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would require that the jug also resides in the cloth, and this would reduce difference to identity. If it is said that the absence of jug in the cloth is not a separate thing, but is rather the identical cloth itself, then also their difference as mutual exclusion cannot be explained. If this mutual negation (anyonyabhâva) is explained as the mere absence of jugness in the cloth and of clothness in the jug, then also a difficulty arises; for there is no such quality in jugness or clothness that they may be mutually excluded; and there is no such quality in them that they can be treated as identical, and so when it is said that there is no jugness in cloth we might as well say that there is no clothness in cloth, for clothness and jugness are one and the same, and hence absence of jugness in the cloth would amount to the absence of clothness in the cloth which is self-contradictory. Taking again the third alternative we see that if difference means divergence of characteristics (vaidharmya), then the question arises whether the vaidharmya or divergence as existing in jug has such a divergence as can distinguish it from the divergence existing in the cloth; if the answer is in the affirmative then we require a series of endless vaidharmyas progressing ad infinitum. If the answer is in the negative then there being no divergence between the two divergences they become identical, and hence divergence of characteristics as such ceases to exist. If it is said that the natural forms of things are difference in themselves, for each of them excludes the other, then apart from the differences—the natural forms—the things are reduced to formlessness (ni@hsvarûpatâ). If natural forms (svarûpa) mean special natural forms (svarûpa-vis'e@sa) then as the special natural forms or characteristics only represent difference, the natural forms of the things as apart from the special ones would appear to be identical. So also it may be proved that there is no such quality as p@rthaktva (separateness) which can explain differences of things, for there also the questions would arise as to whether separateness exists in different things or similar ones or whether separateness is identical with the thing in which it exists or not, and so forth.

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The earliest beginnings of this method of subtle analysis and dialectic in Indian philosophy are found in the opening chapters of Kathâvatthu. In the great Mahâbha@sya on Pâ@nini by Patañjali also we find some traces of it. But Nâgârjuna was the man who took it up in right earnest and systematically cultivated it in all its subtle and abstruse issues and counter-issues in order to prove that everything that appeared as a fixed order or system was non-existent, for all were unspeakable, indescribable and self-contradictory, and thus everything being discarded there was only the void (s'ûnya). S'a@nkara partially utilized this method in his refutations of Nyâya and the Buddhist systems; but S'rîhar@sa again revived and developed it in a striking manner, and after having criticized the most important notions and concepts of our everyday life, which are often backed by the Nyâya system, sought to prove that nothing in the world can be defined, and that we cannot ascertain whether a thing is or is not. The refutations of all possible definitions that the Nyâya could give necessarily led to the conclusion that the things sought to be defined did not exist though they appeared to do so; the Vedântic contention was that this is exactly as it should be, for the indefinite ajñâna produces only appearances which when exposed to reason show that no consistent notions of them can be formed, or in other words the world-appearance, the phenomena of mâyâ or ajñâna, are indefinable or anirvacanîya. This great work of S'rîhar@sa was followed by Tattvadîpikâ of Citsukha, in which he generally followed S'rîhar@sa and sometimes supplemented him with the addition of criticisms of certain new concepts. The method of Vedânta thus followed on one side the method of S'ûnyavâda in annulling all the concepts of world-appearance and on the other Vijñânavâda Buddhism in proving the self-illuminating character of knowledge and ultimately established the self as the only self-luminous ultimate reality.

The Theory of Causation.

The Vedânta philosophy looked at the constantly changing phenomena of the world-appearance and sought to discover the root whence proceeded the endless series of events and effects. The theory that effects were altogether new productions caused by the invariable unconditional and immediately preceding antecedents, as well as the theory that it was the cause which evolved

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and by its transformations produced the effect, are considered insufficient to explain the problem which the Vedãnta had before it. Certain collocations invariably and unconditionally preceded certain effects, but this cannot explain how the previous set of phenomena could be regarded as producing the succeeding set. In fact the concept of causation and production had in it something quite undefinable and inexplicable. Our enquiry after the cause is an enquiry after a more fundamental and primary form of the truth of a thing than what appears at the present moment when we wished to know what was the cause of the jug, what we sought was a simpler form of which the effect was only a more complex form of manifestation, what is the ground, the root, out of which the effect has come forth? If apart from such an enquiry we take the pictorial representation of the causal phenomena in which some collocations being invariably present at an antecedent point of time, the effect springs forth into being, we find that we are just where we were before, and are unable to penetrate into the logic of the affair. The Nyãya definition of cause and effect may be of use to us in a general way in associating certain groups of things of a particular kind with certain other phenomena happening at a succeeding moment as being relevant pairs of which one being present the other also has a probability of being present, but can do nothing more than this. It does not answer our question as to the nature of cause. Antecedence in time is regarded in this view as an indispensable condition for the cause. But time, according to Nyãya, is one continuous entity; succession of time can only be conceived as antecedence and consequence of phenomena, and these again involve succession; thus the notions of succession of time and of the antecedence and consequence of time being mutually dependent upon each other (anyonyâs'raya) neither of these can be conceived independently. Another important condition is invariability. But what does that mean? If it means invariable antecedence, then even an ass which is invariably present as an antecedent to the smoke rising from the washerman's house, must be regarded as the cause of the smoke [Footnote ref 1]. If it means such an antecedence as contributes to the happening of the effect, it becomes again difficult to understand anything about its contributing

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[Footnote 1: Asses are used in carrying soiled linen in India. Asses are always present when water is boiled for washing in the laundry.]

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to the effect, for the only intelligible thing is the antecedence and nothing more. If invariability means the existence of that at the presence of which the effect comes into being, then also it fails, for there may be the seed but no shoot, for the mere presence of the seed will not suffice to produce the effect, the shoot. If it is said that a cause can produce an effect only when it is associated with its accessory factors, then also the question remains the same, for we have not understood what is meant by cause. Again when the same effect is often seen to be produced by a plurality of causes, the cause cannot be defined as that which happening the effect happens and failing the effect fails. It cannot also be said that in spite of the plurality of causes, each particular cause is so associated with its own particular kind of effect that from a special kind of cause we can without fail get a special kind of effect (cf. Vâtsyâyana and Nyâyamañjarî), for out of the same clay different effects come forth namely the jug, the plate, etc. Again if cause is defined as the collocation of factors, then the question arises as to what is meant by this collocation; does it mean the factors themselves or something else above them? On the former supposition the scattered factors being always present in the universe there should always be the effect; if it means something else above the specific factors, then that something always existing, there should always be the effect. Nor can collocation (sâmagrî) be defined as the last movement of the causes immediately succeeding which the effect comes into being, for the relation of movement with the collocating cause is incomprehensible. Moreover if movement is defined as that which produces the effect, the very conception of causation which was required to be proved is taken for granted. The idea of necessity involved in the causal conception that a cause is that which must produce its effect is also equally undefinable, inexplicable, and logically inconceivable. Thus in whatsoever way we may seek to find out the real nature of the causal principle from the interminable series of cause-effect phenomena we fail. All the characteristics of the effects are indescribable and indefinable ajñâna of mâyâ, and in whatever way we may try to conceive these phenomena in themselves or in relation to one another we fail, for they are all carved out of the indefinite and are illogical and illusory, and some day will vanish for ever. The true cause is thus the pure being, the reality which is unshakable in itself, the ground upon

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which all appearances being imposed they appear as real. The true cause is thus the unchangeable being which persists through all experience, and the effect-phenomena are but impositions upon it of ajñâna or avidyâ. It is thus the clay, the permanent, that is regarded as the cause of all clay-phenomena as jug, plates, etc. All the various modes in which the clay appears are mere appearances, unreal, indefinable and so illusory. The one truth is the clay. So in all world-phenomena the one truth is being, the Brahman, and all the phenomena that are being imposed on it are but illusory forms and names. This is what is called the satkâryavâda or more properly the satkâra@navâda of the Vedânta, that the cause alone is true and ever existing, and phenomena in themselves are false. There is only this much truth in them, that all are imposed on the reality or being which alone is true. This appearance of the one cause the being, as the unreal many of the phenomena is what is called the vivarttavâda as distinguished from the sâ@mkhyayogapari@nâmavâda, in which the effect is regarded as the real development of the cause in its potential state. When the effect has a different kind of being from the cause it is called vivartta but when the effect has the same kind of being as the cause it is called pari@nâma (kâra@nasvalak@sa@nânyathâbhâva@h pari@nâma@h tadvilak@sa@no vivartta@h or vastunastatsamattâko'nyathâbhâva@h pari@nâma@h tadvi@samasattâka@h vivartta@h). Vedânta has as much to object against the Nyâya as against the pari@nâma theory of causation of the Sâ@mkhya; for movement, development, form, potentiality, and actuality—all these are indefinable and inconceivable in the light of reason; they cannot explain causation but only restate things and phenomena as they appear in the world. In reality however though phenomena are not identical with the cause, they can never be defined except in terms of the cause (Tadabhedam vinaiva tadvyatireke@na durvacam kâryyam vivartta@h).

This being the relation of cause and effect or Brahman and the world, the different followers of S'a@nkara Vedânta in explaining the cause of the world-appearance sometimes lay stress on the mâyâ, ajñâna or avidyâ, sometimes on the Brahman, and sometimes on them both. Thus Sarvaj@nâtmamuni, the writer of Sa@nk@sepa-s'ârîraka and his followers think that the pure Brahman should be regarded as the causal substance (upâdâna) of the world-appearance, whereas Prakâs'âtman Akhan@dânanda, and

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Mâdhava hold that Brahman in association with mâyâ, i.e. the mâyâ-reflected form of Brahman as Îs'vara should be regarded as the cause of the world-appearance. The world-appearance is an evolution or pari@nâma of the mâyâ as located in Îs'vara, whereas Îs'vara (God) is the vivartta causal matter. Others however make a distinction between mâyâ as the cosmical factor of illusion and avidyâ as the manifestation of the same entity in the individual or jîva. They hold that though the world-appearance may be said to be produced by the mâyâ yet the mind etc. associated with the individual are produced by the avidyâ with the jîva or the individual as the causal matter (upâdâna). Others hold that since it is the individual to whom both Îs'vara and the world-appearance are manifested, it is better rather to think that these are all manifestations of the jîva in association with his avidyâ or ajñâna. Others however hold that since in the

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