The Main Enemy Milton Bearden (read full novel .txt) 📖

the hysteria surrounding the case had led to exaggerations about the extent of their work for the Soviets. But in the spring of 1987, as Jack Downing was trying to rebuild, the Marine spy case was one more bad headache.

So now, just when Downing was getting desperate for a change in fortunes, here was this young Soviet offering him a look at the other side’s playbook.

After notifying CIA headquarters about the potential new KGB agent, Downing scrupulously followed the Russian’s instructions. Every Friday without fail, he and his wife went out to dinner at one of the preselected restaurants (a list that, unfortunately, didn’t include Downing’s favorites in Moscow), and each time he left his briefcase tucked away in his car. Inside, he included an envelope with a message for the Russian, asking him for specific information that the CIA was eager to know about KGB operations.

It turned out that the Russian had a mind-bending story to tell. He said that he had unique access to a major new counterintelligence campaign being planned by the Second Chief Directorate to disrupt and confuse the CIA’s Moscow operations even further. Over the next few months, the Second Chief Directorate was planning to dangle a series of double agents in front of the CIA, in order to keep the agency so busy, so tied up trying to vet the volunteers, that it couldn’t deal with real spies who might actually volunteer. They would be walk-ins, volunteers selected from segments of the Soviet government that the KGB knew were of special interest to the United States. The KGB was changing the rules of the game in Moscow, becoming both more aggressive and more sophisticated in their methods.

Before long, the Red Arrow volunteer gave Downing the identities of at least four of the double agents who he said would appear over the next four months, and, like clockwork, they began to approach the Americans, offering information. Now Downing felt he was inside the KGB’s game and hoped he could determine which walk-ins were double agents and which might be the real thing.

The KGB man also provided a list of the CIA agents who had been arrested since 1985 and revealed how many had been executed. Other informants had told the CIA about the arrests of some of the compromised agents, but Downing’s new source now provided conclusive evidence of the extent of the security breach. Langley had never told Downing how many agents had been lost. So he was stunned when he read the list prepared by his source, who was soon code-named GTPROLOGUE.

CIA Headquarters, Langley, Virginia, May 1987

Burton Gerber shared Jack Downing’s excitement about the sudden appearance of PROLOGUE. Since his early days in SE Division, fighting the Angleton paranoia about walk-ins and volunteers, Gerber had developed a rule of thumb that had become accepted wisdom within the CIA: The KGB never dangles one of its own staff officers. The Soviets didn’t trust their own people enough to let a KGB officer with access to sensitive information walk into the Americans as part of a double agent operation. How could they be certain that he wouldn’t simply keep walking across the line and defect? What’s more, the Soviets knew that the CIA and FBI wouldn’t believe a KGB officer was a genuine volunteer unless he revealed some important secrets. And the KGB had never been willing to part with enough secrets to make such a double agent believable. So Burton Gerber had long argued that when a KGB staff officer volunteers to become a spy, he’s not a double agent. Why should PROLOGUE be any different?

But slowly a debate within SE Division’s senior leadership began to develop about PROLOGUE. The man from the Second Chief Directorate had come along at just the right moment, just when the CIA was desperate for new sources inside Moscow. And he was handing over information that was bound to entice the CIA. Was he too good to be true?

Gerber and Paul Redmond, the SE Division’s most enduring skeptic, wondered what to make of PROLOGUE. Edward Lee Howard, who had defected to Moscow in 1985, certainly could have told the Soviets about Burton Gerber’s inviolable rule of thumb. Could it be that, thanks to Howard, the KGB was now turning Gerber’s logic back on him?

It was too early to tell. Gerber and Redmond realized that the only way to find out if PROLOGUE was genuine was to run the operation for a while. Paul Redmond had always believed that production was the best measure of an agent; if PROLOGUE began to hand over secrets that the KGB would never want revealed, then Redmond, the least trustful man in SE Division, would be convinced.

Gerber agreed. What did he have to lose by running PROLOGUE? The KGB already knew Downing’s identity as Moscow chief, so he would not be compromised by meeting with PROLOGUE, even if he was a double. What’s more, if the Russians were intent on framing Downing and forcing him out of the country, they could do it at almost any time. They wouldn’t need such an elaborate ruse.

And what if PROLOGUE was real? Then he might just be able to provide the solution to the mystery surrounding the 1985 losses, and to Burton Gerber, that possibility was worth the gamble.

Moscow, June 1987

The restaurant that Jack Downing had selected as the site for his first exchange was hardly Moscow’s best. Jack had brought his wife along with him for a late Friday night dinner, and, following PROLOGUE’s instructions, he had left his briefcase in his car, unlocked and parked on the street outside.

Inside, Jack and Suzie did their best to eat the greasy and unpalatable cuisine while marking time for PROLOGUE to check out their car. The restaurant was nearly deserted, and for good reason. Suzie soon found that she had to keep her feet up off the floor in order to avoid the rats scurrying underneath their table.

But enduring the meal had been worth it;