Friends in High Places: The Bechtel Story : The Most Secret Corporation and How It Engineered the Wo Laton Mccartney (surface ebook reader .TXT) 📖

more complex and he began turning to more sensitive sources for help. One was General S. F. Chamberlain, director of intelligence at the War Department, who in June 1947 provided Bechtel with a secret aerial survey of eastern Saudi Arabia, which Bechtel subsequently turned over to the Saudi government, then feverishly laying out roads in preparation for war.

Snodgrass proved so valuable in Saudi Arabia that Bechtel began dispatching him on economic intelligence-gathering missions to Europe and the United States as well. After one especially busy mission to Europe in April 1946, Snodgrass wrote to Bechtel detailing no fewer than eight major projects being undertaken by Bechtel customers and rivals. Included were a French fuel-oil plant in Le Havre; a series of cement plants being planned by the Swiss; a British refinery in Southampton; a power plant in Belgium and assorted major petroleum projects scattered across the Continent-all of which Snodgrass had learned about in less than twenty-four hours.

He was equally adept at picking up political information from his friends in the CIA. After receiving a decoded agency cable from one of his sources in Saudi Arabia in July 1950, shortly after the outbreak of the Korean war, Snodgrass passed along the data to Bechtel. It read: Judging by the statement Jeddah Arabs and local diplomats from other Arab countries Egypt refusal to support UN action in Korea has made unfortunate favorable impression. Hope still held that Saudi Arabia and Lebanon may support UN. Basis of neutrality propaganda is bitter Arab experience with UN and U.S. in Palestine and fear that action in Korea may also be contrary to wishes inhabitants South Korea. Voice of America and other U.S. propagandists would do well to cite evidence South Koreans want U.S. armed help instead of citing UN authority for U.S. actions. Policy of Iraq and Jordan will depend on British pressure. Unfortunately British in Jeddah have been referring cynically to “America’s little war in Korea”

instead of “our war. “17

Inspired by Snodgrass’ cloak-and-daggering, Steve Bechtel. embarked on intelligence-gathering missions of his own. After one such foray to Teheran in October 1950, he shared with Snodgrass what he had learned at the U.S. Embassy, apparently from Kermit Roosevelt, son of 122

THE COMPANY AND THE COMPANY

President Theodore, chief of the CIA’s operations in the Middle East, and later architect of the coup that overthrew the Mossadeq government: Our friend in Teheran feels that there will be no actual movement southward by the northern neighbors [the Soviet Union] unless it is part of a worldwide activity. He says while they are there and ready, every indication is that they recognize that any movement whatsoever would be the spark that would set off a worldwide program [World War III).

Our friend is more worried about the dilatoriness and slowness of the ExportImport Bank than anything else. He chafes under the delays and red tape. This amuses me because of the fact that he, more than most people, should know of the problems of getting anything done in Washington.

All in all, we had a most pleasant trip to Teheran, the result of which is that I feel better about the situation in that area. 18

Bechtel was at least partly correct. Bluntly warned by the United States that intervention in Iran would indeed trigger a “worldwide program,” Soviet troops stayed behind their borders. The internal situation in Iran, however, continued to deteriorate, and in 1951, with the oil companies under increasing pressure from Mossadeq, Snodgrass took a year’s leave of absence from Bechtel to return to government service as chief