The Ethics by Benedictus de Spinoza (most important books of all time .txt) 📖

is meant by

the idea of an idea ; but we may remark that the foregoing

proposition is in itself sufficiently plain. No one, who has a

true idea, is ignorant that a true idea involves the highest

certainty. For to have a true idea is only another expression

for knowing a thing perfectly, or as well as possible. No one,

indeed, can doubt of this, unless he thinks that an idea is

something lifeless, like a picture on a panel, and not a mode of

thinking-namely, the very act of understanding. And who, I ask,

can know that he understands anything, unless he do first

understand it? In other words, who can know that he is sure of a

thing, unless he be first sure of that thing? Further, what can

there be more clear, and more certain, than a true idea as a

standard of truth? Even as light displays both itself and

darkness, so is truth a standard both of itself and of falsity.

I think I have thus sufficiently answered these

questions-namely, if a true idea is distinguished from a false

idea, only in so far as it is said to agree with its object, a

true idea has no more reality or perfection than a false idea

(since the two are only distinguished by an extrinsic mark) ;

consequently, neither will a man who has a true idea have any

advantage over him who has only false ideas. Further, how comes

it that men have false ideas? Lastly, how can anyone be sure,

that he has ideas which agree with their objects? These

questions, I repeat, I have, in my opinion, sufficiently

answered. The difference between a true idea and a false idea is

plain : from what was said in II. xxxv., the former is related to

the latter as being is to not-being. The causes of falsity I

have set forth very clearly in II. xix. and II. xxxv. with the

note. From what is there stated, the difference between a man

who has true ideas, and a man who has only false ideas, is made

apparent. As for the last question-as to how a man can be sure

that he has ideas that agree with their objects, I have just

pointed out, with abundant clearness, that his knowledge arises

from the simple fact, that he has an idea which corresponds with

its object-in other words, that truth is its own standard. We

may add that our mind, in so far as it perceives things truly, is

part of the infinite intellect of God (II. xi. Coroll.) ;

therefore, the clear and distinct ideas of the mind are as

necessarily true as the ideas of God.

 

PROP. XLIV. It is not in the nature of reason to regard things

as contingent, but as necessary.

Proof.-It is in the nature of reason to perceive things truly

(II. xli.), namely (I. Ax. vi.), as they are in themselves-that

is (I. xxix.), not as contingent, but as necessary. Q.E.D.

Corollary I.-Hence it follows, that it is only through our

imagination that we consider things, whether in respect to the

future or the past, as contingent.

Note.-How this way of looking at things arises, I will

briefly explain. We have shown above (II. xvii. and Coroll.)

that the mind always regards things as present to itself, even

though they be not in existence, until some causes arise which

exclude their existence and presence. Further (II. xviii.), we

showed that, if the human body has once been affected by two

external bodies simultaneously, the mind, when it afterwards

imagines one of the said external bodies, will straightway

remember the other-that is, it will regard both as present to

itself, unless there arise causes which exclude their existence

and presence. Further, no one doubts that we imagine time, from

the fact that we imagine bodies to be moved some more slowly than

others, some more quickly, some at equal speed. Thus, let us

suppose that a child yesterday saw Peter for the first time in

the morning, Paul at noon, and Simon in the evening ; then, that

today he again sees Peter in the morning. It is evident, from

II. Prop. xviii., that, as soon as he sees the morning light, he

will imagine that the sun will traverse the same parts of the

sky, as it did when he saw it on the preceding day ; in other

words, he will imagine a complete day, and, together with his

imagination of the morning, he will imagine Peter ; with noon, he

will imagine Paul ; and with evening, he will imagine Simon-that

is, he will imagine the existence of Paul and Simon in relation

to a future time ; on the other hand, if he sees Simon in the

evening, he will refer Peter and Paul to a past time, by

imagining them simultaneously with the imagination of a past

time. If it should at any time happen, that on some other

evening the child should see James instead of Simon, he will, on

the following morning, associate with his imagination of evening

sometimes Simon, sometimes James, not both together : for the

child is supposed to have seen, at evening, one or other of them,

not both together. His imagination will therefore waver ; and,

with the imagination of future evenings, he will associate first

one, then the other-that is, he will imagine them in the future,

neither of them as certain, but both as contingent. This

wavering of the imagination will be the same, if the imagination

be concerned with things which we thus contemplate, standing in

relation to time past or time present : consequently, we may

imagine things as contingent, whether they be referred to time

present, past, or future.

Corollary II.-It is in the nature of reason to perceive

things under a certain form of eternity (sub qu�dam �ternitatis

specie).

Proof.-It is in the nature of reason to regard things, not as

contingent, but as necessary (II. xliv.). Reason perceives this

necessity of things (II. xli.) truly-that is (I. Ax. vi.), as it

is in itself. But (I. xvi.) this necessity of things is the very

necessity of the eternal nature of God ; therefore, it is in the

nature of reason to regard things under this form of eternity.

We may add that the bases of reason are the notions (II.

xxxviii.), which answer to things common to all, and which (II.

xxxvii.) do not answer to the essence of any particular thing :

which must therefore be conceived without any relation to time,

under a certain form of eternity.

 

PROP. XLV. Every idea of every body, or of every particular

thing actually existing, necessarily involves the eternal and

infinite essence of God.

Proof.-The idea of a particular thing actually existing

necessarily involves both the existence and the essence of the

said thing (II. viii.). Now particular things cannot be

conceived without God (I. xv.) ; but, inasmuch as (II. vi.) they

have God for their cause, in so far as he is regarded under the

attribute of which the things in question are modes, their ideas

must necessarily involve (I. Ax. iv.) the conception of the

attributes of those ideas-that is (I. vi.), the eternal and

infinite essence of God. Q.E.D.

Note.-By existence I do not here mean duration-that is,

existence in so far as it is conceived abstractedly, and as a

certain form of quantity. I am speaking of the very nature of

existence, which is assigned to particular things, because they

follow in infinite numbers and in infinite ways from the eternal

necessity of God’s nature (I. xvi.). I am speaking, I repeat, of

the very existence of particular things, in so far as they are in

God. For although each particular thing be conditioned by

another particular thing to exist in a given way, yet the force

whereby each particular thing perseveres in existing follows from

the eternal necessity of God’s nature (cf. I. xxiv. Coroll.).

 

PROP. XLVI. The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of

God which every idea involves is adequate and perfect.

Proof.-The proof of the last proposition is universal ; and

whether a thing be considered as a part or a whole, the idea

thereof, whether of the whole or of a part (by the last Prop.),

will involve God’s eternal and infinite essence. Wherefore,

that, which gives knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence

of God, is common to all, and is equally in the part and in the

whole ; therefore (II. xxxviii.) this knowledge will be adequate.

Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XLVII. The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the

eternal and infinite essence of God.

Proof.-The human mind has ideas (II. xxii.), from which (II.

xxiii.) it perceives itself and its own body (II. xix.) and

external bodies (II. xvi. Coroll. i. and II. xvii.) as actually

existing ; therefore (II. xlv. and xlvi.) it has an adequate

knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God. Q.E.D.

Note.-Hence we see, that the infinite essence and the

eternity of God are known to all. Now as all things are in God,

and are conceived through God, we can from this knowledge infer

many things, which we may adequately know, and we may form that

third kind of knowledge of which we spoke in the note to II. xl.,

and of the excellence and use of which we shall have occasion to

speak in Part V. Men have not so clear a knowledge of God as

they have of general notions, because they are unable to imagine

God as they do bodies, and also because they have associated the

name God with images of things that they are in the habit of

seeing, as indeed they can hardly avoid doing, being, as they

are, men, and continually affected by external bodies. Many

errors, in truth, can be traced to this head, namely, that we do

not apply names to things rightly. For instance, when a man says

that the lines drawn from the centre of a circle to its

circumference are not equal, he then, at all events, assuredly

attaches a meaning to the word circle different from that

assigned by mathematicians. So again, when men make mistakes in

calculation, they have one set of figures in their mind, and

another on the paper. If we could see into their minds, they do

not make a mistake ; they seem to do so, because we think, that

they have the same numbers in their mind as they have on the

paper. If this were not so, we should not believe them to be in

error, any more than I thought that a man was in error, whom I

lately heard exclaiming that his entrance hall had flown into a

neighbour’s hen, for his meaning seemed to me sufficiently clear.

Very many controversies have arisen from the fact, that men do

not rightly explain their meaning, or do not rightly interpret

the meaning of others. For, as a matter of fact, as they flatly

contradict themselves, they assume now one side, now another, of

the argument, so as to oppose the opinions, which they consider

mistaken and absurd in their opponents.

 

PROP. XLVIII. In the mind there is no absolute or free will ;

but the mind is determined to wish this or that by a cause, which

has also been determined by another cause, and this last by

another cause, and so on to infinity.

Proof.-The mind is a fixed and definite mode of thought (II.

xi.), therefore it cannot be the free cause of its actions (I.

xvii. Coroll. ii.) ; in other words, it cannot have an absolute

faculty of positive or negative volition ; but (by I. xxviii.) it

must be determined by a cause, which has also been determined by

another cause, and this last by another, &c. Q.E.D.

Note.-In the