An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding by David Hume (good e books to read TXT) 📖

>delineating even a Venus or an Helen. While the latter employs all the

richest colours of his art, and gives his figures the most graceful and

engaging airs; he must still carry his attention to the inward structure

of the human body, the position of the muscles, the fabric of the bones,

and the use and figure of every part or organ. Accuracy is, in every

case, advantageous to beauty, and just reasoning to delicate sentiment.

In vain would we exalt the one by depreciating the other.

 

Besides, we may observe, in every art or profession, even those which

most concern life or action, that a spirit of accuracy, however

acquired, carries all of them nearer their perfection, and renders them

more subservient to the interests of society. And though a philosopher

may live remote from business, the genius of philosophy, if carefully

cultivated by several, must gradually diffuse itself throughout the

whole society, and bestow a similar correctness on every art and

calling. The politician will acquire greater foresight and subtility, in

the subdividing and balancing of power; the lawyer more method and finer

principles in his reasonings; and the general more regularity in his

discipline, and more caution in his plans and operations. The stability

of modern governments above the ancient, and the accuracy of modern

philosophy, have improved, and probably will still improve, by similar

gradations.

 

6. Were there no advantage to be reaped from these studies, beyond the

gratification of an innocent curiosity, yet ought not even this to be

despised; as being one accession to those few safe and harmless

pleasures, which are bestowed on human race. The sweetest and most

inoffensive path of life leads through the avenues of science and

learning; and whoever can either remove any obstructions in this way, or

open up any new prospect, ought so far to be esteemed a benefactor to

mankind. And though these researches may appear painful and fatiguing,

it is with some minds as with some bodies, which being endowed with

vigorous and florid health, require severe exercise, and reap a pleasure

from what, to the generality of mankind, may seem burdensome and

laborious. Obscurity, indeed, is painful to the mind as well as to the

eye; but to bring light from obscurity, by whatever labour, must needs

be delightful and rejoicing.

 

But this obscurity in the profound and abstract philosophy, is objected

to, not only as painful and fatiguing, but as the inevitable source of

uncertainty and error. Here indeed lies the justest and most plausible

objection against a considerable part of metaphysics, that they are not

properly a science; but arise either from the fruitless efforts of human

vanity, which would penetrate into subjects utterly inaccessible to the

understanding, or from the craft of popular superstitions, which, being

unable to defend themselves on fair ground, raise these intangling

brambles to cover and protect their weakness. Chaced from the open

country, these robbers fly into the forest, and lie in wait to break in

upon every unguarded avenue of the mind, and overwhelm it with religious

fears and prejudices. The stoutest antagonist, if he remit his watch a

moment, is oppressed. And many, through cowardice and folly, open the

gates to the enemies, and willingly receive them with reverence and

submission, as their legal sovereigns.

 

7. But is this a sufficient reason, why philosophers should desist from

such researches, and leave superstition still in possession of her

retreat? Is it not proper to draw an opposite conclusion, and perceive

the necessity of carrying the war into the most secret recesses of the

enemy? In vain do we hope, that men, from frequent disappointment, will

at last abandon such airy sciences, and discover the proper province of

human reason. For, besides, that many persons find too sensible an

interest in perpetually recalling such topics; besides this, I say, the

motive of blind despair can never reasonably have place in the sciences;

since, however unsuccessful former attempts may have proved, there is

still room to hope, that the industry, good fortune, or improved

sagacity of succeeding generations may reach discoveries unknown to

former ages. Each adventurous genius will still leap at the arduous

prize, and find himself stimulated, rather that discouraged, by the

failures of his predecessors; while he hopes that the glory of achieving

so hard an adventure is reserved for him alone. The only method of

freeing learning, at once, from these abstruse questions, is to enquire

seriously into the nature of human understanding, and show, from an

exact analysis of its powers and capacity, that it is by no means fitted

for such remote and abstruse subjects. We must submit to this fatigue,

in order to live at ease ever after: And must cultivate true metaphysics

with some care, in order to destroy the false and adulterate. Indolence,

which, to some persons, affords a safeguard against this deceitful

philosophy, is, with others, overbalanced by curiosity; and despair,

which, at some moments, prevails, may give place afterwards to sanguine

hopes and expectations. Accurate and just reasoning is the only catholic

remedy, fitted for all persons and all dispositions; and is alone able

to subvert that abstruse philosophy and metaphysical jargon, which,

being mixed up with popular superstition, renders it in a manner

impenetrable to careless reasoners, and gives it the air of science

and wisdom.

 

8. Besides this advantage of rejecting, after deliberate enquiry, the

most uncertain and disagreeable part of learning, there are many

positive advantages, which result from an accurate scrutiny into the

powers and faculties of human nature. It is remarkable concerning the

operations of the mind, that, though most intimately present to us, yet,

whenever they become the object of reflexion, they seem involved in

obscurity; nor can the eye readily find those lines and boundaries,

which discriminate and distinguish them. The objects are too fine to

remain long in the same aspect or situation; and must be apprehended in

an instant, by a superior penetration, derived from nature, and improved

by habit and reflexion. It becomes, therefore, no inconsiderable part of

science barely to know the different operations of the mind, to separate

them from each other, to class them under their proper heads, and to

correct all that seeming disorder, in which they lie involved, when made

the object of reflexion and enquiry. This talk of ordering and

distinguishing, which has no merit, when performed with regard to

external bodies, the objects of our senses, rises in its value, when

directed towards the operations of the mind, in proportion to the

difficulty and labour, which we meet with in performing it. And if we

can go no farther than this mental geography, or delineation of the

distinct parts and powers of the mind, it is at least a satisfaction to

go so far; and the more obvious this science may appear (and it is by no

means obvious) the more contemptible still must the ignorance of it be

esteemed, in all pretenders to learning and philosophy.

 

Nor can there remain any suspicion, that this science is uncertain and

chimerical; unless we should entertain such a scepticism as is entirely

subversive of all speculation, and even action. It cannot be doubted,

that the mind is endowed with several powers and faculties, that these

powers are distinct from each other, that what is really distinct to the

immediate perception may be distinguished by reflexion; and

consequently, that there is a truth and falsehood in all propositions on

this subject, and a truth and falsehood, which lie not beyond the

compass of human understanding. There are many obvious distinctions of

this kind, such as those between the will and understanding, the

imagination and passions, which fall within the comprehension of every

human creature; and the finer and more philosophical distinctions are no

less real and certain, though more difficult to be comprehended. Some

instances, especially late ones, of success in these enquiries, may give

us a juster notion of the certainty and solidity of this branch of

learning. And shall we esteem it worthy the labour of a philosopher to

give us a true system of the planets, and adjust the position and order

of those remote bodies; while we affect to overlook those, who, with so

much success, delineate the parts of the mind, in which we are so

intimately concerned?

 

9. But may we not hope, that philosophy, if cultivated with care, and

encouraged by the attention of the public, may carry its researches

still farther, and discover, at least in some degree, the secret springs

and principles, by which the human mind is actuated in its operations?

Astronomers had long contented themselves with proving, from the

phaenomena, the true motions, order, and magnitude of the heavenly

bodies: Till a philosopher, at last, arose, who seems, from the happiest

reasoning, to have also determined the laws and forces, by which the

revolutions of the planets are governed and directed. The like has been

performed with regard to other parts of nature. And there is no reason

to despair of equal success in our enquiries concerning the mental

powers and economy, if prosecuted with equal capacity and caution. It is

probable, that one operation and principle of the mind depends on

another; which, again, may be resolved into one more general and

universal: And how far these researches may possibly be carried, it will

be difficult for us, before, or even after, a careful trial, exactly to

determine. This is certain, that attempts of this kind are every day

made even by those who philosophize the most negligently: And nothing

can be more requisite than to enter upon the enterprize with thorough

care and attention; that, if it lie within the compass of human

understanding, it may at last be happily achieved; if not, it may,

however, be rejected with some confidence and security. This last

conclusion, surely, is not desirable; nor ought it to be embraced too

rashly. For how much must we diminish from the beauty and value of this

species of philosophy, upon such a supposition? Moralists have hitherto

been accustomed, when they considered the vast multitude and diversity

of those actions that excite our approbation or dislike, to search for

some common principle, on which this variety of sentiments might depend.

And though they have sometimes carried the matter too far, by their

passion for some one general principle; it must, however, be confessed,

that they are excusable in expecting to find some general principles,

into which all the vices and virtues were justly to be resolved. The

like has been the endeavour of critics, logicians, and even politicians:

Nor have their attempts been wholly unsuccessful; though perhaps longer

time, greater accuracy, and more ardent application may bring these

sciences still nearer their perfection. To throw up at once all

pretensions of this kind may justly be deemed more rash, precipitate,

and dogmatical, than even the boldest and most affirmative philosophy,

that has ever attempted to impose its crude dictates and principles

on mankind.

 

10. What though these reasonings concerning human nature seem abstract,

and of difficult comprehension? This affords no presumption of their

falsehood. On the contrary, it seems impossible, that what has hitherto

escaped so many wise and profound philosophers can be very obvious and

easy. And whatever pains these researches may cost us, we may think

ourselves sufficiently rewarded, not only in point of profit but of

pleasure, if, by that means, we can make any addition to our stock of

knowledge, in subjects of such unspeakable importance.

 

But as, after all, the abstractedness of these speculations is no

recommendation, but rather a disadvantage to them, and as this

difficulty may perhaps be surmounted by care and art, and the avoiding

of all unnecessary detail, we have, in the following enquiry, attempted

to throw some light upon subjects, from which uncertainty has hitherto

deterred the wise, and obscurity the ignorant. Happy, if we can