Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Henrik Lunde (general ebook reader txt) 📖

from Co 4, arrived in Narvik about 0200 hours. The second group to arrive in Narvik consisted of Co 3. It arrived in Vassvik around 0300 and reached Narvik about 0330 hours. The company left behind a guard detail of 17 men in Elvegårdsmoen. In addition, the sled drivers were left behind in Øyjord when the ferry skipper refused to load the horses. Company 1, minus its sled drivers, arrived in Vassvik around 0415 hours and reached Narvik about 0445 hours, after the engagement between Norge and the German destroyers. The mortar platoon from the headquarters company arrived at the same time. Since no journals were kept, the above times are approximations based on the testimony of participants.

About 205 troops from the 1/13th Inf reached Narvik before the Germans landed. This brought Colonel Sundlo’s infantry strength to about 355 and another 180 arrived while the Germans were landing. At the most, Colonel Sundlo had 535 infantry troops that could take up the fight with the Germans. Even if the combat support and service support personnel are added, the total is only 775.

The Germans landed about 600 infantry in Narvik, not 400. The 400 often referred to are no doubt the troops carried on the destroyers Bernd von Arnim and Georg Thiele. These were the first troops ashore but they were joined within minutes by the 200 troops aboard Wilhelm Heidkamp.

The German troops were relieved to disembark the destroyers. Most of them came from Austria and the interior parts of Germany and they had never been to sea. They had traveled crowded under deck in the destroyers as these headed into the storms they encountered from the time they left Germany until they arrived in Narvik. The destroyer captains welcomed the stormy weather since it would help conceal them from the British. The destroyers, heading north at high speed in order to stay on schedule and keep up with the battleships, were tossed around like toys in the heavy seas. The troops were also tossed around below deck and suffered not only from seasickness but also from broken bones and other injuries. Some, who ventured on deck to help secure equipment, were swept overboard.

Nils Ryeng, quoting a customs official who witnessed the landing, writes, “several hundred soldiers, running, walking, crawling, apathetic, indifferent and seasick. They looked like they were drunk and many fell into the water.”16 This observation deserves further scrutiny.

The two German destroyers were in the process of docking when a larger Norwegian warship opened fire on them at a range of only 800 meters. The German warships were stationary targets and it was imperative that they offload their troops quickly in order to get underway and start maneuvering. There was no time to put out gangplanks as Bernd von Arnim engaged the Norwegian warship with its main batteries, machineguns, and torpedo salvoes. It was imperative for the officers and NCOs to get the 400 troops off the warships as quickly as possible since Norwegian 8-and 6-inch shells were whistling overhead. The next puff of smoke from the Norwegian warship might well bring death. The troops scrambled over the railings and jumped onto the pier with no attempt at unit cohesion. Some may well have fallen into the water in the process. When ashore, unit cohesion had to be restored as quickly as possible because they expected fire from Norwegian troops at any moment. To an untrained observer, the scene must have looked like chaos as the German infantry companies scrambled ashore and reformed.

While the mountain troops endured great hardships during their passage, there is little to indicate that this reduced their combat effectiveness. German writers have not considered the effects of seasickness an important factor. The fact that the German troops seized the designated facilities in Narvik in a rapid and organized fashion is a further indication that seasickness had not demoralized them or impaired their combat effectiveness.

The adrenalin rush in soldiers going into battle helps them focus on their mission and survival and set everything else aside. Sometimes this phenomenon is so strong in battle that a soldier may not even notice an otherwise painful wound. Dietl’s troops were among the best trained in Germany and they had been battle tested in the Carpathian Mountains in 1939. The soldiers likely spent the hours before landing with their NCOs and officers, going over the details of their mission for one last time. These intense activities probably helped them to forget their horrible experience at sea and calmed any fears they may have experienced in the minutes before landing.

How the available forces were used was far more important than the actual combat strength of the two sides. The Norwegians had to prepare to counter landings at any point along 10 kilometers of coastline from Fagernes to the east of Vassvik. The forward deployment of their forces guaranteed the Germans local superiority at any landing site and the consequent reduction in reserves impaired the Norwegians ability to launch counterattacks. It was impossible to establish an effective forward defense with the forces that were available. The harbor area alone stretched about three kilometers from Framnes to the Beisfjord entrance, covered by two bunkers that were not mutually supportive. A force landing in the middle of the harbor, while within the maximum range of the machineguns and small arms, would be outside their effective range. The prevailing heavy snow squalls and gale force winds in Narvik favored the Germans. The darkness and snow sometimes reduced visibility to only a few meters.

The Capture of Narvik

Colonel Sundlo held a meeting with his staff and principal subordinates after the arrival of Major Spjældnes and Co 4, about 0200 hours. Those present included Major Spjældnes and his adjutant, Major Omdal, the commander of Co 4, Captain Brønstad, and Captain Dalsve, Co 2’s executive officer. Sundlo explained what little he knew about the situation and announced that he would not deploy the arriving troops until first light. These units had come through a snowstorm on skis, were