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the Allies.

It is hard to understand the logic behind these assumptions. The opposite is more likely to have occurred. Sweden and Denmark could interpret the passage of a large fleet of warships through the narrow strait between them for attacking a state bordering the Baltic (Germany) as contrary to their international obligations. It is equally logical that forcing these approaches and seizing bases could bring Sweden and Denmark into the war on the side of Germany. Sweden would not have reacted kindly to having its trade with Germany and to other parts of Europe through Germany interrupted in this manner.

Moulton writes that the plan should “not be dismissed too lightly,” although it seemed “in retrospect clumsy and improbable” because “it seemed to offer the prospect of a relatively easy and bloodless way of winning the war by stopping Swedish ore.”1

That prospect was rather dim. The Germans could hurl at least 1,300 combat aircraft at the British ships from nearby bases. Moulton writes that the fleet was expected to operate in the Gulf of Bothnia, thereby placing it beyond the range of German bombers. However, to reach its destination, the fleet would have to make a long passage well within the range of German aircraft, and we can assume that the Germans would make every effort to ensure that the British fleet would not escape from what may well have become a deadly trap. The project shows that Churchill had not yet realized the effects of air power on naval operations, effects that proved enormously detrimental to operations in Norway within seven months. Furthermore, the Kiel Canal offered the Germans the opportunity to move ships between the North Sea and the Baltic without the use of the Baltic approaches.

The plan seems not to have been supported by the Navy. Admiral Pound pointed out that several conditions would have to be met before the operation could be carried out: active Swedish support, no opposition from the Soviet Union, upgrading the ships to withstand air attacks, and an ice-free Baltic. The last two conditions postponed any possibility of carrying out Catherine until the following spring, while the first two had the practical effect of eliminating any prospect of launching it. Admiral Pound may have hoped that by spring Churchill would have turned his boundless energy to other projects.

Iron Ore and Other Motives

Churchill began looking around for other immediate opportunities to strike at the enemy. He advanced the idea that the British government should take immediate action to prevent German ships from using Norwegian territorial waters for transit to Germany. Most of Churchill’s colleagues agreed with his reasoning, but their respect for the neutrality of small states and their hope for a peaceful settlement with Germany prevented them from making an early decision. Churchill presented his views to the Cabinet on September 19, 1939.

Churchill suggested that certain steps were necessary before a closing of the corridor within Norwegian territorial waters could be undertaken. First, the negotiations with the Norwegians for chartering their merchant fleet had to be completed. Second, in order to prevent a quarrel with the Swedish government, the British Board of Trade should arrange to buy that country’s iron ore, which would otherwise go to Germany.

The suggestions advocated by Churchill proved to be more difficult to achieve than envisioned. Negotiations with the Norwegians for the use of their fleet had been underway since the war began. The Norwegians were aware of their fleet’s value, used it to obtain advantage, and dragged out the negotiations. A major agreement was signed in mid-November 1939, but many issues were not settled until March 1940. The Allies realized that any massive violation of Norwegian neutrality would end the negotiations. This consideration, the neutrality arguments, and the hope for a peaceful resolution of the war meant that Churchill’s ideas languished, although he provided the War Cabinet with a more detailed memorandum on September 29.

In addition, there had been a marked decline in the iron ore traffic to Germany via Narvik. One contributing factor was that the crews of merchant ships were unwilling to sail through dangerous waters in wartime, but in addition the German decision-makers diverted some of the Narvik ore to Luleå to be stored. The shipments had declined from 457,482 tons in February 1939 to only 99,391 in February 1940. During the same period, the shipments to Great Britain had more than doubled. These figures, made public by the Norwegians, apparently gave Churchill some temporary concerns.

Before submitting his more detailed memorandum to the War Cabinet on September 29, Churchill asked the Naval Staff to reconvene the committee on iron ore and look over his draft memorandum in order to insure that he was not completely off the mark. He wrote, “It is no use my asking the Cabinet to take the drastic action suggested against a neutral country unless the results are in the first order of importance.” He had heard that the shipment of iron ore from Narvik was much reduced and that the Germans were stockpiling ore in southern Sweden for shipment to Germany during the winter months. He wanted to know if these statements were true and stated, “It would be very unpleasant if I went into action on mining the Norwegian territorial waters and was answered that it would not do the trick.”2

Since Churchill did submit his memorandum to the War Cabinet on September 29, it seems that the Naval Staff dispelled some of his concerns. The memorandum takes note of the decline in shipments from Narvik, but urges more dramatic action if they start moving again. Churchill concluded that the prevention of the Narvik supplies would greatly reduce Germany’s power of resistance. By December 1939, he tried to convince his reluctant colleagues that the interruption of the ore coming through Norway could be decisive for the outcome of the war.

Churchill was a man of vast knowledge and experience; however, it is difficult to square his stated views with realities. It was obvious to Churchill and his colleagues that mining

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