The Story of the Upper Canada Rebellion by John Charles Dent (short novels in english .TXT) 📖

It would seem that President Russell himself had an itching palm, and that his individual interests were carefully watched over during his temporary administration of affairs. Everybody has heard how he made grants of public lands from himself to himself,[24] thereby violating one of the most cherished maxims of English jurisprudence. Lieutenant-Governor Hunter, in a letter written to a friend in England soon after his arrival at York, refers to P. R.--by whom Mr. Russell is clearly indicated--as "an avaricious one." In a subsequent part of the same epistle he adds: "So far as depended upon him [Mr. Russell] he would grant land to the de'il and all his family as good Loyalists, if they would only pay the fees." During Governor Hunter's own term of office, though there is no evidence of corruption or double-dealing on his own part, abuses continued to exist, and dishonesty too often stared honesty out of countenance. During the _regime_ of his successor, Commodore Grant, these abuses grew steadily, both in number and in bulk; and during Francis Gore's long though interrupted administration, they reached a height which called aloud for redress.
And here it is desirable to enquire into the specific nature of the manifold evils which enriched a few at the expense of the many; which endowed a venal and corrupt clique with a practical monopoly of political and social power; which sowed the deadly seed of factious strife, and stemmed the tide of Upper Canadian prosperity.
Theoretically speaking, the constitution granted to Upper Canada by the Act of 1791 was not unfairly represented by Lieutenant-Governor Simcoe as being "the very image and transcript of that of Great Britain."[25] We had a Legislative Council, the members whereof were appointed by the Crown for life. This body bore some resemblance to the British House of Lords. Next, we had a Legislative Assembly, the members whereof were periodically elected by the people--or rather by such of the people as possessed a sufficient property qualification to entitle them to exercise the franchise; and this property qualification was placed so low as almost to constitute universal suffrage.[26] The Assembly corresponded to the British House of Commons; and these two bodies--Council and Assembly--with the Lieutenant-Governor, constituted the Provincial Parliament. The last-named functionary of course corresponded to the Sovereign of Great Britain. He was appointed by the Crown, to whom he was solely responsible. He was in no constitutional sense responsible to either branch of the Legislature, or to both branches combined, or to any other cis-Atlantic authority whatsoever.
With such substitutes for King, Lords and Commons, Upper Canada might therefore be said to possess a pretty close copy of the British constitution. But when carried into practice the resemblance failed in a matter of the very highest import. The absence of ministerial responsibility was an all-comprehending divergence. When a British ministry fails to command the confidence of the electorate, as represented by the House of Commons, resignation must follow. In other words, the Government of the day derives its power from the people, to whom it is responsible for the manner in which it discharges the trust reposed in it; and the moment it fails to command public confidence it must give way to those who possess such confidence. The test of confidence is the vote in the House of Commons. This has been a recognized principle of English Parliamentary Government for nearly two hundred years; in fact, ever since the settlement of the constitution after the Revolution of 1688. With us in Upper Canada there was none of this ministerial responsibility. We had a ministry, but not a responsible ministry. It was manifestly impossible that each member of the Legislative Council and Assembly should be consulted as to every minute detail of the administration. Such a system would be cumbrous, and altogether impracticable. The actual task of carrying on the Government was therefore, as in England, entrusted to a small body of men who, from the nature of their functions, were known as the Executive Council. The members of this body were appointed by the Crown--that is to say, by the Lieutenant-Governor--at will. It was not necessary that they should have seats in either branch of the Legislature, to neither of which were they in any sense responsible. They were not required to possess any property or other qualification. In a word, the Crown's representative was at liberty to select them without any restriction, and no one in the Province would have had any constitutional right to call him to account if he had seen fit to enrol his own valet as an Executive Councillor. As matter of fact they were commonly selected from the judiciary and other salaried officials, and from the members of the Legislative Council. Their number was indeterminate, but was seldom less than four or more than six, in addition to the Lieutenant-Governor himself. Their functions consisted of giving advice to the Lieutenant-Governor on all matters of governmental policy, whenever he might deem it expedient to consult them. With respect to mere matters of detail, such as appointments to office, he was not supposed to be under the necessity of advising with them, nor, according to an opinion long and ostentatiously proclaimed, was he in these early days under the smallest obligation to follow their advice after it had been given. This, however, was merely the prescriptive view, and it derived no sanction from the Constitutional Act itself, which incidentally refers to the Executive Council as being appointed "within such Province, for the affairs thereof." On the other hand, the Executive Councillors themselves were not legally or constitutionally responsible to the Upper Canadian people, either individually or collectively, for any line of policy they might inculcate, or for any advice they might give. There were no means whereby they could be called to account by the people, even should they corruptly and openly abuse the trust reposed in them.
It is not difficult to foresee the result of so anomalous a state of things, though in this Province, owing to sparsity of population and other local causes, the result did not immediately become apparent. Simcoe was a strong-minded, as well as a conscientious man. He had a policy of his own for the government of the country, both at large and in detail, and during his _regime_ he carried out that policy as to him seemed best. He from time to time went through the form of consulting with his Executive Council, but, so far from receiving any impulse from them, he invariably carried all before him at the Council Board, and was the be-all and end-all of the Administration. He was, in short, a beneficent despot, of high and disinterested views, who accomplished much good for Upper Canada, and would doubtless have accomplished more but for his too early removal. The moment his all-pervading influence was gone, however, the mischief, as has already been seen, began to work. President Russell granted public lands to Peter Russell, and rapidly laid up a store of wealth. Where the head of the public service was thus disposed to help himself, we may be sure that subordinate officials were not slow to follow his example. Subsequent Lieutenant-Governors were for the most part military men, with little knowledge of the country's needs, and with a disposition to make their voluntary exile as easy and agreeable--and withal as profitable--as might be.[27] They naturally turned for counsel and assistance to their Executive Councillors, who thus became the dispensers of patronage and the supreme power in the State. The Crown's representative was a mere tool in their hands. Their domination was complete. "A body of holders of office thus constituted," says Lord Durham,[28] "without reference to the people or their representatives, must in fact, from the very nature of colonial government, acquire the entire direction of the affairs of the Province. A Governor, arriving in a colony in which he almost invariably has had no previous acquaintance with the state of parties or the character of individuals, is compelled to throw himself almost entirely upon those whom he finds placed in the position of his official advisers. His first acts must necessarily be performed, and his first appointments made, at their suggestion. And as these first acts and appointments give a character to his policy, he is generally brought thereby into immediate collision with the other parties in the country, and thrown into more complete dependence upon the official party and its friends."
It has been the fashion with most writers on our early history to represent the Executive Council as an arbitrary creation of the early Lieutenant-Governors: as an arrangement sanctioned by the Imperial authorities, but not authorized by the Provincial constitution. Such writers cannot have read the debates which took place in the House of Commons while the Constitutional Act of 1791 was under discussion there. Nay, they cannot have read the Act itself with much care. Nothing is more certain than that the framers of that statute contemplated the creation of an Executive Council. By reference to the seventh, thirty-fourth and thirty-eighth clauses it will be seen that the Executive Council is definitely mentioned by name, and that the appointment of such a body is assumed, and treated as a matter of course. But that the Council should occupy the same relative position as in Great Britain, and that it should be amenable to public opinion as expressed by the vote of the House of Assembly, does not appear to have been clearly understood. Indeed, with the exception of a few master minds, such as Pitt, Fox, and Burke, but little interest seems to have been taken by British legislators in this important colonial experiment. Parliamentary Government, though it had been long established in England, had not then been reduced to a science. Even such clear-sighted statesmen as Pitt and Fox were blind to facts which at the present day force themselves upon the attention of every student of constitutional history. What wonder, then, that there should have been defects in the measure of 1791? What wonder that even eminent statesmen should have attempted to square the circle in politics by introducing such an incongruity as representative institutions without Executive responsibility? Power was given to the popular branch of the Legislature to pass measures for the public good. But, no matter how overwhelming might be the majorities whereby such measures were passed, there was no obligation on the other branches of the Legislature to accept or act upon them. In the words of one of our own writers: "the Legislative Councils, nominated by the Crown, held the Legislative Assemblies by the throat, kept them prostrate, and paralyzed them."[29] As for the members of the Executive Council, they were to all intents and purposes independent of public opinion, and could override a unanimous vote of the Assembly without incurring any responsibility whatever. By reference to the correspondence between successive colonial Governors and the Home Office, it appears to have been tacitly recognized by the magnates on both sides of the Atlantic that it was unnecessary for a colonial Executive to defer to a Parliamentary majority. The right of appointment to office was considered to be the exclusive prerogative of the representative of the Sovereign, and it was regarded as a badge of colonial dependence that the people should have no voice in such matters.
It seems to have been assumed that certain Imperial interests were involved in this great question, and that to give way to the popular demand would be to render the colonies free from Imperial control. What those particular interests were which required to be protected by so jealous and anomalous a doctrine does not appear to be anywhere specified with precision. But nothing is more certain than that confusion and chaos must be the inevitable outcome of any attempt to reduce to practice such opposite principles as are involved in Representative Government and Executive irresponsibility. Such an attempt in England would very soon