the nature of its pure essence, these were mere exaggerations intended to put the commandment of performing some kind of worship of Brahman into a more attractive form. S'a@nkara could not deny that the purport of the Vedas as found in the Brâhma@nas was explicitly of a mandatory nature as declared by the Mîmâ@msâ, but he sought to prove that such could not be the purport of the Upani@sads, which spoke of the truest and the highest knowledge of the Absolute by which the wise could attain salvation. He said that in the karmak@n@da—the (sacrificial injunctions) Brâhma@nas of the Vedas—the purport of the Vedas was certainly of a mandatory nature, as it was intended for ordinary people who were anxious for this or that pleasure,

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and were never actuated by any desire of knowing the absolute truth, but the Upani@sads, which were intended for the wise who had controlled their senses and become disinclined to all earthly joys, demonstrated the one Absolute, Unchangeable, Brahman as the only Truth of the universe. The two parts of the Vedas were intended for two classes of persons. S'a@nkara thus did not begin by formulating a philosophy of his own by logical and psychological analysis, induction, and deduction. He tried to show by textual comparison of the different Upani@sads, and by reference to the content of passages in the Upani@sads, that they were concerned in demonstrating the nature of Brahman (as he understood it) as their ultimate end. He had thus to show that the uncontradicted testimony of all the Upani@sads was in favour of the view which he held. He had to explain all doubtful and apparently conflicting texts, and also to show that none of the texts referred to the doctrines of mahat, prak@rti, etc. of the Sâ@mkhya. He had also to interpret the few scattered ideas about physics, cosmology, eschatology, etc. that are found in the Upani@sads consistently with the Brahman philosophy. In order to show that the philosophy of the Upani@sads as he expounded it was a consistent system, he had to remove all the objections that his opponents could make regarding the Brahman philosophy, to criticize the philosophies of all other schools, to prove them to be self-contradictory, and to show that any interpretation of the Upani@sads, other than that which he gave, was inconsistent and wrong. This he did not only in his bhâsya on the Brahma-sûtras but also in his commentaries on the Upani@sads. Logic with him had a subordinate place, as its main value for us was the aid which it lent to consistent interpretations of the purport of the Upani@sad texts, and to persuading the mind to accept the uncontradicted testimony of the Upani@sads as the absolute truth. His disciples followed him in all, and moreover showed in great detail that the Brahman philosophy was never contradicted either in perceptual experience or in rational thought, and that all the realistic categories which Nyâya and other systems had put forth were self-contradictory and erroneous. They also supplemented his philosophy by constructing a Vedânta epistemology, and by rethinking elaborately the relation of the mâyâ, the Brahman, and the world of appearance and other relevant topics. Many problems of great philosophical interest which

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had been left out or slightly touched by S'a@nkara were discussed fully by his followers. But it should always be remembered that philosophical reasonings and criticisms are always to be taken as but aids for convincing our intellect and strengthening our faith in the truth revealed in the Upani@sads. The true work of logic is to adapt the mind to accept them. Logic used for upsetting the instructions of the Upani@sads is logic gone astray. Many lives of S'a@nkarâcârya were written in Sanskrit such as the S'a@nkaradigvijaya, S'a@nkara-vijaya-vilâsa, S'a@nkara-jaya, etc. It is regarded as almost certain that he was born between 700 and 800 A.D. in the Malabar country in the Deccan. His father S'ivaguru was a Yajurvedi Brâhmin of the Taittirîya branch. Many miracles are related of S'a@nkara, and he is believed to have been the incarnation of S'iva. He turned ascetic in his eighth year and became the disciple of Govinda, a renowned sage then residing in a mountain cell on the banks of the Narbuda. He then came over to Benares and thence went to Badarikâs'rama. It is said that he wrote his illustrious bhâ@sya on the Brahma-sûtra in his twelfth year. Later on he also wrote his commentaries on ten Upani@sads. He returned to Benares, and from this time forth he decided to travel all over India in order to defeat the adherents of other schools of thought in open debate. It is said that he first went to meet Kumârila, but Kumârila was then at the point of death, and he advised him to meet Kumârila's disciple. He defeated Ma@n@dana and converted him into an ascetic follower of his own. He then travelled in various places, and defeating his opponents everywhere he established his Vedânta philosophy, which from that time forth acquired a dominant influence in moulding the religious life of India.

S'a@nkara carried on the work of his teacher Gaudapâda and by writing commentaries on the ten Upani@sads and the Brahma-sûtras tried to prove, that the absolutist creed was the one which was intended to be preached in the Upani@sads and the Brahma-sûtras [Footnote: 1]. Throughout his commentary on the Brahma-sûtras, there is ample evidence that he was contending against some other rival interpretations of a dualistic tendency which held that the Upani@sads partly favoured the Sâ@mkhya cosmology

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[Footnote 1: The main works of S'a@nkara are his commentaries (bhâ@sya) on the ten Upani@sads (Îs'a, Kena, Katha, Pras'na, Mu@ndaka, Mâ@n@dûkya, Aitareya, Taittirîya, B@rhadâra@nyaka, and Chândogya), and on the Brahma-sûtra.]

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of the existence of prak@rti. That these were actual textual interpretations of the Brahma-sûtras is proved by the fact that S'a@nkara in some places tries to show that these textual constructions were faulty [Footnote ref 1]. In one place he says that others (referring according to Vâcaspati to the Mîmâ@msâ) and some of us (referring probably to those who interpreted the sûtras and the Upani@sads from the Vedânta point of view) think that the soul is permanent. It is to refute all those who were opposed to the right doctrine of perceiving everything as the unity of the self (âtmaikatva) that this S'ârîraka commentary of mine is being attempted [Footnote ref 2]. Râmânuja, in the introductory portion of his bhâ@sya on the Brahma-sûtra, says that the views of Bodhâyana who wrote an elaborate commentary on the Brahma-sûtra were summarized by previous teachers, and that he was following this Bodhâyana bhâ@sya in writing his commentary. In the Vedârthasa@mgraha of Râmânuja mention is made of Bodhâyana, Tanka, Guhadeva, Kapardin, Bhâruci as Vedântic authorities, and Dravi@dâcâryya is referred to as the "bhâ@syakâra" commentator. In Chândogya III. x. 4, where the Upani@sad cosmology appeared to be different from the Vi@s@nupurana cosmology, S'a@nkara refers to an explanation offered on the point by one whom he calls "âcâryya" (atrokta@h parihârah âcâryyaih) and Ânandagiri says that "âcâryya" there refers to Dravi@dâcâryya. This Dravi@dâcâryya is known to us from Râmânuja's statement as being a commentator