Washington's Engineer Norman Desmarais (best e book reader .TXT) 📖

time. Duportail complied with the orders and wrote the following hasty note on March 5,

i receive this afternoon your two letters, one of the 21 of february the second of the first of march. i have not time enough to enquire how it happened so, but i am exceedingly sorry of that accident. i will do all my endeavors for repairing it as much as it is possible. i will set off tomorrow morning and i will go as fast as my horse will be able to do; i will go by new windsor and fiskill although i believe it is not the shortest road. but i have not time enough to enquire and i must now agree with Colonel pickering about the road i will take on account of the horses.

i am exceedingly afraid not to joint your excellency—at a time—but i take the liberty to beg (if you leave rhodisland before I arrive there, and you have other orders to give me) to send them by the different roads I may take. this is principally necessary if you do not come by the same road you went.

i dont thinck i shall arrive at newport before the 14th.9

Duportail traveled quickly, passing through New Windsor and reaching Newport, as expected, on March 14, only to find that he had passed Washington on the way. Washington had left the day before but took a different route. Duportail remained with the Comte de Rochambeau for three weeks, discussing the American situation with him from every point of view and going over the plans and suggestions that had been brought out during the visit of the American commander in chief. Rochambeau wrote General Washington from Newport on March 31.

DUPORTAIL’S MEMORIAL

Duportail’s lengthy memorial, written undoubtedly while at Newport and undated but classed as belonging to the end of March 1781, is titled “General Observations upon the different operations which can be undertaken according to the different cases at the arrival of the Comte de Grasse at the Hook.” He begins by confronting the problem of taking New York, supposing that Admiral de Ternay could force Sandy Hook. He then considers alternatives if they could not attack New York. He notes, “The enemy either will have evacuated or they will have left a Garrison at Portmouth.” After discussing all the possibilities and having exposed the situation at Charleston, he determines that the possession of the port of Portsmouth was the most important action to undertake in the South because possession of the harbor there would make it easy to capture the few Crown positions left in Virginia:

If it is determined that Count De Grasse cannot force the Hook [Sandy Hook], but if he is master of those Seas, I suppose ’till November when he must go to the West Indies, it is asked in what case we may attack New York.

I think that if the British at New York have not received any Reinforcement from Virginia and if Count De Grasse brings 4000 men with him we may undertake to attack New York, to speak more generally, to attack New York in the case mentioned here, I would have no less than thrice the number of Men which we suppose that the Enemy have, because the time for the siege is determined and if we don’t succeed, we lose all our advantages we could get in other quarters. . . .

Let us suppose now, that the circumstances do not permit to attempt any thing against New York, then we must consider these two cases.

Either the Enemy shall have evacuated Virginia entirely or they shall have left a Garrison in Portsmouth.

If the Enemy have evacuated Virginia entirely, I suppose they have made this distribution of their Troops, they have sent 3000 Men to New York and 12,000 to Charlestown. I suppose besides, that Lord Rawdon has now 3500 and that in case of an Attack, the British may collect 1500 Militia that will make 8000 Men in all. Is it advisable to undertake something against Charlestown so Garrisoned?

I answer that we have here a circumstance like that at New York. I mean that the harbour may be forced, and that by the local circumstances, after you have forced it, you may Stay in it as long as you please. Although not in possession of the Town, so that with a moderate number of Troops you can reduce it by Famine, if not by force.

I cannot say what difficulty we could meet now in the attempt for forcing the bar; but I observe we must observe it cannot be defended by land Batteries, it must be defended only by Armed Ships, Frigates, floating Batteries; Gallies, etc. When I was Prisoner near Charlestown, I heard the British had only sometimes one two or three small frigates at most, with one or two Gallies for that purpose; if it is the case now, I think that it should be very easy to force the bar with four or five large Frigates, or better, one or two 44 Gun Ships. Admiral Arbuthnot, in one of his Letters to Lord Germaine, says there are 19 feet of Water upon the bar at high tide. I think this is enough for a 40 Gun Ship. After you have forced the bar and entrance of the Harbour, you may introduce two or three fifty Gun Ships in it and then I believe you could brave all the attempts of the Enemy to get in again, so the whole fleet of Ships of the line may go where they are more necessary.

When we are perfectly Master of the Harbour of Charlestown, we then may choose either to attack it, or to block it up according to our means and strength.

To block it up, I think 7000 Men are enough on the Land side between James and Ashley Rivers, because we may fortify them if necessary. The quantity of Troops we must have on James’s Island, and on the other sides of