The Religion of Nature Delineated William Wollaston (my reading book .TXT) 📖

known rule is Ἔνδοξα, τὰ δοκοῦντα πᾶσιν, ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις, ἢ τοῖς σοφοῖς, καὶ τούτοις, ἢ τοῖς πᾶσιν, ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις, ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα γνωρίμοις καὶ ἐνδόξοις: “Those things are probable, which seem so to all men, or to most men, or to wise men: or which seem so to such as these, viz. to all, or to a great many, or to the most knowing and those of the best reputation.” (Topics.) But it is not applicable to all cases. ↩

Δοκεῖ μοι χρῆναι παῤ ἀυτῶν [πρεσβυτῶν] πυνθάνεσθαι, ὥσπερ τινὰ ὁδὸν προεληλυθότων, ἣν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἴσως δεήσει πορεύεσθαι, ποία τίς ἐστι: “It seems best to enquire of old men, who have gone over the way that you are to go, what sort of a way it is.” (Plato, Republic.) ↩

When Sophocles, now grown old, was asked, Πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς τ᾿ αφροδίσια, “What relish he had of women,” he answered, Εὐφήμει, ὦ ἄνθρωπε ἀσμενέστατα μέν τοι αὐτὸ ἀπέφυγον, ὥσπερ λυττῶντά τινα καὶ ἄγριον δεσπότην ἀποφυγών⁠ ⁠… παντάπασι γὰρ τῶν γε τοιούτων ἐν τῷ γήρᾳ πολλὴ εἰρήνη γίγνεται καὶ ἐλευθερία: “Be quiet, Sir. I flee from them as gladly as I would run away from a mad or a cruel master⁠ ⁠… there is great ease and freedom from all such things when a man is grown old.” (Plato, Republic, et al.) ↩

Ἐν βραχεῖ σφυρήλατον νοῦν περιεχούτα: “That contains solid sense in a small compass.” (Plutarch, De Garrulitate.) ↩

Prerequisites. (Editor’s note.) ↩

Sicut ἀμαθία μὲν θράσος, λογισμὸς δὲ ὄκνον φέρει (è Thucydides) ita recta ingenia debilitat verecundia, perversa confirmat audacia: “As ignorance carries impudence along with it (out of Thucydides’s History of the Peloponnesian War) and reputation makes men lazy; so modesty weakens great geniuses, and impatience confirms the obstinate.” (Pliny, the younger, Epistles.) ↩

Ὅταν τι βουλόμεθα ἀκριβὲς νοῆσαι, ἐις ἐρημίαν αποδιδράσκομεν, τὰς ὄψεις, τὰ ὦτα ἐπιφράττομεν, ἀποταττόμεθα ταῖς αισθήσεσι: “When we would consider a thing very exactly, we retire into some private place, we wink our eyes, and stop our ears, and renounce all our bodily senses.” (Philo Judaeus, Legum Allegoriæ.) ↩

Aliis nullus est deorum respectus, aliis pudendus: “Some do not worship the Gods at all, and others do it in a shameful manner.” (Pliny the Elder, Natural History.) The former part of this observation is in truth the effect of the latter. ↩

Pudet dicere frequentiam salutandi, etc.: “I am ashamed to relate what sort of visits they make to each other, etc.” (Jerome, Epistles.) ↩

Τὰ χρηστ᾿ ἐπιστάμεθα, καὶ γιγνώσκομεν, Οὐκ ἐκπονοῦμεν δ᾿ οἱ μὲν ἀργίας ὕπο, κ.τ.λ.: “We know and understand what is good, but we do not labor after it; some out of laziness, etc.” (Euripides, Hippolytus.) ↩

פאת, “fate” in Arabic is “to die”: and from hence the word fatum, “fate,” seems to come (as many Latin words do, from that and other Eastern languages), death, if anything, being fatal and necessary. Yet, it does not follow that therefore the time or manner of dying is unmoveably fixed. Οὑ πάντα καθαρῶς οὐδὲ διαρρήδην ἡ εἱμαρμένη περιέχει, ἀλλ̔ ὅσα καθόλου: “Fate does not contain in it all things clearly and distinctly, but only general things.” (Plutarch, Moralia.) Chrysippus, in Aulus Gellus, seems to explain himself much after the same manner. The ancients moreover seem many times to make fate conditional. Similis si cura fuisset, Nec pater omnipotens Trojam, nec fata vetabant Stare, etc.: “If the same care had been taken, neither Jupiter nor fate would have hindered Troy from standing at this time, etc. (Virgil, Aeneid.) ↩

What the Pharisees say, according to Josephus, seems to be right. Οἱ μὲν οὖν Φαρισαῖοι τινὰ καὶ οὐ πάντα τῆς εἱμαρμένης εἶναι λέγουσιν ἔργον, τινὰ δ᾿ ἐφ᾿ ἑαυτοῖς ὑπάρχειν, συμβαίνειν τε καὶ οὐ γίνεσθαι: “The Pharisees say some things, but not all, are the work of fate, for some are in our own power, and some may by accident not come to pass.” (Antiquities of the Jews.) Rabbi Albo, in relation to human actions (and the consequent events), explains this opinion thus: מקצתן בחיריות ומקצתן מכרחות ומקצתן מעודבות מן ההכרח והבחירה וכו׳: “Some of them are perfectly free, some of them are forced, and some of them have a mixture of choice and force.” (Sefer ha-Ikkarim IV, 5.) But for men to charge their own faults upon fate or fortune has been an old practice: ἐθελοκακήσαντας⁠ ⁠… ἐπὶ τὴν κοινὴν ἐκείνην ἀπολογίαν, κ.τ.λ.: “voluntary evildoers⁠ ⁠… have recourse to that common apology.” (Lucian, Apologia.) ↩

Dimidium dacti, qui cœpit, habet. Sapere aude: “He that has made a good beginning, has half finished his work: take courage then enough to be wise.” (Horace, Epistles.) Aristotle goes further than that old adagial saying (ἀρχή ἥμισυ παντός: “The beginning is half the work”). His words are, Δοκεῖ πλεῖον ἢ τὸ ἥμισυ τοῦ παντός εἶναι ἡ ἀρχή: “The beginning is more than half the whole business.” (Nicomachean Ethics.) ↩

Οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτω κακῶς συντέτακται τῶν ψυχὴν ἐχόντων, ὥστ᾿ ἀβουλοῦντος αὐτοῦ προϊέναι πόδας ἢ φθέγγεσθαι γλῶτταν κ.τ.λ.: “No living creatures are so badly constituted, as that their feet will move, and their tongues speak, whether they will or no.” (Plutarch, De Communibus Notitiis Adversus Stoicos.) That in Tibullus, Cùm bene juravi, pes tamen ipso redit: “Though I had directly sworn to the contrary, yet my feet would come back