Monty Python and Philosophy Gary Hardcastle (mystery books to read txt) đ
- Author: Gary Hardcastle
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With the exception of the contradictions already considered, we can easily agree that every statement made in the dialogue is true, or at least verifiably true. Even so, the conditions that underwrite their truth, and the ways by which we would verify their truth, do not appear to account for why what the women are saying is absurd (or funny). For, the joke of the skit is that even though we completely understand the meanings of their sentences, we cannot make heads or tails of what they are saying. As I mentioned above, the difference being drawn here is admittedly odd. Although Iâll not be able to make it look less odd, I think that I can make it a bit clearer.
For starters, then, imagine that we meet for coffee and you say, âHello, good to see you,â and I extend out my hand, my eyes sort of wide open as I stare at it, and utter, âThis is my hand.â Although you clearly understand the meaning of the sentence I just uttered (it isnât as though I uttered, âGobily gook muk not me fancy cakesâ), my guess is that for all that you would nevertheless find my uttering âThis is my handâ here a bit creepy. Rush Rhees has an answer as to why you would:
But âwhat it makes sense to sayâ is not âthe sense these expressions have.â It has more to do with what it makes sense to answer or what it makes sense to ask, or what sense one remark may have in connexion with another.19
The distinction that Rhees is making, I think, is what I want to bring out: there is a difference between the meaning of a sentence (its sense) and what it makes sense to say. According to Rhees, this is the sort of shift that Wittgenstein makes when moving from his earlier to his later work. He is less interested in asking âWhat is the meaning of a sentence?â and more interested in asking âWhat is it to say something?â In uttering, âThis is my hand,â you might think that I was simply offering a bit of trivial information. However, the more likely reaction to my behavior would be to quickly fish around for a context in which it would make sense for me to say, âThis is my hand,â and say it so that it wouldnât count as a piece of trivial information. For example, you might think to yourself: this idiot thinks that I think that he doesnât have a hand. The point to stress here is that although the Verification Principle might work to account for the meaning of the sentence âThis is my hand,â it does nothing to help us understand why uttering it in this context is so creepy.
Even when given reasons for the purchase of the piston engines, the reasons are strange. The strangeness, I think, stems from the fact that Mrs. Smokerâs answer to the question âWhy did you buy that?â is connected in all the right ways to this question, though it cannot be accepted (by us) as an answer. For, given the cost of living, and the fact that these ladies are of the working-class (and so must spend their money wiselyâthis is why being working-class is significant here), one buys a piston engine only if one is in need of one. To be sure, that it would be on sale at the time one needed to purchase such a thing would be a matter of good fortuneâone worthy of note. But, one doesnât buy such a thing simply because it is a bargain! That the engines are gift-wrapped makes things even stranger. For, though one might buy a piston engine on sale knowing that one will most certainly need one in the near future, one wouldnât normally go the extra step and have the thing gift-wrapped. And so, even granting that reason is at work, the assumption doesnât go very far in making the exchange between these women intelligible.
Wittgenstein in his later work seems to have abandoned the Verification Principle, which he claims to have never held in the first place. Now, why he would abandon something that he never held is itself a bit curious, but be that as it may, he appears to abandon it and introduces another: the Meaning-as-Use Principle.20 This principle says: âFor a large class of casesâthough not for allâin which we employ the word âmeaningâ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.â This could go far in helping explain away the worry about Mrs. Gorillaâs and Mrs. Smokerâs contradictory statements. For instance, we might say that it has become customary among these women to use a phrase of the form âNo, . . . Pâ when asked whether one has been P-ing. So, when Mrs. Non-Gorilla asks, âBeen shopping?â the appropriate response (if one has in fact been shopping) is âNo, . . . been shopping.â If this is the accepted form of response, then we might say that the sentence âNo, . . . been shoppingâ means âYes, Iâve been shoppingâ or something like this. The phrase gets its meaning here by its being used to confirm that one has been shopping.
But, what of the other statements in the dialogue? For example, when Mrs. Non-Smoker says, âYou canât eat that raw!â she appears to be using it to inform Mrs. Smoker of a simple fact about eating such things
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