Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Henrik Lunde (general ebook reader txt) 📖

the northern front and the Allies concentrated their efforts on supplying these forces, there was an excellent possibility of concluding the campaign. Fleischer was also correct in placing the weight of his effort on the left flank and his order on May 19 appears to give great latitude to Berg as to the timing and direction of attack. His failure, as I see it, was not to exploit the opportunity of the open German right flank quickly and vigorously. The claim that Berg misunderstood or willfully ignored Fleischer’s wishes must be viewed in the context of several events:

1. The exchange of views that took place between Fleischer and Berg from May 12.

2. The 6th Division’s directives of 15, 19, and 22 May.

3. Fleischer’s apparent acquiescence in the 6th Brigade’s final operational concept developed after May 12, which did not include slipping around the enemy’s still open right flank.

4. The statement made by Colonel Berg at the end of the campaign.

The Norwegians Capture the High Plateau

The rest that Fleischer anticipated before resuming the offensive did not materialize, as both unit commanders and troops were eager to clear the high plateau. The fighting over the next week was concentrated around the high grounds: Kuberget (Hill 820), Kobberfjell (Hill 914), and Lillebalak (Hill 572). Four Norwegian infantry battalions participated in the attack on the mountain massif. The 6th Brigade was in the east with the 1/16th closest to the Swedish border and facing the Germans on Hill 860 and Kuberget. The 2/16th in the center faced the Germans on Hill 914 and Hill 648. The 1/12th faced the Germans west of Storebalak, including at Hill 648, while the Alta Bn faced the Germans on Lillebalak and Hill 482. Only a passing reference to this achievement is made by British authors.

The fighting for the high plateau in the week from May 15 to 22 was the heaviest and most demanding of the campaign. It brought Group Windisch to a state of near collapse. The Germans suffered serious casualties and with troops approaching complete exhaustion, they were forced to withdraw to a last defensive line north of their base at Bjørnefjell.

The Norwegian plan called for an attack by two battalions of the 6th Brigade, to seize the Kuberg-Koberfjell area at the same time as the 7th Brigade attacked further west. The Alta Bn was to secure Hill 336 and the 1/12th would begin its advance up the very steep river valley between Lillebalak and Storebalak when its neighbor to the west moved against Hill 336. The two battalions of Legionnaires would attack the Germans in their sector from Hill 648 to Rombakfjord.

At the outset of the fighting, the Germans were deployed with the 1/139th on their left and the 3rd Bn on the right. The far right later became the responsibility of Group von Schleebrügge. The German companies were switched around frequently during the fighting to reinforce certain parts of the front and prevent breakthroughs. However, at the outset we find Co 1 in the Kuberg area (Hills 860 and 820), Co 2 in the Holmevann area, Cos 3, 4, and 5 north of Fiskeløsvann, Co 11 on Hill 648 (to the west of Kobberfjell), Co 12, on Kobberfjell, and parts of Cos 14 and 15 on Lillebalak. Co Müller was located south of Jernvannene as Group Windisch’s reserve, and later as reserve for the 1st Bn. Company 13 was located south of Kobberfjell as the 3rd Bn’s reserve. Company 3/138th was pulled out of the front as divisional reserve on May 15 but had to be committed as reinforcement for Schleebrügge already on May 17. As a replacement for Co 3, Group Windisch received a platoon from the reorganized Naval Battalion Kothe.

Kuberget is the most easterly of the prominent heights south of the Nævertind-Næverfjell area. The 1/16th Inf, commanded by Major Hunstad, was ordered to seize it on May 15. Schleebrügge’s Co 1/139th occupied the Kuberg area. This reinforced company became part of Group Schleebrügge by divisional order on May 18 when it became responsible for the German right flank. Norwegian reconnaissance established that the Germans occupied strong defensive positions on Hills 860, 820, and 794 and they concluded that a frontal attack would be difficult and costly. A couple of attempts on May 14 and early on May 15 failed to drive the Germans from Hill 860.

The battalion commander decided to strike at the German flanks with the main attack consisting of Cos 1 and 7 from the east, while Co 2 attacked from the north to seize Hill 794 and the ridge between it and Kuberget. One machinegun platoon supported Co 2 while the rest of the machinegun Co supported the two-company attack from the east. The Norwegian maneuver made the German position on Hill 860 untenable and it was abandoned around 1800 hours on May 15.

Company 2 started its advance at 1430 hours. The plans called for one platoon to seize Hill 794 while two platoons captured the western part of Kuberget as well as the ridge between it and Hill 794. The resistance was heavy and by 2000 hours, the company was still well short of its objectives.

Companies 1 and 7 began their advance at 1400 hours but the attack faltered after the commander of Co 7, Lieutenant Liljedahl, was seriously wounded around 2100 hours. The question of pulling back from Kuberget was under discussion at Dietl’s headquarters and the Germans had already started withdrawing from some of their positions under Norwegian pressure, but reoccupied them quickly when the Norwegian attack began to waver.

A reshuffling of forces took place within the 1/16th Inf during the fighting for Kuberget that is difficult to understand. It appears that Co 1 was pulled out of the line on May 16 and used to bring provisions forward. The company, reinforced with a machinegun platoon from the 1/12th Inf, was directed to relieve Co 7 and prepare to attack Kuberget. Company 1, instead of attacking Kuberget, was moved to the high ground south and