Washington's Engineer Norman Desmarais (best e book reader .TXT) 📖

in their presence, each Commanding officer of a Column, according to the size of the works before him, and the number of men which he judges are contained in them, divides his troops into two parts, one of which surrounds his works and attacks them vigorously while the other marches boldly through the Intervals and falls upon the Troops in the Rear—But every one sees how much harmony is required in all these dispositions—how much presence of mind in the Superior officers, how much firmness in the Troops who have to execute all their manoeuvers under the fire of an Enemy who are in a great measure covered.

If the Enemy Works are not inclosed, the Enterprise would be much less dangerous—if they are, the Enterprise is too hardy.

His Excellency, I think, desired us to say a word respecting the operations in Jersey. In general it seems to me that we can do nothing better than to endeavor to attack the Enemy’s Force there with superior numbers—but there is a very important observation to be made, which is that we should not weaken ourselves too much here, for we are to consider that the Enemy may recross their Troops in one night and attack us by daybreak with their whole force.

The Chevalier du Portail

P.S. If however an attack be determined upon, the Enemys Works should be more particularly reconnoitred.3

Duportail’s suggestion must have been acted upon, as Colonel John Laurens, Washington’s aide-de-camp, wrote in a letter to his father, then president of Congress, on November 26:

Our Commander-in-Chief wishing ardently to gratify the public expectation by making an attack upon the enemy yet preferring at the same time a loss of popularity to engaging in an enterprise which he could not justify . . . went yesterday [November 25], to view the works. . . . we saw redouts of a very respectable profile, faced with planks, formidably fraised, and the intervals between them closed with an abattis unusually strong. General Duportail declared that in such works with five thousand men he would bid defiance to any force that should be brought against him.4

WINTER QUARTERS

General Washington abandoned any immediate thought of attacking the enemy and turned his attention to selecting a site for winter quarters. He convened another council of general officers on November 30, in which many places were suggested and their various claims to acceptance discussed. They included Wilmington on the Delaware, positions back of Chester and Darby, Lancaster and Reading. These latter places were much farther removed from the enemy lines. Again, the commander in chief requested that his officers give their opinions in writing.

No minutes of the meeting have been found, but Robert Hanson Harrison, Washington’s aide-de-camp, summarized the officers’ preferences. Generals Armstrong, Duportail, Greene, Lafayette, Scott, Smallwood, and Wayne favored Wilmington. Generals de Kalb, Knox, Maxwell, Muhlenberg, Poor, Sullivan, Varnum, Weedon, and Woodford favored the Lancaster-Reading line. Varnum preferred “Reading to Easton.” Lord Stirling was the only one to favor the “Great Valley or Trydruffin.” Generals Duportail and Irvine were “for hutting in a strong position,” and Pulaski favored a winter campaign.5

Duportail responded,

By taking Winter Quarters from Lancaster to Reading, we abandon to the Enemy Jersey and all the Country adjacent to Darby, Chester and Wilmington, one of the richest Tracts in this part of the Continent—By establishing them at Wilmington we cover the Country, and do not so completely abandon that part of it which is before Philadelphia, nor even Jersey because our proximity to the Enemy and the ease with which we could throw ourselves upon the rear of their lines in case the Schuylkill should be frozen, will keep them in respect, and put it out of their power to send considerable detachments on the other side of the Delaware from the fear of weakening themselves too much. . . . The position then of Wilmington answers the end of making very difficult the subsistence of Genl. Howe. . . . This position further deprives him of the means of recruiting in the Country,—extending himself in it, adding to the number of his Partisans, in a word, gaining the Country—It has besides the advantage of rendering his communication with his fleet difficult. . . . I should not omit mentioning . . . should War be declared between France and England, and Genl. Howe, from a dread of finding himself blocked up in the Spring by a French Fleet, should wish to quit Philadelphia, we shall be within distance at Wilmington for hindering his embarcation. . . .

This Position [of Wilmington] then unites great Military Advantages—but . . . to ask whether it is eligible is to ask whether we should expose ourselves to an Action, and perhaps more than one— . . . at present . . . if we should gain an advantage we should be unable to pursue it—if we experience a check we run the risque of seeing our army dissipated in the rude marches consequent on a defeat. Consistently with the plan which we ought to form of putting our army in good condition this winter and preparing it for a good Campaign we ought not to have its Repose preceeded by a Defeat.

As to the other points to be considered in this Question, whether Wilmington or Lancaster will be the most proper situation for furnishing the Army with every necessary, I cannot decide, being ignorant of the Country, but it appears to me in general that this point deserves our most serious attention—it is much better to lose Soldiers in Combats with the Enemy to whom we cause a loss at the same time than to lose them by Disorders or Desertion arising from their Misery. Misery, destroys part of an Army and leaves the other without Vigour, without Courage and without good will—we should find ourselves then in the Spring with a Body of an Army incapable of anything, and consequently have no right to expect a successful campaign.6

COUNCIL OF WAR

As a brigadier general,