More Guns Less Crime John Jr (accelerated reader books .txt) 📖

sample period. However, permits granted in the counties surrounding Philadelphia were valid for use in the city.

4. However, the increase in the number of property crimes is larger than the decrease in the number of robberies.

5. While I adopt the classifications used by Cramer and Kopel in "'Shall Issue': The New Wave of Concealed-Handgun Permit Laws," Tennessee Law Review 62 (Spring 1995), some are more convinced by other classifications of states (for example, see Doug Weil, "Response to John Lott's Study on the Impact of 'Carry-Concealed' Laws on Crime Rates," U.S. Newswire, Aug. 8, 1996; and Stephen P. Teret, "Critical Comments on a Paper by Lott and Mustard," School of Hygiene and Public Health, Johns Hopkins University, mimeo, Aug. 7, 1996). Setting the "shall-issue" dummy for Maine to zero and rerunning the regressions shown in table 4.1 results in the "shall-issue" coefficient equaling—3% for violent crimes, —8% for murder, -6% for rape, —4.5 for aggravated assault, —1% for robbery, 3% for property crimes, 8.1% for automobile theft, 0.4% for burglary, and 3% for larceny. Similarly, setting the "shall-issue" dummy for Virginia to zero results in the "shall-issue" coefficient equaling —4% for violent crimes, —9% for murder, -5% for rape, —5% for aggravated assault, —0.11% for robbery, 3% for property crimes, 9% for automobile theft, 2% for burglary, and 3% for larceny. As a final test, dropping both Maine and Virginia from the data set results in the "shall-issue" coefficient equaling —2% for violent crimes, —10% for murder, -6% for rape, —3% for aggravated assault, 0.6% for robbery, 3.6% for property crimes, 10% for automobile theft, 2% for burglary, and 4% for larceny.

6. This information is obtained from Mortality Detail Records provided by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

7. This assumption is implausible for many reasons. One reason is that accidental handgun deaths occur in states without concealed-handgun laws.

8. Given the possible relationship between drug prices and crime, I reran the regressions in table 4.1 and included an additional variable for cocaine prices. One argument linking drug prices and crime is that if the demand for drugs is inelastic and if people commit crimes in order to finance their habits, higher drug prices might lead to increased levels of crime. Using the Drug Enforcement Administration's STRIDE data set from 1977 to 1992 (with the exceptions of 1988 and 1989), Michael Grossman, Frank J. Chaloupka, and Charles C. Brown, ("The Demand for Cocaine by Young Adults: A Rational Addiction Approach," NBER working paper, July 1996), estimate the price of cocaine as a function of its purity, weight, year dummies, year dummies interacted with eight regional dummies, and individual city dummies. There are two problems with this measure of predicted prices: (1) it removes observations during a couple of important years during which changes were occurring in concealed-handgun laws, and (2) the predicted values that I obtained ignored the city-level observations. The reduced number of observations provides an important reason why I do not include this variable in the regressions shown in table 4. 1. However, the primary impact of including this new variable is to make the "shall-issue" coefficients in the violent-crime regressions even more negative and more

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significant (for example, the coefficient for the violent-crime regression becomes -7.5%, -10% for the murder regression, -7.7% for rape, and -11% for aggravated assault, with all of them significant at more than the 0.01 level). Only for the burglary regression does the "shall-issue" coefficient change appreciably: it becomes negative and insignificant. The variable for drug prices itself is negatively related to murders and rapes and positively and significantly related, at least at the 0.01 level for a one-tailed t-test, to all the other categories of crime. I would like to thank Michael Grossman for providing me with the original regressions on drug prices from his paper.

9. In contrast, if we had instead inquired what difference it would make in crime rates if either all states or no states adopted right-to-carry concealed-handgun laws, the case of all states adopting concealed-handgun laws would have produced 2,000 fewer murders; 5,700 fewer rapes; 79,000 fewer aggravated assaults; and 14,900 fewer robberies. In contrast, property crimes would have risen by 336,410.

10. Ted R. Miller, Mark A. Cohen, and Brian Wiersema, Victim Costs and Consequences: A New Look (Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, Feb. 1996).

11. See Sam Peltzman, "The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation," Journal of Political Economy 83 (Aug. 1975): 677-725.

12. To be more precise, a one-standard-deviation change in the probability of arrest accounts for 3 to 11 percent of a one-standard-deviation change in the various crime rates.

13. Translating this into statistical terms, a one-standard-deviation change in the percentage of the population that is black, male, and between 10 and 19 years of age explains 22 percent of the ups and downs in the crime rate.

14. This is particularly observed when there are more black females between the ages of 20 and 39, more white females between the ages of 10 and 39 and over 65, and females of other races between 20 and 29.

15. In other words, the second number shows how a one-standard-deviation change in an explanatory variable explains a certain percent of a one-standard-deviation change in the various crime rates.

16. While I believe that such variables as the arrest rate should be included in any regressions on crime, one concern with the results reported in the various tables is over whether the relationship between the "shall-issue" variable and the crime rates occurs even when all the other variables are not controlled for. Using weighted least squares and reporting only the "shall-issue" coefficients, I estimated the following regression coeffi-

How do average crime rates differ among states with and without nondiscretionary laws?

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