The Analysis of Mind by Bertrand Russell (best large ereader .txt) 📖
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THE ANALYSIS OF MIND
by
BERTRAND RUSSELL
1921
MUIRHEAD LIBRARY OF PHILOSOPHY
An admirable statement of the aims of the Library of Philosophy
was provided by the first editor, the late Professor J. H.
Muirhead, in his description of the original programme printed in
Erdmann’s History of Philosophy under the date 1890. This was
slightly modified in subsequent volumes to take the form of the
following statement:
“The Muirhead Library of Philosophy was designed as a
contribution to the History of Modern Philosophy under the heads:
first of Different Schools of Thought—Sensationalist, Realist,
Idealist, Intuitivist; secondly of different
Subjects—Psychology, Ethics, Aesthetics, Political Philosophy,
Theology. While much had been done in England in tracing the
course of evolution in nature, history, economics, morals and
religion, little had been done in tracing the development of
thought on these subjects. Yet ‘the evolution of opinion is part
of the whole evolution’.
“By the co-operation of different writers in carrying out this
plan it was hoped that a thoroughness and completeness of
treatment, otherwise unattainable, might be secured. It was
believed also that from writers mainly British and American
fuller consideration of English Philosophy than it had hitherto
received might be looked for. In the earlier series of books
containing, among others, Bosanquet’s “History of Aesthetic,”
Pfleiderer’s “Rational Theology since Kant,” Albee’s “History of
English Utilitarianism,” Bonar’s “Philosophy and Political
Economy,” Brett’s “History of Psychology,” Ritchie’s “Natural
Rights,” these objects were to a large extent effected.
“In the meantime original work of a high order was being produced
both in England and America by such writers as Bradley, Stout,
Bertrand Russell, Baldwin, Urban, Montague, and others, and a new
interest in foreign works, German, French and Italian, which had
either become classical or were attracting public attention, had
developed. The scope of the Library thus became extended into
something more international, and it is entering on the fifth
decade of its existence in the hope that it may contribute to
that mutual understanding between countries which is so pressing
a need of the present time.”
The need which Professor Muirhead stressed is no less pressing
to-day, and few will deny that philosophy has much to do with
enabling us to meet it, although no one, least of all Muirhead
himself, would regard that as the sole, or even the main, object
of philosophy. As Professor Muirhead continues to lend the
distinction of his name to the Library of Philosophy it seemed
not inappropriate to allow him to recall us to these aims in his
own words. The emphasis on the history of thought also seemed to
me very timely; and the number of important works promised for
the Library in the very near future augur well for the continued
fulfilment, in this and other ways, of the expectations of the
original editor.
H. D. Lewis
PREFACEThis book has grown out of an attempt to harmonize two different
tendencies, one in psychology, the other in physics, with both of
which I find myself in sympathy, although at first sight they
might seem inconsistent. On the one hand, many psychologists,
especially those of the behaviourist school, tend to adopt what
is essentially a materialistic position, as a matter of method if
not of metaphysics. They make psychology increasingly dependent
on physiology and external observation, and tend to think of
matter as something much more solid and indubitable than mind.
Meanwhile the physicists, especially Einstein and other exponents
of the theory of relativity, have been making “matter” less and
less material. Their world consists of “events,” from which
“matter” is derived by a logical construction. Whoever reads, for
example, Professor Eddington’s “Space, Time and Gravitation”
(Cambridge University Press, 1920), will see that an
old-fashioned materialism can receive no support from modern
physics. I think that what has permanent value in the outlook of
the behaviourists is the feeling that physics is the most
fundamental science at present in existence. But this position
cannot be called materialistic, if, as seems to be the case,
physics does not assume the existence of matter.
The view that seems to me to reconcile the materialistic tendency
of psychology with the anti-materialistic tendency of physics is
the view of William James and the American new realists,
according to which the “stuff” of the world is neither mental nor
material, but a “neutral stuff,” out of which both are
constructed. I have endeavoured in this work to develop this view
in some detail as regards the phenomena with which psychology is
concerned.
My thanks are due to Professor John B. Watson and to Dr. T. P.
Nunn for reading my MSS. at an early stage and helping me with
many valuable suggestions; also to Mr. A. Wohlgemuth for much
very useful information as regards important literature. I have
also to acknowledge the help of the editor of this Library of
Philosophy, Professor Muirhead, for several suggestions by which
I have profited.
The work has been given in the form of lectures both in London
and Peking, and one lecture, that on Desire, has been published
in the Athenaeum.
There are a few allusions to China in this book, all of which
were written before I had been in China, and are not intended to
be taken by the reader as geographically accurate. I have used
“China” merely as a synonym for “a distant country,” when I
wanted illustrations of unfamiliar things.
Peking, January 1921.
CONTENTS
I. Recent Criticisms of “Consciousness” II. Instinct and Habit
III. Desire and Feeling IV. Influence of Past History on Present
Occurrences in Living Organisms V. Psychological and
Physical Causal Laws VI. Introspection VII. The Definition of
Perception VIII.Sensations and Images IX. Memory X. Words and
Meaning XI. General Ideas and Thought XII. Belief XIII.Truth and
Falsehood XIV. Emotions and Will XV. Characteristics of Mental
Phenomena
THE ANALYSIS OF MIND
LECTURE I. RECENT CRITICISMS OF “CONSCIOUSNESS”
There are certain occurrences which we are in the habit of
calling “mental.” Among these we may take as typical BELIEVING
and DESIRING. The exact definition of the word “mental” will, I
hope, emerge as the lectures proceed; for the present, I shall
mean by it whatever occurrences would commonly be called mental.
I wish in these lectures to analyse as fully as I can what it is
that really takes place when we, e.g. believe or desire. In this
first lecture I shall be concerned to refute a theory which is
widely held, and which I formerly held myself: the theory that
the essence of everything mental is a certain quite peculiar
something called “consciousness,” conceived either as a relation
to objects, or as a pervading quality of psychical phenomena.
The reasons which I shall give against this theory will be mainly
derived from previous authors. There are two sorts of reasons,
which will divide my lecture into two parts
(1) Direct reasons, derived from analysis and its difficulties;
(2) Indirect reasons, derived from observation of animals
(comparative psychology) and of the insane and hysterical
(psychoanalysis).
Few things are more firmly established in popular philosophy than
the distinction between mind and matter. Those who are not
professional metaphysicians are willing to confess that they do
not know what mind actually is, or how matter is constituted; but
they remain convinced that there is an impassable gulf between
the two, and that both belong to what actually exists in the
world. Philosophers, on the other hand, have maintained often
that matter is a mere fiction imagined by mind, and sometimes
that mind is a mere property of a certain kind of matter. Those
who maintain that mind is the reality and matter an evil dream
are called “idealists”—a word which has a different meaning in
philosophy from that which it bears in ordinary life. Those who
argue that matter is the reality and mind a mere property of
protoplasm are called “materialists.” They have been rare among
philosophers, but common, at certain periods, among men of
science. Idealists, materialists, and ordinary mortals have been
in agreement on one point: that they knew sufficiently what they
meant by the words “mind” and “matter” to be able to conduct
their debate intelligently. Yet it was just in this point, as to
which they were at one, that they seem to me to have been all
alike in error.
The stuff of which the world of our experience is composed is, in
my belief, neither mind nor matter, but something more primitive
than either. Both mind and matter seem to be composite, and the
stuff of which they are compounded lies in a sense between the
two, in a sense above them both, like a common ancestor. As
regards matter, I have set forth my reasons for this view on
former occasions,* and I shall not now repeat them. But the
question of mind is more difficult, and it is this question that
I propose to discuss in these lectures. A great deal of what I
shall have to say is not original; indeed, much recent work, in
various fields, has tended to show the necessity of such theories
as those which I shall be advocating. Accordingly in this first
lecture I shall try to give a brief description of the systems of
ideas within which our investigation is to be carried on.
* “Our Knowledge of the External World” (Allen & Unwin), Chapters
III and IV. Also “Mysticism and Logic,” Essays VII and VIII.
If there is one thing that may be said, in the popular
estimation, to characterize mind, that one thing is
“consciousness.” We say that we are “conscious” of what we see
and hear, of what we remember, and of our own thoughts and
feelings. Most of us believe that tables and chairs are not
“conscious.” We think that when we sit in a chair, we are aware
of sitting in it, but it is not aware of being sat in. It cannot
for a moment be doubted that we are right in believing that there
is SOME difference between us and the chair in this respect: so
much may be taken as fact, and as a datum for our inquiry. But as
soon as we try to say what exactly the difference is, we become
involved in perplexities. Is “consciousness” ultimate and simple,
something to be merely accepted and contemplated? Or is it
something complex, perhaps consisting in our way of behaving in
the presence of objects, or, alternatively, in the existence in
us of things called “ideas,” having a certain relation to
objects, though different from them, and only symbolically
representative of them? Such questions are not easy to answer;
but until they are answered we cannot profess to know what we
mean by saying that we are possessed of “consciousness.”
Before considering modern theories, let us look first at
consciousness from the standpoint of conventional psychology,
since this embodies views which naturally occur when we begin to
reflect upon the subject. For this purpose, let us as a
preliminary consider different ways of being conscious.
First, there is the way of PERCEPTION. We “perceive” tables and
chairs, horses and dogs, our friends, traffic passing in the
street—in short, anything which we recognize through the senses.
I leave on one side for the present the question whether pure
sensation is to be regarded as a form of consciousness: what I am
speaking of now is perception, where, according to
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