An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding by David Hume (good e books to read TXT) 📖

of evidence, in the present case, may be derived

from several different causes; from the opposition of contrary

testimony; from the character or number of the witnesses; from the

manner of their delivering their testimony; or from the union of all

these circumstances. We entertain a suspicion concerning any matter of

fact, when the witnesses contradict each other; when they are but few,

or of a doubtful character; when they have an interest in what they

affirm; when they deliver their testimony with hesitation, or on the

contrary, with too violent asseverations. There are many other

particulars of the same kind, which may diminish or destroy the force of

any argument, derived from human testimony.

 

Suppose, for instance, that the fact, which the testimony endeavours to

establish, partakes of the extraordinary and the marvellous; in that

case, the evidence, resulting from the testimony, admits of a

diminution, greater or less, in proportion as the fact is more or less

unusual. The reason why we place any credit in witnesses and historians,

is not derived from any connexion, which we perceive a priori,

between testimony and reality, but because we are accustomed to find a

conformity between them. But when the fact attested is such a one as has

seldom fallen under our observation, here is a contest of two opposite

experiences; of which the one destroys the other, as far as its force

goes, and the superior can only operate on the mind by the force, which

remains. The very same principle of experience, which gives us a certain

degree of assurance in the testimony of witnesses, gives us also, in

this case, another degree of assurance against the fact, which they

endeavour to establish; from which contradition there necessarily arises

a counterpoize, and mutual destruction of belief and authority.

 

I should not believe such a story were it told me by Cato, was a

proverbial saying in Rome, even during the lifetime of that

philosophical patriot.[20] The incredibility of a fact, it was allowed,

might invalidate so great an authority.

 

[20] Plutarch, in vita Catonis.

 

The Indian prince, who refused to believe the first relations concerning

the effects of frost, reasoned justly; and it naturally required very

strong testimony to engage his assent to facts, that arose from a state

of nature, with which he was unacquainted, and which bore so little

analogy to those events, of which he had had constant and uniform

experience. Though they were not contrary to his experience, they were

not conformable to it.[21]

 

[21] No Indian, it is evident, could have experience that water

did not freeze in cold climates. This is placing nature in a

situation quite unknown to him; and it is impossible for him to

tell a priori what will result from it. It is making a new

experiment, the consequence of which is always uncertain. One

may sometimes conjecture from analogy what will follow; but

still this is but conjecture. And it must be confessed, that,

in the present case of freezing, the event follows contrary to

the rules of analogy, and is such as a rational Indian would

not look for. The operations of cold upon water are not

gradual, according to the degrees of cold; but whenever it

comes to the freezing point, the water passes in a moment, from

the utmost liquidity to perfect hardness. Such an event,

therefore, may be denominated extraordinary, and requires a

pretty strong testimony, to render it credible to people in a

warm climate: But still it is not miraculous, nor contrary to

uniform experience of the course of nature in cases where all

the circumstances are the same. The inhabitants of Sumatra

have always seen water fluid in their own climate, and the

freezing of their rivers ought to be deemed a prodigy: But they

never saw water in Muscovy during the winter; and therefore

they cannot reasonably be positive what would there be the

consequence.

 

90. But in order to encrease the probability against the testimony of

witnesses, let us suppose, that the fact, which they affirm, instead of

being only marvellous, is really miraculous; and suppose also, that the

testimony considered apart and in itself, amounts to an entire proof; in

that case, there is proof against proof, of which the strongest must

prevail, but still with a diminution of its force, in proportion to that

of its antagonist.

 

A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and

unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a

miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument

from experience can possibly be imagined. Why is it more than probable,

that all men must die; that lead cannot, of itself, remain suspended in

the air; that fire consumes wood, and is extinguished by water; unless

it be, that these events are found agreeable to the laws of nature, and

there is required a violation of these laws, or in other words, a

miracle to prevent them? Nothing is esteemed a miracle, if it ever

happen in the common course of nature. It is no miracle that a man,

seemingly in good health, should die on a sudden: because such a kind of

death, though more unusual than any other, has yet been frequently

observed to happen. But it is a miracle, that a dead man should come to

life; because that has never been observed in any age or country. There

must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous event,

otherwise the event would not merit that appellation. And as a uniform

experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof,

from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle; nor

can such a proof be destroyed, or the miracle rendered credible, but by

an opposite proof, which is superior.[22]

 

[22] Sometimes an event may not, in itself, seem to be

contrary to the laws of nature, and yet, if it were real, it

might, by reason of some circumstances, be denominated a

miracle; because, in fact, it is contrary to these laws. Thus

if a person, claiming a divine authority, should command a sick

person to be well, a healthful man to fall down dead, the

clouds to pour rain, the winds to blow, in short, should order

many natural events, which immediately follow upon his command;

these might justly be esteemed miracles, because they are

really, in this case, contrary to the laws of nature. For if

any suspicion remain, that the event and command concurred by

accident, there is no miracle and no transgression of the laws

of nature. If this suspicion be removed, there is evidently a

miracle, and a transgression of these laws; because nothing can

be more contrary to nature than that the voice or command of a

man should have such an influence. A miracle may be accurately

defined, _a transgression of a law of nature by a particular

volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some

invisible agent_. A miracle may either be discoverable by men

or not. This alters not its nature and essence. The raising of

a house or ship into the air is a visible miracle. The raising

of a feather, when the wind wants ever so little of a force

requisite for that purpose, is as real a miracle, though not so

sensible with regard to us.

 

91. The plain consequence is (and it is a general maxim worthy of our

attention), ‘That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle,

unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more

miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavours to establish; and even in

that case there is a mutual destruction of arguments, and the superior

only gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of force, which

remains, after deducting the inferior.’ When anyone tells me, that he

saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself,

whether it be more probable, that this person should either deceive or

be deceived, or that the fact, which he relates, should really have

happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other; and according to

the superiority, which I discover, I pronounce my decision, and always

reject the greater miracle If the falsehood of his testimony would be

more miraculous, than the event which he relates; then, and not till

then, can he pretend to command my belief or opinion.

 

PART II.

 

92. In the foregoing reasoning we have supposed, that the testimony,

upon which a miracle is founded, may possibly amount to an entire proof,

and that the falsehood of that testimony would be a real prodigy: But it

is easy to shew, that we have been a great deal too liberal in our

concession, and that there never was a miraculous event established on

so full an evidence.

 

For first, there is not to be found, in all history, any miracle

attested by a sufficient number of men, of such unquestioned good-sense,

education, and learning, as to secure us against all delusion in

themselves; of such undoubted integrity, as to place them beyond all

suspicion of any design to deceive others; of such credit and reputation

in the eyes of mankind, as to have a great deal to lose in case of their

being detected in any falsehood; and at the same time, attesting facts

performed in such a public manner and in so celebrated a part of the

world, as to render the detection unavoidable: All which circumstances

are requisite to give us a full assurance in the testimony of men.

 

93. Secondly. We may observe in human nature a principle which, if

strictly examined, will be found to diminish extremely the assurance,

which we might, from human testimony, have, in any kind of prodigy. The

maxim, by which we commonly conduct ourselves in our reasonings, is,

that the objects, of which we have no experience, resembles those, of

which we have; that what we have found to be most usual is always most

probable; and that where there is an opposition of arguments, we ought

to give the preference to such as are founded on the greatest number of

past observations. But though, in proceeding by this rule, we readily

reject any fact which is unusual and incredible in an ordinary degree;

yet in advancing farther, the mind observes not always the same rule;

but when anything is affirmed utterly absurd and miraculous, it rather

the more readily admits of such a fact, upon account of that very

circumstance, which ought to destroy all its authority. The passion of

surprise and wonder, arising from miracles, being an agreeable

emotion, gives a sensible tendency towards the belief of those events,

from which it is derived. And this goes so far, that even those who

cannot enjoy this pleasure immediately, nor can believe those miraculous

events, of which they are informed, yet love to partake of the

satisfaction at second-hand or by rebound, and place a pride and delight

in exciting the admiration of others.

 

With what greediness are the miraculous accounts of travellers received,

their descriptions of sea and land monsters, their relations of

wonderful adventures, strange men, and uncouth manners? But if the

spirit of religion join itself to the love of wonder, there is an end of

common sense; and human testimony, in these circumstances, loses all

pretensions to authority. A religionist may be an enthusiast, and

imagine he sees what has no reality: he may know his narrative to be

false, and yet persevere in it, with the best intentions in the world,

for the sake of promoting so holy a cause: or even where this delusion

has not place, vanity, excited by so strong a temptation, operates