Problems of Life and Mind. Second series by George Henry Lewes (chrysanthemum read aloud txt) 📖

27. It would be a profitless labor to search out, and a wearisome infliction to set down, the various definitions which have been proposed and accepted; but certain characteristic examples may be selected. All that I am acquainted with belong to two classes: 1°, the meta-physiological hypothesis of an extra-organic agent, animating lifeless matter by unknown powers; 2°, the physiological hypothesis which seeks the cause of the phenomena (i. e. the conditions) within the organism itself,—a group of conditions akin to those manifested elsewhere, but differently combined. The first hypotheses are known under the names of Animism and Vitalism,—more commonly the latter. The second are known as Organicism and Materialism,—but the latter term only applies to some of the definitions.

28. Under Vitalism are included all the hypotheses of a soul, a spirit, an archæus, a vital principle, a vital force, a nisus formativus, a plan or divine idea, which have from time to time represented the metaphysical stage of Biology. The characteristic of that stage is the personification of a mystery, accompanied by the persuasion that to name a mystery is to explain it. In all sciences when processes are imperfectly observed, the theory of the processes (which is a systematic survey of the available evidence marshalled in the order of causal dependence) is supplemented by hypothesis, which fills up with a guess the gap left by observation. The difference between the metaphysical and the positive stages of a science lies in the kind of guess thus introduced to supplement theory, and the degree of reliance accorded to it. I have more than once insisted on the scientific canon that “to be valid, an explanation must be expressed in terms of phenomena already observed”; now it is quite clear that most of the extra-organic hypotheses do not fulfil this condition; no one having ever observed a spirit, an archæus, or a vital principle; but only imagined these agents to explain the facts observed. As an example of the difference, and a proof that the value of an hypothesis does not rest on the facility with which it connects observations, and seems to explain them, take the three hypotheses of animal spirits, nervous fluid, and electricity, by which neural processes have been explained. The animal spirits are imaginary; the nervous fluid is without a basis in observation, no evidence of such a fluid having been detected; but electricity (or, speaking rigorously, the movements classed as electrical), although not proved to be the agent in nerve-action, is proved to exist in nerves as elsewhere, and its modes of operation are verifiable. It, therefore, and it alone of the three hypotheses, is in conformity with the scientific canon. It may not, on full investigation, meet all requirements; it may be rejected as imperfect; but it is the kind of guess which scientific theory demands.

The second difference noticeable between the metaphysical and the positive stages is the degree of reliance accorded to hypothesis; which is very much the same as that noticeable in the uncritical and critical attitudes of untrained and trained intellects. The one accepts a guess as if it were a proof; is fascinated by the facility of linking together isolated observations, and, relying on the guess as truth, proceeds to deduce conclusions from it; the other accepts a guess as an aid in research, trying by its aid to come upon some observation which will reveal the hidden process; but careful never to allow the guess to supersede observation, or to form a basis of deductions not immediately verified.

29. A glance at the metaphysiological definitions will detect both the kind of guess and the kind of reliance which prevailed. The mystery was not simply recognized, it was personified as an entity: Will and Intelligence were liberally accorded to it, for it was supposed to shape matter, and direct force into predestined paths by prescience of a distant end. The observed facts of the egg passing through successive changes into a complex organism were so marvellous, so unlike any facts observable in the inorganic world, that they seemed to demand a cause drawn from higher sources. The mystery of life obtruded itself at every turn. It was named, and men fancied it explained. But in truth no mystery is got rid of by explanation, however valid; it is only shifted farther back. Explanation is the resolution of a complex phenomenon into its conditions of existence—the product is reduced to its factors; the explanation is final when this resolution has been so complete that a reconstruction of the product is possible from the factors. The vast majority of explanations—especially in the organic region—are no more than what mathematicians call “a first approximation.” It is through successive approximations that science advances; but even when the final stage is reached a mystery remains. We may know that certain elements combine in certain proportions to produce certain substances; but why they produce these, and not different substances, is no clearer than why muscles contract or organisms die. This Why is, however, an idle question. That alone which truly concerns us is the How, and not the Why.

30. Biology is still a long way off the How. But it can boast of many approximations; and its theories are to be tested by the degree of approximation they effect. In this light the physiological, intra-organic, hypotheses manifestly have the advantage. Many of them are indeed very unacceptable; they are guided by a mistaken conception of the truths reached by Analysis. For when men first began to discard the extra-organic hypotheses, and to look into the organism itself, they were so much impressed by the mechanical facts observed, that they endeavored to reduce all the phenomena to Mechanics. The circulation became simply a question of hydraulics. Digestion was explained as trituration. The chemists then appeared, and their shibboleths were “affinities” and “oxidations.” With Bichat arose the anatomical school, which decomposing the organism into organs, the organs into tissues, and these tissues into their elements, sought the analytical conditions of existence of the organism in the properties of these tissues, and the functions of these organs. The extra-organic agent was thus finally shown to be not only a fiction, but a needless fiction.

Every student of the history of the science will note how from the very necessities of the case the metaphysiologists, without relinquishing their Vital Principle, have been led more and more to enter on the track of the physiologists, pursuing their researches more and more into the processes going on in the organism, and assigning more and more causal efficiency to these, with a corresponding restriction of the province of their extra-organic cause. Hence in the ranks of the vitalists have been found some of the very best observers and theorists; but they were such in despite of, and not in consequence of, their hypothesis, which was only invoked by them when evidence was at fault. Nor, unscientific as vitalism is, can we deny that it has been so far serviceable to the science, that it has corrected the materialist error of endeavoring to explain organic phenomena by physico-chemical laws; and has persistently kept in view the radical difference between organic and inorganic.

31. These remarks may justify a selection of definitions, classified under the two heads. The selection is fitly opened by the Aristotelian definition which prevailed for centuries.

Aristotle distinguishes Life, which he says means “the faculties of self-nourishment, self-development, and self-decay,” from the Vital Principle. Every natural body manifesting life may be regarded as an essential existence (οὐσία); but then it is an existence only as a synthesis (ὡς συθέτη); and since an organism is such a synthesis, being possessed of Life, it cannot be the Vital Principle (ψυχή). Therefore it follows that the Vital Principle must be an essence, as being the Form of a natural body holding life in potentiality. The Vital Principle is the primary reality of an organism. “It is therefore as idle to ask whether the Vital Principle and Organism are one, as whether the wax and the impress on it are one.... Thus if an eye were an animal, Vision would be its Vital Principle: for Vision is, abstractedly considered, the essence of the eye; but the eye is the body of Vision, and if Vision be wanting, then, save in name, it is no longer an eye.”

Apart from certain metaphysical implications, inevitable at that period, there is profound insight in this passage. His adversary Telesio quite misconceives the meaning here assigned to the Vital Principle.8

32. Let us pass over all the intermediate forms of the hypothesis, and descend to Kant, who defines Life “an internal principle of action” (this does not distinguish it from fermentation); an organism he says is “that in which every part is at once means and end.” “Each part of the living body has its cause of existence in the whole organism; whereas in non-living bodies each