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were traveling in column at 30 knots with Captain Bonte’s flagship, Wilhelm Heidkamp, in the lead. Dawn was breaking but visibility was still severely limited by snow squalls. Both Michael Sars and Kelt, patrolling the waters between Barøy and Tjeldøy, observed the lead German warship and informed Captain Askim by radio. In the span of ten minutes, another eight German destroyers passed the patrol boats. This information, along with the observation that the warships were German, was also reported to the Ofot Division. The two patrol boats sent separate messages and this caused some unfortunate confusion. Kelt identified the ships as German while Michael Sars referred to them only as foreign warships.

Kelt gave an accurate report when it identified nine German destroyers. The Erich Giese became separated from the rest before the encounter with Glowworm. The toppling waves had flooded her gyro room and navigation was by a magnetic compass that gyrated violently as the ship was tossed around in the violent seas. In the afternoon of April 8, Lieutenant Commander Karl Smidt, Erich Giese’s skipper, brought his ship around to pick up a soldier who had washed overboard. The soldier was saved but the rescue operation caused Erich Giese to fall even further behind the rest of the task force. The destroyer was running low on fuel and the ship’s violent movements in the northwesterly gale caused the pumps to lose suction sporadically. Speed was reduced to conserve fuel and Erich Giese had fallen about 50 miles behind when the rest of the task force entered Ofotfjord.

The reports from the two patrol vessels at the entrance to Ofotfjord reached Captain Askim at 0310 hours, with the last message from Kelt coming in at 0320 hours, and he ordered battle stations on Norge. Askim also alerted Captain Willoch in the other coastal defense ship. The 3rd Naval District was informed by radio via the communications center in Tromsø at 0320 hours. The message from Norge to the communications center identified the force simply as “foreign warships.” The 3rd Naval District informed District Command in Harstad at 0337 hours. The message to District Command read, “From the commanding officer Norge. Michael Sars reports foreign warships entering Ofotfjord. Norge and Eidsvold are casting off.”8

Captain Askim, located about two kilometers from Colonel Sundlo, knew around 0310 hours that foreign warships had entered Ofotfjord. Askim reported that he tried to warn Sundlo but was unable to make contact since the telephone line from ship to shore was broken when the aft lines were cut loose. He did ask a harbor official to warn Norwegian ships in the harbor but neglected to ask him to warn the army.9 Captain Steen observes,

As a result of this [failure to notify Colonel Sundlo directly], valuable time was lost. If the captain had managed to give this report, the colonel would have received it approximately 40 minutes earlier than he did, and he would also have received it in the correct version, that Germans ships were approaching in the fjord.10

The one-hour warning time the army expected was reduced to 10–20 minutes.

The exact time Colonel Sundlo learned that foreign warships were approaching is somewhat uncertain. Steen and Hovland give the time as about 0400 hours. Sandvik writes that Sundlo was informed at 0337 hours. It was probably later, since the District Command received the message from the 3rd Naval District at 0337. Sandvik writes that the 6th Division was informed at 0400 hours, although Lindbäck-Larsen claims it was 0345 hours, and it is logical to assume that Sundlo received the information about that time. Whatever the exact hour, the slow pace of passing information cost the forces in Narvik valuable preparation time.

Shortly after 0430 hours, Colonel Sundlo received another message that caused uncertainty and that gives some insight into the intrigues going on in the 6th Division. Lindbäck-Larsen writes that the District Command reported that it had received an order from the General Staff at 0330 hours not to fire on British and French warships. The same report stated that when informed about the order, Sundlo had commented, “in other words, the Germans are to be fired on but not the British.” Sandvik writes that Colonel Mjelde reported this conversation to General Fleischer “in view of Colonel Sundlo’s well-known attitude towards the Germans.” According to Lindbäck-Larsen, the decision was made to relieve Sundlo of his command after this comment. Lindbäck-Larsen writes that before they were able to contact Narvik to carry out the decision, the report arrived (0345 hours according to him) that foreign warships had entered Ofotfjord. This made it too late to make a command change.

Some claims in Lindbäck-Larsen’s report on this event fail to stand up to close scrutiny. Sundlo admitted having made the above statement when Captain Knudsen at the District Command relayed the General Staff message, but only for the sake of repeating the order to make sure he understood it correctly. Navy Captain Siem, Chief of Sea Transport at District Command, who was present when the conversation took place, also concluded that Sundlo was only trying to clarify the order.11 The naval history and a report by the District Command, backed by telephone logs, show that the order from the General Staff arrived at 0430, not at 0330. This time is undoubtedly correct since the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy sent out a similar order to the 3rd Naval District, where it arrived at 0420 hours.12 If Fleischer decided to relieve Colonel Sundlo prior to 0430 hours, he could not base or justify that decision on Sundlo’s reaction to a General Staff order that had not yet arrived.

Fleischer and his chief of staff assumed they would have a quiet night at their hotel in Vadsø after receiving a message from the General Staff around 2200 hours. District Command received the message at 2125 hours. It announced that a decision on mobilization would not be taken until the following morning.13 Based on what Lindbäck-Larsen writes, both he and Fleischer concluded that this message from the

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