Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Henrik Lunde (general ebook reader txt) 📖

The Germans viewed the British units as having low morale, poor self-reliance, and lacking fighting qualities and spirit. This is an interesting observation in view of General Auchinleck’s confidential report on June 19, 1940. An abridged version of this report was published in 1947 but two paragraphs were suppressed:

The comparison between the efficiency of the French contingent and that of British troops operating under similar conditions has driven this lesson home to all in this theatre, though this was not altogether a matter of equipment.

By comparison with the French, or the Germans, either for that matter, our men for the most part seemed distressingly young, not so much in years as in self-reliance and manliness generally. They give an impression of being callow and undeveloped, which is not reassuring for the future, unless our methods of man-mastership and training for war can be made more realistic and less effeminate.3

As later years in the war would demonstrate, a great deal had to do with poor training and inadequate equipment.

The Long Term Effects

There is no doubt that the occupation of Norway was a constant drain on German resources. At times, nearly a half million men from the armed forces were tied up in Norway. Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely that the resources tied up in Norway could have had any major influence on the events in other theaters of war.

Hitler, like Churchill, had what can be characterized as an unhealthy preoccupation with Scandinavia, particularly Norway. Hitler was extremely proud of having pulled off the “sauciest” military operation of the war, against virtually all military principles except surprise and against the almost unanimous views of the renowned German General Staff. He undoubtedly viewed Norway as a trophy attesting to his military genius and wanted to protect that trophy at nearly any cost. He continued to maintain, “Norway is the zone of destiny in this war” and demanded unconditional obedience to all edicts pertaining to its defense.5 Concern about Norway after the British/Norwegian commando raid on Vågsø in December 1941 was the reason for ordering the battleships Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen to make the famous Channel dash in February 1942 and for subsequently stationing most of the German fleet in Norway.

Was this expenditure of resources warranted by the advantages obtained? Let us first look at what is considered a primary motive for Hitler’s move against Norway, iron ore. While the harbor facilities in Narvik were so damaged that the first shipments of iron ore from that port could not tale place for over seven months, the Germans shipped over 600,000 tons through Narvik in 1941. This amounted to no more than 25% of what had flowed through that port in 1939 but by 1943, it was back up to 1.8 million tons. Shipments from Swedish ports more than compensated for the reduced volume going through Narvik. While the successful German offensive in the west secured a 14 million ton annual supply of iron ore from the French and Luxembourg mines, Hubatsch claims that the flow of Swedish ore made the great battles of 1942-44 possible for the Germans.

While the German Navy obtained bases for a wider starting line against the British, the problem was that the naval losses sustained in the invasion and the cancellation of most of the building program in the famous Z plan, made obtaining these bases rather meaningless. Furthermore, the German Navy acquired excellent harbors on the Atlantic after the fall of France but this could also not have been anticipated. The advantages secured by a less restricted access to the Atlantic were countered by the British occupation of Iceland in May 1940. Aircraft operating from Iceland and the Faeroe Islands were able to patrol the gateways to the Atlantic, including the strait between Iceland and Greenland. While the movement of the heavy units of the German fleet to the fjords of northern Norway in 1942 presented a potent threat against the Murmansk convoys, the concentration of most of the German fleet in Norwegian waters was welcomed by the Royal Navy.

German occupation of Norway complicated British blockade measures. They were also forced to prepare to defend against air and naval threats from the Scandinavian Peninsula. However, these threats were more than offset by the resources Germany needed to employ to defend against the reverse threat of Allied raids and possible invasion.

Nevertheless, all of this fails to address adequately the question of advantages versus disadvantages. We have to place ourselves in the position of the German planners and ask what the situation would have been for the Germans if the Allies had seized strategic points in Norway. This would have allowed them to exert pressure on Sweden and Finland and eliminate Swedish export of iron ore to Germany. Allied air power would be more effective in the Baltic and over German ports on the southern shores of that sea. An Allied presence in Norway would probably have kept Finland from joining Germany in its attack on the Soviet Union and Stalin would not have had to worry about an Arctic front or a threat to his supply line from the United States. While the wisdom of the German preoccupation with Norway was an advantage or an unnecessary drain on its resources is debatable, Hitler was not paranoid when he concluded that an Allied occupation of Norway would be of decisive importance for the outcome of the war.

Those in Germany who secretly hoped for a failure in Norway that would weaken Hitler’s hold on power were silenced. In fact, the stunning success strengthened Hitler’s popularity. His military advisers became increasingly reluctant to argue against his plans. To some, he took on the qualities of a genius. The incidents of Hitler losing his nerve when confronting the possibility of failure were forgotten in the elation of success and they did not resurface as serious issues until the military reverses in the east and in North Africa. Hitler’s international