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and symptomatic of long-suppressed fears and doubts of the ability of traditional infantry to attack at all … British soldiers were helpless to act, and in the end left the fighting to others.” Mackesy was not a lone holdout. A number of army and navy officers supported his arguments. Cork, for his part was unwilling to overrule Mackesy on land operations, especially after he experienced personally how difficult it was to move in snow up to his waist.

Allied warships carried out a number of shore bombardments in late April and early May. Some caused damage, particularly at Elvegårdsmoen, where on April 27 several barracks and a considerable amount of supplies and equipment were destroyed. German casualties were five killed and six wounded. Naval gunfire against targets in Narvik on May 3 resulted in four Germans killed and several wounded.

General Fleischer had recommended a landing near Bjerkvik and General Béthouart had suggested landings at either Øyjord or east of Narvik after his reconnaissance on April 28. The British had promised to study Fleischer’s suggestion; Béthouart’s suggestion was turned down by General Mackesy the same day it was made.

Béthouart came to see Mackesy in Harstad on May 2. He explained the difficulties experienced by his troops in Labergsdal and concluded that the operation would not yield timely results because of very stiff German resistance, difficult terrain and his troops’ lack of mobility in the deep snow. Béthouart stated that it was folly to press the attack under conditions where only the Norwegians and Germans were qualified to operate. He warned that his battalions would melt away from exhaustion and losses. This time he insisted that an amphibious landing be made in Bjerkvik in order to relieve the pressures on his troops.5

General Mackesy was not moved. He met Béthouart again the following day and told him that after a reconnaissance by officers, he had concluded that a landing in Bjerkvik or on the east shore of Herjangsfjord was impossible. The western shore of the fjord offered better possibilities but the homes in this area were filled with civilian refugees including many women and children. A landing there was therefore out of the question. Béthouart suggested an overland move from Bogen and offered a battalion of the Foreign Legion, expected to arrive in Harstad within a few days, for this mission.

There was another meeting on May 4 at Cork’s headquarters. At this meeting the decision was made for French troops on the northern front not to press their attack but only tie down the Germans. This decision was taken without consulting or informing the Norwegians. The 7th Brigade found itself pressing forward alone, increasingly disappointed in the weak support provided by the French. The 7th Brigade’s advance pulled the French forces along as the Germans opposing them withdrew because of worries about their right flank. Nevertheless, the bulk of the French forces were still two miles behind, at the north end of Storevann on May 9 as the 7th Brigade was attacking the high ground on both sides of Læigastind.

Under pressure from London, Admiral Cork decided on a direct attack against Narvik and gave orders for Mackesy to carry it out. The admiral had made a reconnaissance on May 1 and come to the conclusion that the snow had thawed sufficiently that it no longer presented the kind of obstacle it had earlier. The operation was scheduled for May 8 and Mackesy planned to land two battalions on the northern shore, a few kilometers from the city.

However, this was not the end of the British Army’s attempts to delay the attack. Senior army officers, including Brigadier Fraser, the commander of the 24th Guards Brigade, protested to Cork about the planned operation. Their objections fell into three general categories. First, there was an acute shortage of ALCs. Local fishing vessels and ships’ boats would therefore have to be used and their deeper draft limited the areas where landings could be made. Second, continual daylight and a lack of smoke shells eliminated the element of surprise and provided no concealment during the approach to the beaches and the initial period ashore. Finally, the troops in the open boats would be exposed to German air attacks. Even some naval officers, including Cork’s chief of staff, Captain Loben E. H. Maund, argued against the operation.6 It is interesting that the same objections were not raised five days later when it was decided to send the Foreign Legionnaires ashore in Bjerkvik under similar conditions.

Allied intelligence about the situation in Narvik and the surrounding area was woefully inadequate at this stage. The Norwegians had a much better knowledge of the German order of battle but no formal machinery existed for sharing vital intelligence information. The British commanders did not know that Dietl had sent the preponderance of his mountain troops to shore up the northern front or that he had removed some of the naval personnel from Narvik for the same purpose. Von Falkenhorst’s situation report on May 6 termed the situation in Narvik critical, a term used sparingly by German commanders. It is debatable whether better intelligence would have altered the Allied decision.

It may be that Cork was reluctant to overrule his army subordinates or that he had himself become somewhat infected by their caution. In any event, he sent a list of the army objections to his proposed attack on Narvik to London on May 6 for consideration. Before receiving a reply, Cork decided to adopt an alternate operation recommended by General Mackesy and postpone the attack on Narvik until a new army commander arrived.

After the arrival of the French Foreign Legionnaires and the Polish brigade, Admiral Cork had 12 infantry battalions under his command. There were about 25,000 Allied troops when support and service support personnel were included. The British Government decided that the size of the ground forces in North Norway was so large that it warranted the appointment of a corps commander. The ground forces were named the North Western Expeditionary Force and Lieutenant General

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