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subject behaves unconcerned and assumes an “I don’t care,” or a “What-is-the-use” attitude. This will be called indifferent reaction. These three types of behavior are characteristic of the reactive consciousness to anger. The emotion may contain one, or it may contain all three of these types before it finally ends. Going over the results of the observations of all the subjects, about fourteen hundred sixty eight reactions are counted in the six hundred cases of anger studied. Seventy one percent of such reactions are classified as attributive reaction, eighteen percent are the contrary type, and eleven percent are the indifferent.

The initial reaction to anger is always of the attributive type. Whatever other reactions may follow in the course of the entire anger period, the attributive reaction in some form is characteristic of the early stage of the emotion. The contrary and indifferent types are secondary in point of time and occur after the initial hostile tendencies have been restrained. If an emotion of anger is made up entirely of the attributive type, which frequently occurs, and continues for any length of time, it is always noted that some of the reactions are more crude and unsocial and others are refined, disguised it may be, covered up, and when the emotion is most intense whether it be in the initial stage or elsewhere, the unsocial attributive tendencies are usually found at those places.

ATTRIBUTIVE REACTION

The anger consciousness in its development, especially in its initial stage is characterized by restraint. The subject is aware of hostile unlawful impulses that must be controlled. Its initial stage is usually reported as unpleasant. The second characteristic of the anger consciousness is reaction of some sort. What takes place on the mental side, is along the line of least resistance for the moment. Mental life is rather versatile in providing subjective reaction to anger. Motor and visual imagery play an important role involving lessened resistance. A third characteristic of the anger consciousness is what the Germans call “Verschiebung.” The emotive tendency is inhibited. A substitution follows for the tendencies restrained. It may be purely subjective or only partly subjective. But the subject in the observation of his anger is fully aware that he would behave in some more drastic fashion if the restraint were off.

Substitution of Visual and Motor Imagery. With the subjects studied there occurred no real pugnacious attack in which blows were struck except with those persons who have the correction of children; there are also but few real quarrels reported. But the versatility of consciousness in substituting and providing merely mental reaction for other hostile tendencies that the subject really wished fulfilled is quite striking. Visual and motor imagery may take the place of tendencies which are inhibited and allow a successful expression. An observation from A. will illustrate. “I found myself saying cutting remarks as if speaking directly to X., and I planned a course of behavior toward him that I considered would humiliate him. I finally ended by imagining myself kicking him down the street, telling him I wanted no more to do with him. The imagery of this act was pleasant. I felt victorious. X. was imagined as penitent.” The imagery of the pugnacious attack in some form is a quite common characteristic of the mental reaction to anger. It occurs after a period of restraint when there seems nothing else to be done; imagination and fancy appear at such a crisis and assume the role of a surrogate for hostile tendencies, which the subject has controlled. The awareness of the direct end of the initial tendency of the anger may be present in consciousness or the aim may be indefinite. Subject I. observes, “I felt as if I wanted to say something or do something at once that would get even with X. The thing to do was vague, but the impulse to do something in a hostile manner was strong.” The aim of behavior may be rather definitely formed in the early stage of the anger consciousness as soon as the irascible feelings are definitely referred to some object. An illustration from A. follows:—“The impulse to take X. (a child) and shake him, was strong on the first stimulus of the emotion; suppressing this I spoke crossly to him, at the same time there appeared motor imagery of my holding him with both hands and shaking him.” Another instance from the same subject: “I had an impulse to punish X., restraint was immediately followed by a motor and visual imagery of the act of punishment.” Subject C. observes, “The first impulse was to kick X., the restraint was accompanied by motor images of kicking him, followed by the image of his being hurt in the face.” E. states, “I felt as if I would like to shake him and imagined myself doing it.” G. developed a case of anger from a series of irritating stimuli. Describing his anger, he says, “I felt like I wanted to bite or hit something.” B. reports a case when he had been humiliated by some boys along the street. The tendency to anger at the time was controlled, but as he passed on, the emotion arose with greater intensity. “I imagined myself beating one of the boys, I gave him several good punches; he had no show at all. I came out victor and was enjoying it all.” One of the many sorts of mental reactions that H. reports to a case of anger that extended over three quarters of an hour, is, “I imagined myself charging at him and his looking frightened at my behavior.”

Substitution of Irascible Play. The imagined fight and victory take the place of tendencies which would have a more objective expression. Another sort of substitution of the initially restrained emotional reaction, is first to lessen the restraint by inhibition and react in some less crude manner in a slightly disguised form, which gives a feeling of satisfaction in inner victory and at the same time lacks the objective hostility. A. felt humiliated because of X.’s remark in the presence of others. “Resenting his familiarity, I went out of my way to pass him; I grabbed his arm and gave it a tremendous grip, at the same time I smiled playfully. I really aimed to hurt him and was fully aware that I wished to hurt him worse than I did. What I did was merely a substitution, but now that the act was over, I felt fully satisfied and pleased with what I had done.” The playful attack is a rather common sort of reaction to resentment with observers A., C. and D. D. observes, “I was angry at X. and was trying to control myself; suddenly I grabbed him and punched him several times in the ribs, at the same time I smiled. I did not want him or the others to know I was angry. I enjoyed pummelling him, as I felt I had demonstrated to him that I could handle him.” In such observations the subject’s awareness that what he does in a playful fashion is but a substitution of what he would like to do in another manner, is significant. This sort of awareness seems to be ignored in the every-day experience of our emotional life. Attention is directed to the reaction; we involuntarily seek a place of lessened resistance, but the act of introspection allows the subject to be more clearly aware of the inhibited reaction and the substituted expression which follows.

Substitution of Imaginary Invective and Cutting Remarks. The vocal expression of anger is one of primary significance. Swearing, grumbling, invective, quarrelling, interjectional obloquy, etc., are very common signs of anger. The results would very strongly suggest that anger rarely, if ever, occurs without its vocal expression in some manner, if not by direct vocalization either by inner speech or voco-motor imagery. Introspection of slight emotions or anger lasting momentarily, show as their most marked sensation, one of tightening of the throat muscles. Defamatory language or mild swearing is common with all the subjects studied while in the privacy of their own rooms when the restraint is off. The expression of the vocal cords is one of the most successful vents. B. was instructed to abandon himself to vigorous invective and interjectional obloquy when the emotion first began and note the result. He followed these instructions on three occasions when the emotion from the beginning was unpleasant, developing from a fore-period of irritation. With this sort of voluntary vigorous vocal expression, the anger soon passed into rather pleasurable excitement.

The reaction to anger in its initial stage may be a vocal tendency to express one’s anger, referring the emotion directly to some person or to an object. When the restraint is on, either from motives of decency or the absence of the offender, the thinking of cutting remarks may be substituted for the actual verbal attack. The subject is aware that what he says to himself he would like to say to the offender. Methods of procedure are elaborately planned for a future verbal attack, just what he expects to say and wants to say, how he will say it, the inflection of the voice, the emphasis of words and dramatic attitude. He may imagine the effect of the attack on his opponent, the latter may talk back. The imagined verbal combat is usually a one-sided affair and ends in victory for the subject. Drastic remarks and the most cutting sarcasms are planned at times by the subjects studied. However there are wide individual differences which cannot be referred entirely to the difference in intensity of the emotional life. Habit apparently plays an important role. D. felt that he had been imposed upon by X. and Y. After the humiliating incident had passed, D. suddenly found himself in the midst of an anger reaction. “I found myself having a verbal combat with them. I imagined I was telling X., ‘I should think it costs but little to act like a gentleman, but I presume this is an illustration of your piggishness.’ Then I imagined Y. beginning to talk. Just what he was saying was not clear, but I was aware that he was helping X. I interrupted by telling him, ‘I understand you are from —— and of course I can’t expect anything better of you.’ They began to talk back several times, but I got the better of them and felt pleased about it.”

The cutting remarks are at times crude and abusive. The subject may swear at the offender. Persons who do not swear in actual life frequently do in imagination. In such imaginative verbal attacks the offender’s bad qualities are displayed before him, at other times the same subject may resort to imagery, sarcasm, witticism or joking of a hostile nature. The motivation seems to be to imagine remarks that would humiliate the offender. The visual imagery of the astonished humble opponent is usual in these imaginary attacks. Crude and abusive remarks may at times seem entirely appropriate; at others, sarcasm and irascible joking seem more adequate. Sarcasm usually develops rather slowly with a period of restraint preceding it, unless it is ready made for the occasion. When the fitting sarcastic remark is found, it is usually accompanied by pleasantness in some degree. F. observes, “I could get no imaginative remark that would suit me at first, but after the emotion appeared several times in succession I suddenly discovered one and found myself saying it over and over again. It rather pleased me, I practiced it to get the right inflection and emphasis that I desired.”

The imaginative cutting remark may be in the second person as if addressed directly to the offender, especially when the emotion is intense. It may be in the third person about the offender, his unfavorable qualities

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