Hitler's Terror Weapons Brooks, Geoffrey (bts books to read TXT) 📖

by the Department of the Navy’s Naval Historical Centre, Washington, and logs compiled by the researcher Gian Quasar who has taken a special interest in the case.

On the afternoon of 5 December 1945 five TBM Avenger bombers were readied at Fort Lauderdale Naval Air Station, Florida for an authorized advanced overwater navigational training flight. Four of the aircraft had a pilot, gunner and radio operator; the fifth was a crewman short. All five pilots were qualified as basic flight instructors with up to 350 to 400 hours’ flying time, of which at least 55 hours had been on TBM aircraft. The aircraft had a cruise speed of about 145 knots and a range of just over 1130 miles, which meant that the type could remain up for at least seven hours of normal flight, more if well throttled back.

All five aircraft were fitted with two compasses and carried a radio operator who worked the transmitter/receiver. A ZBX homing receiver to obtain a bearing on base and an IFF transponder for use in emergency enabling ground stations to identify aircraft were also fitted. The aircraft had been carefully serviced beforehand and carried inflatable life rafts. Each man wore a life-jacket and had a parachute. The flight leader was 28-year-old bachelor Lt Charles Carroll Taylor USNR, a 6-year Navy veteran and a senior qualified flight instructor who had over 2500 flying hours’ experience, including ten months on combat missions in the Pacific. He had been appointed a flight instructor in Miami in January 1945. Two of his pilots, Edward J. Powers, USMC, and George W. Stivers Jr, USMC, were Captains and thus outranked Taylor.

On the fatal afternoon Taylor was late for duty and on his arrival at 1.15 he informed the duty officer, “I just do not want to take this flight out”. Whether this was due to some premonition of impending disaster is not known, but Taylor was told he had to take it since there was nobody else.

Scattered rain showers were forecast for the sea area east of Florida that afternoon. Cloud was broken with a ceiling of 2500 feet, visibility six to eight miles, otherwise unlimited ceiling with visibility ten to twelve miles. Wind was south-westerly, 20 knots gusting to 31 knots at times, sea moderate to rough, air temperature 67 degrees Fahrenheit.

Starting from Fort Lauderdale naval air base the schedule was to fly east 91 degrees true over the sea for 56 miles and practice-bomb a concrete hulk on a rocky outcrop known as the Chicken and Hen Shoals, an exercise lasting about fifteen minutes. Flight 19 would then continue east towards the Bahamas on the same heading for another 67 miles and, using Great Stirrup Cay as a visual fix, turn left at the 123-mile point to a course NNW 346 degrees true for 73 miles. Crossing Great Sale Cay which is 60 miles long at right angles to the path of approach and could not be missed, a second visual fix was to be taken just beyond it before completing the third leg of the triangle home. The total distance to be flown was 316 miles, take-off 2.10, ETA 4.25, time 135 minutes, the average ground speed being about 147 knots, the cruise speed for the Avenger. Sundown was at 5.29. Flight 18 flew the identical course taking off twenty-five minutes earlier and arriving at base at 4.00.

Lt Taylor’s Flight 19 took off at ten past two but there was a delay in forming up. A fishing vessel watched the bombing practice over the Hen Shoals at about 2.45 and then saw the aircraft fly off eastwards. Their actual bearing was 120 degrees to compensate for the strong southwesterly wind. At about 3.45, a half-hour after having turned left at Great Stirrup Cay, the five aircraft should have completed the second leg. Powers was leading, Taylor bringing up the rear.

The Flight 19 Anomaly

3.45 Taylor: (repeated several times) “Powers, what does your compass read?”

(The aircraft were transmitting on the 4805 kilocycles band which was weak over more than 125 miles and, though none of Powers’ messages were picked up and logged at base, some were noted by Lt Cox, a colleague flight instructor circling Fort Lauderdale.)

Powers: “I don’t know where we are. We must have got lost after that last turn.”

As we shall see, Powers’ apparent error of landfall was so great that it could only be accounted for by a cross-wind of super-hurricane force. This led Taylor to surmise that everybody’s compass must be faulty, an assumption which would imply a local problem involving the Earth’s magnetic field.

Taylor: “Does anyone have any suggestions? I think we must be over the [word in evidence written as ‘Keys’].”

After hearing this conversation, Cox requested Fort Lauderdale to notify the Air-Sea Rescue Task Unit 4, Port Everglades, to stand by.

Lt Cox had been asking Taylor persistently for half an hour what the problem was.

4.21 Taylor: “Both my compasses are out and I’m trying to find Fort Lauderdale. I’m over land, but it’s broken. I’m sure I’m in the [Keys], but I don’t know how far down.” This statement was included in the deposition of Lt Cox and one word in it has been responsible for all the misunderstanding about what happened on this flight.

According to the board of enquiry, by the term ‘Keys’ Lt Taylor must have meant the chain of Florida Keys islands running a short distance west from the tip of the Florida peninsula. Taylor knew them well, and from the air the aviator can see the whole chain and the Florida mainland. Since Lt Taylor was over the Bahamas he obviously did not mean the Florida Keys, but something else, and Lt Cox also pointed out that the interpretation made no sense.

Lt Taylor was flying a navigational exercise eastwards from Florida towards the Bahamas. The Bahamas comprise 700 low-lying islands and cays that stretch over 100,000 square miles of the Atlantic Ocean seaward of the Atlantic Coast of Florida to Hispaniola. It