The Analysis of Mind by Bertrand Russell (best large ereader .txt) đź“–
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to which the sensation belongs as the set of particulars that are
earlier or later than, or simultaneous with, the given sensation.
Moreover, the very same definitions can be applied to particulars
which are not sensations. They are actually required for the
theory of relativity, if we are to give a philosophical
explanation of what is meant by “local time” in that theory The
relations of simultaneity and succession are known to us in our
own experience; they may be analysable, but that does not affect
their suitability for defining perspectives and biographies. Such
time-relations as can be constructed between events in different
biographies are of a different kind: they are not experienced,
and are merely logical, being designed to afford convenient ways
of stating the correlations between different biographies.
It is not only by time-relations that the parts of one biography
are collected together in the case of living beings. In this case
there are the mnemic phenomena which constitute the unity of one
“experience,” and transform mere occurrences into “experiences.”
I have already dwelt upon the importance of mnemic phenomena for
psychology, and shall not enlarge upon them now, beyond observing
that they are what transforms a biography (in our technical
sense) into a life. It is they that give the continuity of a
“person” or a “mind.” But there is no reason to suppose that
mnemic phenomena are associated with biographies except in the
case of animals and plants.
Our twofold classification of particulars gives rise to the
dualism of body and biography in regard to everything in the
universe, and not only in regard to living things. This arises as
follows. Every particular of the sort considered by physics is a
member of two groups (1) The group of particulars constituting
the other aspects of the same physical object; (2) The group of
particulars that have direct time-relations to the given
particular.
Each of these is associated with a place. When I look at a star,
my sensation is (1) A member of the group of particulars which is
the star, and which is associated with the place where the star
is; (2) A member of the group of particulars which is my
biography, and which is associated with the place where I am.*
*I have explained elsewhere the manner in which space is
constructed on this theory, and in which the position of a
perspective is brought into relation with the position of a
physical object (“Our Knowledge of the External World,” Lecture
III, pp. 90, 91).
The result is that every particular of the kind relevant to
physics is associated with TWO places; e.g. my sensation of the
star is associated with the place where I am and with the place
where the star is. This dualism has nothing to do with any “mind”
that I may be supposed to possess; it exists in exactly the same
sense if I am replaced by a photographic plate. We may call the
two places the active and passive places respectively.* Thus in
the case of a perception or photograph of a star, the active
place is the place where the star is, while the passive place is
the place where the percipient or photographic plate is.
* I use these as mere names; I do not want to introduce any
notion of “activity.”
We can thus, without departing from physics, collect together all
the particulars actively at a given place, or all the particulars
passively at a given place. In our own case, the one group is our
body (or our brain), while the other is our mind, in so far as it
consists of perceptions. In the case of the photographic plate,
the first group is the plate as dealt with by physics, the second
the aspect of the heavens which it photographs. (For the sake of
schematic simplicity, I am ignoring various complications
connected with time, which require some tedious but perfectly
feasible elaborations.) Thus what may be called subjectivity in
the point of view is not a distinctive peculiarity of mind: it is
present just as much in the photographic plate. And the
photographic plate has its biography as well as its “matter.” But
this biography is an affair of physics, and has none of the
peculiar characteristics by which “mental” phenomena are
distinguished, with the sole exception of subjectivity.
Adhering, for the moment, to the standpoint of physics, we may
define a “perception” of an object as the appearance of the
object from a place where there is a brain (or, in lower animals,
some suitable nervous structure), with sense-organs and nerves
forming part of the intervening medium. Such appearances of
objects are distinguished from appearances in other places by
certain peculiarities, namely
(1) They give rise to mnemic phenomena;
(2) They are themselves affected by mnemic phenomena.
That is to say, they may be remembered and associated or
influence our habits, or give rise to images, etc., and they are
themselves different from what they would have been if our past
experience had been different—for example, the effect of a
spoken sentence upon the hearer depends upon whether the hearer
knows the language or not, which is a question of past
experience. It is these two characteristics, both connected with
mnemic phenomena, that distinguish perceptions from the
appearances of objects in places where there is no living being.
Theoretically, though often not practically, we can, in our
perception of an object, separate the part which is due to past
experience from the part which proceeds without mnemic influences
out of the character of the object. We may define as “sensation”
that part which proceeds in this way, while the remainder, which
is a mnemic phenomenon, will have to be added to the sensation to
make up what is called the “perception.” According to this
definition, the sensation is a theoretical core in the actual
experience; the actual experience is the perception. It is
obvious that there are grave difficulties in carrying out these
definitions, but we will not linger over them. We have to pass,
as soon as we can, from the physical standpoint, which we have
been hitherto adopting, to the standpoint of psychology, in which
we make more use of introspection in the first of the three
senses discussed in the preceding lecture.
But before making the transition, there are two points which must
be made clear. First: Everything outside my own personal
biography is outside my experience; therefore if anything can be
known by me outside my biography, it can only be known in one of
two ways
(1) By inference from things within my biography, or
(2) By some a priori principle independent of experience.
I do not myself believe that anything approaching certainty is to
be attained by either of these methods, and therefore whatever
lies outside my personal biography must be regarded,
theoretically, as hypothesis. The theoretical argument for
adopting the hypothesis is that it simplifies the statement of
the laws according to which events happen in our experience. But
there is no very good ground for supposing that a simple law is
more likely to be true than a complicated law, though there is
good ground for assuming a simple law in scientific practice, as
a working hypothesis, if it explains the facts as well as another
which is less simple. Belief in the existence of things outside
my own biography exists antecedently to evidence, and can only be
destroyed, if at all, by a long course of philosophic doubt. For
purposes of science, it is justified practically by the
simplification which it introduces into the laws of physics. But
from the standpoint of theoretical logic it must be regarded as a
prejudice, not as a well-grounded theory. With this proviso, I
propose to continue yielding to the prejudice.
The second point concerns the relating of our point of view to
that which regards sensations as caused by stimuli external to
the nervous system (or at least to the brain), and distinguishes
images as “centrally excited,” i.e. due to causes in the brain
which cannot be traced back to anything affecting the
sense-organs. It is clear that, if our analysis of physical
objects has been valid, this way of defining sensations needs
reinterpretation. It is also clear that we must be able to find
such a new interpretation if our theory is to be admissible.
To make the matter clear, we will take the simplest possible
illustration. Consider a certain star, and suppose for the moment
that its size is negligible. That is to say, we will regard it
as, for practical purposes, a luminous point. Let us further
suppose that it exists only for a very brief time, say a second.
Then, according to physics, what happens is that a spherical wave
of light travels outward from the star through space, just as,
when you drop a stone into a stagnant pond, ripples travel
outward from the place where the stone hit the water. The wave of
light travels with a certain very nearly constant velocity,
roughly 300,000 kilometres per second. This velocity may be
ascertained by sending a flash of light to a mirror, and
observing how long it takes before the reflected flash reaches
you, just as the velocity of sound may be ascertained by means of
an echo.
What it is that happens when a wave of light reaches a given
place we cannot tell, except in the sole case when the place in
question is a brain connected with an eye which is turned in the
right direction. In this one very special case we know what
happens: we have the sensation called “seeing the star.” In all
other cases, though we know (more or less hypothetically) some of
the correlations and abstract properties of the appearance of the
star, we do not know the appearance itself. Now you may, for the
sake of illustration, compare the different appearances of the
star to the conjugation of a Greek verb, except that the number
of its parts is really infinite, and not only apparently so to
the despairing schoolboy. In vacuo, the parts are regular, and
can be derived from the (imaginary) root according to the laws of
grammar, i.e. of perspective. The star being situated in empty
space, it may be defined, for purposes of physics, as consisting
of all those appearances which it presents in vacuo, together
with those which, according to the laws of perspective, it would
present elsewhere if its appearances elsewhere were regular. This
is merely the adaptation of the definition of matter which I gave
in an earlier lecture. The appearance of a star at a certain
place, if it is regular, does not require any cause or
explanation beyond the existence of the star. Every regular
appearance is an actual member of the system which is the star,
and its causation is entirely internal to that system. We may
express this by saying that a regular appearance is due to the
star alone, and is actually part of the star, in the sense in
which a man is part of the human race.
But presently the light of the star reaches our atmosphere. It
begins to be refracted, and dimmed by mist, and its velocity is
slightly diminished. At last it reaches a human eye, where a
complicated process takes place, ending in a sensation which
gives us our grounds for believing in all that has gone before.
Now, the irregular appearances of the star are not, strictly
speaking, members of the system which is the star, according to
our definition of matter. The irregular appearances, however, are
not merely irregular: they proceed according to laws which can be
stated in terms of the matter through which the light has passed
on its way. The sources of
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