Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Henrik Lunde (general ebook reader txt) 📖

Warburton-Lee led his five destroyers westward at moderate speed to a point northeast of Skomsnes and held a council of war on the bridge. Everyone favored making another run into the harbor to ensure that all enemy ships were destroyed. It is an understandable emotion by men flushed with at the prospect of complete victory. Warburton-Lee accepted the views of his officers and even ordered landing parties readied. This was a strange order since the landing parties consisted of no more than one lightly armed platoon on each ship and the British had received a hail of small arms and machinegun fire from the shoreline, an indication that the shore was held in force. The fateful decision to make a third foray into the harbor spelled the end to the amazing run of British luck.

Dickens claims that the Germans finally alerted their five destroyers located outside the harbor about 0530 hours, one hour after the action began. The outlaying destroyers no doubt received word late about the British attack on Narvik, but probably not quite as late as indicated by Dickens.

Warburton-Lee took his flotilla back into the harbor at 20 knots. The mist and smoke was heavy as the destroyers weaved their way past the graveyard of sunken or sinking hulls of merchant ships in their path. They met gunfire from Hans Lüdemann and Hermann Künne. Those ships were not visible but the British fired at the point of the gun flashes. Hans Lüdemann also fired a salvo of four torpedoes at the attacking British destroyers but they all missed, one passing under Hostile. Hostile ventured a little too close to the enemy in launching its torpedoes and received the first large caliber hit by a British ship so far in the action. The damage from the 5-inch shell was not serious. Hardy, leading the line of British warships, turned west as she exited Narvik’s harbor.

Jan Wellem had so far escaped the carnage but its captain now felt that her time had come and ordered the ship abandoned. Jan Wellem carried a number of British prisoners and the captain and his crew remained aboard until the prisoners were lowered safely away.

The distance from the three German destroyers in Herjangsfjord to Narvik was approximately 10 miles, and the distance to Ballangen Bay was about 15 miles. From the time these destroyers received word about the British attack, they needed to weigh anchors, get underway, and cover the distances mentioned above.

The official Norwegian naval history agrees with Dickens that the destroyers in Herjangsfjord were notified about the action in Narvik in a message from Hans Lüdemann. However, it states that this message was sent at 0515 hours, at the same time as Warburton-Lee’s destroyers were beginning their second run into the harbor. This seems a more realistic timeline although it is still probably too tight.

There are therefore reasons to believe that the message may have been sent even before the time indicated by the Norwegian history, possibly after the three British destroyers had completed their first run. It took the German destroyers in Herjangsfjord at least 15 minutes to weigh anchor and they set out for Narvik at the maximum speed allowable by their scant fuel supplies. The British destroyer flotilla exited Narvik harbor after its third run around 0550 hours, about 35 minutes after the German destroyers in Herjangsfjord were alerted if we accept the sequence of events reported by the Norwegians.

The German Counterattack

One can well imagine the surprise on Hardy’s bridge when, as the British flotilla turned westward from the harbor entrance, they observed an enemy force steering in their direction from the northeast at a distance estimated to be 7,500 meters. Warburton-Lee was the first to see the enemy force and he estimated that it consisted of one cruiser and three destroyers. He is reported to have told those present on the bridge, “This is our moment to get out,” and as he sent the following message to his superiors at 0551 hours, “One cruiser, three destroyers off Narvik. Am withdrawing to westward,”13 he increased speed to 30 knots and fired the emergency withdrawal signal.

Warburton-Lee was mistaken as to both the composition and number of enemy ships but the German destroyers were large ships and it is understandable that one could be identified as a cruiser. It was also undoubtedly difficult to ascertain the exact number in the hazy morning light.

Commander Bey’s destroyers were in an oblique formation that allowed all ships to open fire with their forward guns without endangering each other. They opened fire shortly after they were sighted and the battle developed into a running engagement on a westerly course. The British ships, with the exception of Hostile that lingered behind still looking for targets in the harbor, were able to reply to the German fire with full broadsides as the enemy was off their starboard beam. The fire by both sides was ineffective and all shells fell far short of their targets. The reason was undoubtedly a mistake in range estimation. The British estimated that the enemy ships were 7,000 to 7,500 meters away when they opened fire. German reports state that the distance was over 10,000 meters.14

Commander Erich Bey, the commander of the 4th Destroyer Flotilla, became the senior German naval officer when Captain Bonte was killed. He was an experienced and respected destroyer officer, but tended to err on the side of caution.15 He was not fully aware of what had happened in Narvik or of the size of the opposing enemy force. The only message he received from Narvik after being alerted stated that Wilhelm Heidkamp was sunk, that Bonte was killed, and that three destroyers were prepared to serve as floating batteries.

This sounded rather ominous to the new naval commander, who placed heavy emphasis on that part of Admiral Raeder’s operational order that called for the preservation of the ships and their early and safe return to Germany. It was natural for him to conclude that