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of the refueled destroyers. The other two were Bernd von Arnim and Georg Thiele. However, the last two destroyers also had minor engine troubles that needed to be fixed before they could undertake the voyage back to Germany. Only one destroyer was therefore fully ready to depart. At 1357 hours Captain Bonte sent a message to Admiral Saalwächter at Naval Command West and to Admiral Lütjens, who was waiting to link up with the destroyers. The message notified them that the destroyers could not depart Narvik on April 9 as planned, but Bonte intended to depart after dark on April 10, by which time all destroyers should be refueled. Saalwächter approved Bonte’s decision and informed him that German submarines had taken up positions at the entrance to Norwegian fjords, including Vestfjord and Ofotfjord.

U-boat Group 1, consisting of U25, U46, U51, U64 and U65, operated off North Norway. Some of these submarines were now patrolling Vestfjord and Ofotfjord along the approach any British force would have to follow. U51 patrolled the inner part of Vestfjord; U25 was in position off Barøy Lighthouse; and U46 was in Ofotfjord, off Ramnes. Bonte’s journal entries indicate that he had strong faith in the submarines’ ability to warn him about approaching enemy ships. He was confident that the two submarines in the narrow straits near Barøy and Ramnes would detect any approaching enemy force. He even hoped that the submarines could prevent an enemy attempt to enter the fjord. This assessment was an overestimation of the submarines’ capabilities in the low visibility caused by almost continuous snow squalls. Naval Command West informed Bonte about the submarines’ positions and he in turn asked that command to impress upon the U-boat commanders the importance of their mission to report and hinder a British attack on Narvik.

The British would have been dismayed to know that the Germans had excellent and accurate intelligence about British naval operations. The information was obtained from intercepted and deciphered British radio traffic. Captain Bonte knew, for example, that a large naval force, thought to be the main body of the Home Fleet, was on its way north and that the force in or near Vestfjord included two battle cruisers. The most important intelligence passed to Bonte was that a British destroyer flotilla had orders to attack an unknown target.

Bonte may have feared air attacks more than a surface attack and this concern probably influenced how he deployed the ships that were not refueling in the evening of April 9. To some extent, his concern was unwarranted. Narvik was well beyond the reach of British land-based aircraft. The nearest British aircraft carrier was with the Home Fleet, still well out of range, but believed to be heading north. Bonte directed Commander Berger to send George Thiele and Bernd von Arnim into Ballangen Bay, about 15 miles southwest of Narvik. He ordered Commander Bey to take the destroyers Wolfgang Zenker, Erich Giese, and Erich Koellner into Herjangsfjord, about ten miles northeast of Narvik. Commander Hans-Joachim Gadow was to keep three of the 3rd Destroyer Flotilla’s four destroyers in Narvik to refuel. The fourth destroyer was assigned patrol duty in Ofotfjord. This destroyer would be relieved, as required, by the refueling schedule. Bonte also kept his flagship, Wilhelm Heidkamp, in Narvik. He planned initially to have the refueled Wilhelm Heidkamp join the three destroyers in Herjangsfjord. However, Dietl convinced him to remain in Narvik to facilitate consultations.

At 2200 hours on April 9, Captain Bonte received a radio message from Lieutenant Commander Knorr, the skipper of U51. This submarine patrolled the inner part of Vestfjord and reported sighting five British destroyers on a southwest course. This course took them away from Narvik and therefore the message did not cause Bonte to take any further precautions. As in the case of Admiral Forbes earlier with respect to Task Force 2, Captain Bonte placed too much reliance on the reported course of the British destroyers. These ships were waiting for dawn and high tide for their entry into Ofotfjord and the German submarine just happened to see the ships while they were heading southwestward.

Bonte is criticized for the actions he took or failed to take that fateful evening. Some of the criticism is justified, but not all. Bonte failed to be sufficiently on guard, despite knowing that superior British naval forces were in the Vestfjord area. However, it was logical for Bonte to assume that the three submarines at the entrance to Ofotfjord and one destroyer on patrol in the fjord outside the harbor entrance would provide adequate warning about a British attack. It was difficult for Bonte to increase the early warning patrols since seven of the ten destroyers were not refueled and did not have sufficient fuel to patrol. Nevertheless, he could have used his fully refueled flagship, despite Dietl’s desire for it to remain in Narvik, and the two destroyers in Ballangen Bay to patrol further out in the fjord to provide earlier warning of approaching enemy forces.

He also kept too many destroyers in Narvik harbor, which was most likely to be the target of any surprise attack. There were five destroyers in the harbor when the British attacked but Bonte believed there were only four. Two had to be there in order to refuel. However, it would have been a good idea to move Jan Wellem to a side fjord to conduct the refueling operation. Refueling destroyers were vulnerable targets and the destruction of Jan Wellem would have ended all hopes of bringing the destroyers back to Germany. He could also have reduced the number of ships in Narvik by taking his flagship out of the immediate harbor area and by relocating the destroyer that was not actually involved in refueling operations. Bogen, on the north side of the fjord, or Rombaken would have been a good place for these two ships.

Captain Dickens is critical of Bonte for failing to issue orders to the destroyer captains about what actions to take in case of attack.

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