Washington's Engineer Norman Desmarais (best e book reader .TXT) 📖

. . . It must . . . be admitted that the different undertakings that [I] have just . . . described lead only to breaking the chain in a hurry, without having time to carry it away nor to detach it from the woods in order to sink it. It is not probable that the enemy would expose himself to so much danger in order to cause a damage that can be easily repaired, if we prepare the means. I am inclined to believe that if he undertakes something against West Point it will be in a more solid and decisive way. This will be to make himself master following operations against all the forts of West Point either to hold them or to destroy them completely and thus procure for himself a free passageway on the river. . . .

Fifth Undertaking. The 5th undertaking is the probable plan. If one examines the terrain above Fort Clinton, one will see that the heights which overlook it or which look down on each other, are occupied rather extensively in two directions. On one side Putnam, Rockhill and [a redoubt]; from the other side Webbs, Willys, but also one sees a mountain which begins at Rockhill and which extends behind Putnam, Webbs and Willys and which perfectly dominates these works, so that this array of fortifications which prescribes a great deal at first look, is reduced to little for effect, because the enemy, supposedly in possession of this mountain can establish at the same time cannon and mortar batteries against Rockhill, . . . Putnam, . . . Webbs and Willys. . . . [T]hese last two works are not even tenable for very long under these conditions, being too prolonged. It will be necessary then to abandon them early and consequently the enemy would advance along the slope . . . and can set up his batteries against Clinton without even having taken Fort Putnam. It is evident then that the real point of attack against West Point is from the mountain M, O in question, since one comes all of a sudden from it to the attack on Putnam instead of making successive attacks on all the Forts above or below this Fort, as would be necessary coming from the other side. Now with respect to the difficulty to the enemy to get to this place, if there were no works, there would be none. This mountain is most accessible from any side and its slope from the west is such that cannon can easily be brought there, so that supposing the enemy, disembarked opposite Robinson’s, establishes himself on the mountain, sets up his batteries and fires his first cannon shot against Putnam, cannot require more than four or five days (since the batteries can be constructed even while the cannon are being brought up) it would be indispensable, then, to occupy this mountain; this is what we have done by the two works S, T. . . . I don’t think it any longer possible for the enemy to select it as his debarkation point; it is true that from there to the first battery . . . is more than a mile; but one must consider that it is not a question of firing on a work, on a small space, but on a multitude of boats, ships, horses, carriages, men; everything conceivable assembled in one spot where all the apparatus of an army munitions of all types being unloaded. It is clear that at a distance of more than a mile each cannon round Is almost sure and it must always strike something; that consequently one cannot select such a point to establish himself; moreover the enemy, getting off of his ships, will not expose himself by camping on the plain under the fire of these same batteries, he must then withdraw to the rear of this point. We can conclude that he will prefer to disembark at the other place. . . . This is already an advantage, to move further away the enemy’s disembarkation point; this stretches still more his communications, gives greater facility to attacking him, renders more difficult the transportation of artillery and munitions.

Let us suppose now that the enemy established on the plain at the required distance and on the mountain (U) opposite our redoubts, what decision will he make then? Will this be to advance on our left under the fires of [two of our] batteries . . . and those that can be set up on the same mountain for the attack on the redoubt Willys, then on Webbs, from there to Putnam or Clinton? The absurdity of such a plan is too palpable for there to be a need to show its effect. The enemy can do only one of these two things. He can advance by the mountain, . . . attack redoubt R in order to march against Rockhill, and from Rock-hill against Putnam; but it must be noticed that redoubt R, can only be attacked in strength because it is perhaps impossible for the enemy to bring up large cannon against it as long as he does not control Redoubts S and T, secondly because it would be covered by [a] Battery, . . . against that which one might set up opposite . . . after having taken redoubt R by strong attack he must likewise take Rockhill and then Putnam for . . . the enemy cannot find (neither at the Redoubt R nor at Rockhill) cannon suitable for firing on the works.

The other route that the enemy can take to get to Putnam (which is still the central point to which he must come) is by the mountain . . . as we have already pointed out. He must then capture Redoubts S and T. If he captures only Redoubt T, he can easily establish his troops on the mountain, but he could only bring his cannon up