Holocaust: The Nazi Persecution and Murder of the Jews Peter Longerich (grave mercy .TXT) 📖

similar conclusion: ‘quarter the Jews in barracks and use them in units as labour

gangs’. 32 Nevertheless, the Army High Command did not issue the order that recommended the establishment of ghettos until 19 August, and then under

certain conditions. The commanders of the Rear Army Areas North, Central,

and South gave differing instructions in this respect. 33

Alfred Rosenberg, the Reich Minister for the Eastern Territories, had described

the ‘establishment of ghettos and labour gangs’ as the ‘key solution’ to the ‘Jewish

problem’ in a directive for the Reichskommissar for the Ukraine, who had yet to

be appointed, 34 and the civilian administration was similarly demanding the formation of ghettos in many towns. 35 The Einsatzgruppen were just as strongly From Anti-Semitic Terror to Genocide

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in favour, too. A plan for the establishment of ghettos in Kaunas and Minsk36 by Einsatzgruppen A and B can be found in the incident reports for mid-July. The

Minsk ghetto was in fact set up on the orders of the Field Commandant dated 19

July, and that in Kaunas was sealed on 15 August. 37

It was also in mid-July that Einsatzgruppe B—which had described the ‘solution

to the Jewish question during the war’ as ‘impossible’ in the old Soviet areas—

suggested the establishment of Jewish councils in all cities, in order to identify

Jews and deploy them for the purposes of forced labour, but above all to set up

ghettos across the whole area: in fact, the ‘implementation of this task’ was

‘ongoing’. 38 The same group reported further success at the end of July:39 ‘where it was necessary and possible, and with the agreement of the responsible local and

field command posts, ghettos were being set up, councils of Jewish elders formed,

the visible identification of Jews implemented and work gangs established, etc.’

Einsatzgruppe D evidently also did not see the ‘solution to the Jewish question’

at the end of August 1941 in the immediate and total annihilation of the Jews, as

can be seen in an incident report from the 25th of that month:40 ‘the solution to one of the most important problems, the Jewish question, has also been tackled,

even if tentatively. In Kishinev there were 60,000–80,000 Jews before the war. . . .

On the initiative of the Einsatzkommando the Romanian town commandant set

up a Jewish ghetto in the old town. This currently comprises some 9,000 Jews.

They have been formed into work gangs and set to work for various German and

Romanian agencies on clearing and other operations.’

The same Einsatzgruppe reported at the beginning of October that ‘the first part

of the Jewish question has been solved’. The nature of this ‘solution’ emerges from

the remainder of the report, and consisted in the registration and marking-out of

Jews, the formation of Jewish councils, ghettoization, and enforced labour. 41

The establishment of ghettos, the ‘first part’ of the ‘solution to the Jewish

question’, was thus a provisional measure in the eyes of the Einsatzgruppen,

which was initially planned only for the duration of the war. This explains why

the Einsatzgruppen both extended the range of the murders during the summer to

include women and children, making whole districts ‘free of Jews’ and, at the same

time, took measures that were aimed at preserving part of the Jewish population.

It was still the case that, from their perspective, the ‘Final Solution’ to the ‘Jewish

question’—the complete annihilation of the Jews—had been postponed until after

the war. They were still mainly concerned with murdering as many of those Jews

who were not capable of work as possible. Ghettos played an important part in

this approach because they achieved the necessary degree of control over the

Jewish workforce, which for the moment the authorities were unwilling to dis-

pense with. This view gradually prevailed during the summer of 1941 in place of

the previous approach, which favoured selective terrorization of the Jewish lead-

ership, and was still predominant during the autumn and winter of 1941 to 1942.

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Mass Executions in Occupied Soviet Zones, 1941

At that point, and with massive acceleration from spring 1942, there followed a

third phase in which the population of the ghettos was selectively screened and

murdered, and in which whatever remained of the Jewish population living

outside the ghettos was traced and killed in so-called ‘cleansing campaigns’ that

were generally described as anti-partisan measures. This third phase will be

described in a later chapter. 42

Himmler’s ‘Mission’ and the Deployment

of the SS Brigades

As the original ‘security policing’ approach to the ‘Jewish question’—a selective

campaign of terror—was replaced by policies aiming at total ethnic annihilation,

the SS Brigades under the command of the Higher SS and Police Commanders for

Russia South and Russia Centre played a decisive role at the end of July and in

early August. The mass murders perpetrated by these formations attained new

dimensions of horror and made the whole process of annihilation considerably

more radical. These massacres enabled the Higher SS and Police Commanders

once and for all to seize the initiative and take over the leading role in the process

of annihilation.

The deployment of the SS Brigades in the East had been planned since spring,

and it was clear that the brigades were to be used as a third team after the

Einsatzgruppen and police battalions. The starting signal for their deployment

was given at a meeting with Goering, Lammers, Rosenberg, and Keitel on 16 July

in which Hitler had set out some of the principles for the future occupation of the

Eastern territories and revealed his far-reaching plans for annexation and the

brutality with which he intended to deal with the indigenous population. 43

According to Hitler, ‘the fundamental need is to divide up the huge cake man-

ageably so that we can, first, control it, second, administer it, and third, exploit it’.

The partisan war that the enemy had launched had its advantages, he said: ‘it gives

us the chance to exterminate what stands in our way.’ He went on: ‘this huge area

must be returned to peace as soon as possible, of course, and this can best happen

if you shoot dead anyone who so much as blinks at you.’

The Führer’s decree on the Administration of the Newly Occupied Eastern

Areas established that, after the end of the military campaign, the administration

would be transferred into civilian hands. The basic structure of the occupation

administration was also set out, with Reichskommissars