More Guns Less Crime John Jr (accelerated reader books .txt) 📖

14. As another test of the sensitivity of the results, I also reestimated the before-and-after trends by limiting them to ten years before and after the adoption of the right-to-carry laws. The results equivalent to table 9.1 are —3.1 percent for violent crime, —0.8 percent for murder, —2.0 percent for rape, —2.6 percent for robbery, —3.3 percent for aggravated assault, and —0.4 percent for property crime. All the violent-crime category results are significant at least at the .01 percent level except for murder, which is significant at the 4 percent level.

15. See also figures 7.7—7.9.

16. Glenn Puit, "Survey: Gun Sales Increasing since Grocery Store Shooting," Las Vegas Review-Journal, June 24, 1999, p. 4A; and "Gun Sales up 30 Percent This Year," Associated Press Newswire, dateline San Francisco, Aug. 28, 1999. The Las Vegas Review-Journal article mentions that "Firearms instructors also said they have seen a jump in the number of people wanting to know the requirements to carry a concealed weapon. And, Las Vegas police have

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seen an increase in requests for concealed weapons permits in recent weeks." The Associated Press story mentions that "Others say recent crime stories in the news, from the shooting rampage at a Los Angeles Jewish day camp to the tourist killings in Yosemite National Park, have motivated gun buyers."

17. The average murder rate for states over this period is 7.57 per 100,000; for rapes, 33.8; for aggravated assaults, 282.4; and for robberies, 161.8. A 4 percent change in murders is 0.3 per 100,000, a 7 percent change in rape is 2.4 per 100,000, a 5 percent change in aggravated assaults is 14.1 per 100,000, and a 13 percent change in robberies is 21 per 100,000. By contrast, a one-percentage-point increase in the population with permits is 1,000 per 100,000.

18. While small, lightweight guns are available and new materials have also made it possible to make lighter guns, most handguns weigh about the same as a laptop computer. Carrying them around requires some significant inconvenience.

19. More precisely, I replaced the predicted percentage of the population with permits with the predicted percentage of the population with permits divided by the permit fee. This is the same as the interactions done earlier looking at the percentage with permits multiplied by county demographics.

20. Ideally, one would also want to use the expected variation in permit rates across counties (though those data were not available at the time that I put these results together), but since I am examining all counties in the state, the state permitting rates at least allow us to rank the relative impact of right-to-carry laws across states.

21. The different drafts of their paper also went through different specifications.

22. Edward E. Learner, "Let's Take the Con Out of Econometrics," American Economic Review 173 (Mar. 1983): 31-43; and Walter S. McManus, "Estimates of the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: The Importance of the Researcher's Prior Beliefs," Journal of Political Economy 93 (Feb. 1985): 417-25.

23. I also included a tenth variable that examined the percentage of the adult population that was in prison, but there were sufficient theoretical objections to including this that I have decided not to report these results in the text. The major theoretical problem is that this variable is a "stock" while the crime rate is a "flow." In other words, the prison population is created by the number of people who are convicted and sentenced over many years and not just how harsh the current sentences are. In fact, if tough sentencing in the past makes it more likely that current criminals will not be sentenced to prison terms as long as those of past criminals (e.g., because of a takeover of the prison system by the courts), it is possible that there might even be a negative relationship between the prison population and the current toughness of the system. The bottom line is that past punishment is only roughly related to current punishment, particularly when average state differences are already being taken into account through fixed effects and when regional yearly fixed effects have also been added.

24. In a powerful piece, Isaac Ehrlich and Zhiqiang Liu show that classic economics papers concerning the law of demand, production theory, and investment theory would fail this test (Isaac Ehrlich and Zhiqiang Liu, "Sensitivity Analyses of the Deterrence Hypothesis: Let's Keep the Econ in Econometrics," Journal of Law and Economics 42 [Apr. 1999]: 455—88). Because of this strong bias toward not finding "true" relationships, Learner and McManus have dropped off the 10 percent most extreme values on both ends of their estimates when they have reported their results. Yet even this does not protect most studies from having their results determined to be "fragile" by this test.

25. One problem from excluding the arrest rate was never clearly made in the first edition of this book. The reason using the arrest rate forces some county observations to be dropped is that when the number of crimes is zero, the arrest rate is "undefined." Including counties with zero crime rates biases the results toward not finding an effect because crime rates cannot fall below zero. Since these counties already have a zero crime

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rate, the passage of the right-to-carry law can produce no benefit. The more counties with zero crime rates that are included, the more the estimated benefit from the law will move toward zero.

My work with Steve Bronars also examined whether replacing the crime-specific arrest rates with the overall violent-crime or property-crime arrest rates altered the results, and we found that it had no impact on the results. There are few counties which have no violent crimes of