The Analysis of Mind by Bertrand Russell (best large ereader .txt) 📖
- Author: Bertrand Russell
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Yet this might perhaps be regarded as something of an
overstatement. The words alone, without the use of images, may
cause appropriate emotions and appropriate behaviour. The words
have been used in an environment which produced certain
emotions;. by a telescoped process, the words alone are now
capable of producing similar emotions. On these lines it might be
sought to show that images are unnecessary. I do not believe,
however, that we could account on these lines for the entirely
different response produced by a narrative and by a description
of present facts. Images, as contrasted with sensations, are the
response expected during a narrative; it is understood that
present action is not called for. Thus it seems that we must
maintain our distinction words used demonstratively describe and
are intended to lead to sensations, while the same words used in
narrative describe and are only intended to lead to images.
We have thus, in addition to our four previous ways in which
words can mean, two new ways, namely the way of memory and the
way of imagination. That is to say:
(5) Words may be used to describe or recall a memory-image: to
describe it when it already exists, or to recall it when the
words exist as a habit and are known to be descriptive of some
past experience.
(6) Words may be used to describe or create an imagination-image:
to describe it, for example, in the case of a poet or novelist,
or to create it in the ordinary case for giving
information-though, in the latter case, it is intended that the
imagination-image, when created, shall be accompanied by belief
that something of the sort occurred.
These two ways of using words, including their occurrence in
inner speech, may be spoken of together as the use of words in
“thinking.” If we are right, the use of words in thinking
depends, at least in its origin, upon images, and cannot be fully
dealt with on behaviourist lines. And this is really the most
essential function of words, namely that, originally through
their connection with images, they bring us into touch with what
is remote in time or space. When they operate without the medium
of images, this seems to be a telescoped process. Thus the
problem of the meaning of words is brought into connection with
the problem of the meaning of images.
To understand the function that words perform in what is called
“thinking,” we must understand both the causes and the effects of
their occurrence. The causes of the occurrence of words require
somewhat different treatment according as the object designated
by the word is sensibly present or absent. When the object is
present, it may itself be taken as the cause of the word, through
association. But when it is absent there is more difficulty in
obtaining a behaviourist theory of the occurrence of the word.
The language-habit consists not merely in the use of words
demonstratively, but also in their use to express narrative or
desire. Professor Watson, in his account of the acquisition of
the language-habit, pays very little attention to the use of
words in narrative and desire. He says (“Behavior,” pp. 329-330):
“The stimulus (object) to which the child often responds, a box,
e.g. by movements such as opening and closing and putting objects
into it, may serve to illustrate our argument. The nurse,
observing that the child reacts with his hands, feet, etc., to
the box, begins to say ‘box’ when the child is handed the box,
‘open box’ when the child opens it, ‘close box’ when he closes
it, and ‘put doll in box ‘ when that act is executed. This is
repeated over and over again. In the process of time it comes
about that without any other stimulus than that of the box which
originally called out the bodily habits, he begins to say ‘box’
when he sees it, ‘open box’ when he opens it, etc. The visible
box now becomes a stimulus capable of releasing either the bodily
habits or the word-habit, i.e. development has brought about two
things : (1) a series of functional connections among arcs which
run from visual receptor to muscles of throat, and (2) a series
of already earlier connected arcs which run from the same
receptor to the bodily muscles…. The object meets the child’s
vision. He runs to it and tries to reach it and says ‘box.’…
Finally the word is uttered without the movement of going towards
the box being executed…. Habits are formed of going to the box
when the arms are full of toys. The child has been taught to
deposit them there. When his arms are laden with toys and no box
is there, the word-habit arises and he calls ‘box’; it is handed
to him, and he opens it and deposits the toys therein. This
roughly marks what we would call the genesis of a true
language-habit.”(pp. 329-330).*
* Just the same account of language is given in Professor
Watson’s more recent book (reference above).
We need not linger over what is said in the above passage as to
the use of the word “box” in the presence of the box. But as to
its use in the absence of the box, there is only one brief
sentence, namely: “When his arms are laden with toys and no box
is there, the word-habit arises and he calls ‘box.’ ” This is
inadequate as it stands, since the habit has been to use the word
when the box is present, and we have to explain its extension to
cases in which the box is absent.
Having admitted images, we may say that the word “box,” in the
absence of the box, is caused by an image of the box. This may or
may not be true—in fact, it is true in some cases but not in
others. Even, however, if it were true in all cases, it would
only slightly shift our problem: we should now have to ask what
causes an image of the box to arise. We might be inclined to say
that desire for the box is the cause. But when this view is
investigated, it is found that it compels us to suppose that the
box can be desired without the child’s having either an image of
the box or the word “box.” This will require a theory of desire
which may be, and I think is, in the main true, but which removes
desire from among things that actually occur, and makes it merely
a convenient fiction, like force in mechanics.* With such a view,
desire is no longer a true cause, but merely a short way of
describing certain processes.
* See Lecture III, above.
In order to explain the occurrence of either the word or the
image in the absence of the box, we have to assume that there is
something, either in the environment or in our own sensations,
which has frequently occurred at about the same time as the word
“box.” One of the laws which distinguish psychology (or
nerve-physiology?) from physics is the law that, when two things
have frequently existed in close temporal contiguity, either
comes in time to cause the other.* This is the basis both of
habit and of association. Thus, in our case, the arms full of
toys have frequently been followed quickly by the box, and the
box in turn by the word “box.” The box itself is subject to
physical laws, and does not tend to be caused by the arms full of
toys, however often it may in the past have followed them—always
provided that, in the case in question, its physical position is
such that voluntary movements cannot lead to it. But the word
“box” and the image of the box are subject to the law of habit;
hence it is possible for either to be caused by the arms full of
toys. And we may lay it down generally that, whenever we use a
word, either aloud or in inner speech, there is some sensation or
image (either of which may be itself a word) which has frequently
occurred at about the same time as the word, and now, through
habit, causes the word. It follows that the law of habit is
adequate to account for the use of words in the absence of their
objects; moreover, it would be adequate even without introducing
images. Although, therefore, images seem undeniable, we cannot
derive an additional argument in their favour from the use of
words, which could, theoretically, be explained without
introducing images.
*For a more exact statement of this law, with the limitations
suggested by experiment, see A. Wohlgemuth, “On Memory and the
Direction of Associations,” “British Journal of Psychology,” vol.
v, part iv (March, 1913).
When we understand a word, there is a reciprocal association
between it and the images of what it “means.” Images may cause us
to use words which mean them, and these words, heard or read, may
in turn cause the appropriate images. Thus speech is a means of
producing in our hearers the images which are in us. Also, by a
telescoped process, words come in time to produce directly the
effects which would have been produced by the images with which
they were associated. The general law of telescoped processes is
that, if A causes B and B causes C, it will happen in time that A
will cause C directly, without the intermediary of B. This is a
characteristic of psychological and neural causation. In virtue
of this law, the effects of images upon our actions come to be
produced by words, even when the words do not call up appropriate
images. The more familiar we are with words, the more our
“thinking” goes on in words instead of images. We may, for
example, be able to describe a person’s appearance correctly
without having at any time had any image of him, provided, when
we saw him, we thought of words which fitted him; the words alone
may remain with us as a habit, and enable us to speak as if we
could recall a visual image of the man. In this and other ways
the understanding of a word often comes to be quite free from
imagery; but in first learning the use of language it would seem
that imagery always plays a very important part.
Images as well as words may be said to have “meaning”; indeed,
the meaning of images seems more primitive than the meaning of
words. What we call (say) an image of St. Paul’s may be said to
“mean” St. Paul’s. But it is not at all easy to say exactly what
constitutes the meaning of an image. A memory-image of a
particular occurrence, when accompanied by a memory-belief, may
be said to mean the occurrence of which it is an image. But most
actual images do not have this degree of definiteness. If we call
up an image of a dog, we are very likely to have a vague image,
which is not representative of some one special dog, but of dogs
in general. When we call up an image of a friend’s face, we are
not likely to reproduce the expression he had on some one
particular occasion, but rather a compromise expression derived
from many occasions. And there is hardly any limit to the
vagueness of which images are capable. In such cases, the meaning
of the image, if defined by relation to the prototype, is vague:
there is not one definite prototype, but a number, none of which
is copied exactly.*
* Cf. Semon, Mnemische Empfindungen, chap. xvi, especially pp.
301-308.
There is, however, another way of approaching the meaning of
images, namely through their causal efficacy. What is called an
image
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