Malaysian Maverick: Mahathir Mohamad in Turbulent Times Barry Wain (grave mercy .TXT) 📖

inclined to sit back, smile and periodically proclaim himself "the happiest prime minister in the world". Who could blame him? Answer: Dr. Mahathir. He warned that the Tunku's approach was misguided and would not last, and that behind the peaceful facade pressures were building dangerously.

Subsequent research would show Dr. Mahathir was right. The constitutional bias in favour of the Malays simply was not working in practice. Soon after Malaya obtained independence, the average annual income for an adult male was calculated at RM3,223 for Chinese, RM2,013 for Indians and RMl,463 for Malays.[9] Many assessments showed that the Malay share of national wealth declined over the next ten to 15 years.

While government spending was supposed to have been heavily skewed in favour of the countryside where 70 per cent of Malays toiled as rice farmers, fishermen and rubber small-holders, it was insufficient, or not guided by the appropriate policies, to promote meaningful change. Malay rural life, in fact, was stagnating, with farmers missing out on the growth being achieved by the overall economy. While the provision of roads, irrigation, electrification and technical advice helped, such infrastructure could not overcome institutional constraints such as landlessness, lack of reasonable credit and marketing monopolies.[10]

Looking back, political scientist John Funston found that the reason for the lack of Malay progress was that UMNO did not have control of the political system, despite what was almost universally believed. While UMNO fielded most candidates in elections and had a decisive majority of Cabinet slots, it was the Chinese partner, the Malaysian Chinese Association, that provided most of the Alliance funds and held the two key portfolios, Finance, and Commerce and Industry. And while it was true that power was concentrated in the hands of Tunku Abdul Rahman, he was no typical Malay and did not always represent their interests. In many ways, the Anglicized, mahjong-playing, horse race-loving Tunku had more in common with the leaders of the Alliance partner parties than with the rank and file of UMNO.[11]

Presciently, in a newspaper article published in 1968, Dr. Mahathir foresaw a "pent-up reservoir of ill-feelings", with the potential for violence, behind the seemingly "harmonious relationship between the races". Noting that racial intolerance leading to riots had occurred in the United States, Britain, Africa and neighbouring Asian countries, he said preventive measures were needed to avoid it happening in Malaysia. He was in touch with people on the ground, and "I know that the signs and symptoms are already there." Having given a similar warning in an article the previous month, Dr. Mahathir concluded, "If I may say so again, soon it may be too late."[12]

Just over a year later, on 13 May 1969, Dr. Mahathir's grim prediction came true. Three days after a general election result upset the precarious balance of hope and fear, following a campaign that aroused communal passions, Malays and Chinese indulged in an orgy of killing, looting and burning in Kuala Lumpur. Although the Alliance government retained a majority in Parliament, UMNO lost 8 of its 59 seats, one of them Dr. Mahathir's. The opposition won 14 urban seats, 13 of them at the expense of the Malaysian Chinese Association. Critically, the opposition captured half of the seats in the Selangor State Assembly, raising the possibility that a Malay state that included the nation's capital would pass into Chinese hands.

Chinese and Indian opposition supporters paraded through the streets of Kuala Lumpur in celebration, taunting and insulting the Malays. Fearful that they were losing their last refuge, political dominance, the Malays retaliated. They slaughtered each other with an assortment of parangs, a type of machette with a wooden handle, knives, daggers, iron bars and other improvised weapons, while torching cars and buildings. By the time the army moved in and restored order, terrified Chinese and Malays were huddled behind makeshift barricades in a maze of fortified enclaves patrolled by armed vigilantes. The official toll was put at 196 dead and 439 wounded. Unofficial estimates ran much higher. "May 13" was seared in the young nation's soul: a date, a bloodbath, a tragedy.

The following day, the king proclaimed a State of Emergency, suspended Parliament and a National Operations Council took over, a serious setback for the fledgling democracy. It effectively marked the end of Tunku Abdul Rahman's reign, though he did not formally retire as prime minister until September 1970. Deputy Premier Razak, who was also defence minister and minister for home affairs, slipped easily into the chairmanship of the council, which governed by decree for the next 21 months.

In UMNO, young Malay nationalists associated with Dr. Mahathir, including Musa Hitam, an assistant minister, and Abdullah Ahmad, political secretary to Razak, reached a rough consensus on the electoral results. They felt the "social contract" had failed, that UMNO had conceded too much to the Chinese, and the country must be "returned" to the Malays. They held Tunku Abdul Rahman responsible and felt he should quit, but Ismail Abdul Rahman, recruited as home affairs minister by Razak, told a four-man delegation, which included Dr. Mahathir, that he would not tolerate any attempt to depose the Tunku. At the same time, though, Ismail said to give him and Razak a year, and if they failed to "arrange things" with the Tunku, they would openly back a putsch against him.[13] The anti-Tunku agitators were supposed to be patient.

Dr. Mahathir had other ideas. He sat down in Alor Star on 17 June and hammered out the most notorious letter in Malaysian politics. This was no surat layang, flying letter, an anonymous poisoned message designed to discredit an opponent, which is a common tactic. He addressed his missive to Tunku Abdul Rahman, and signed it. Having been reprimanded by the Tunku for commenting publicly on the delicate political situation, Dr. Mahathir sent a letter in Malay that political scientist Karl von Vorys called noteworthy not only because it was deliberately offensive but also because it represented the mood of many Malays.[14]

In it, Dr. Mahathir said Tunku Abdul Rahman's pro-Chinese policies were directly