Moral Science by Alexander Bain (top 20 books to read txt) 📖

injustice without thinking of its ultimate consequences. So universal are the rules of justice, from the universality of its end, that we approve of it mechanically. Still, we have often to recur to the final end, and to ask, What must become of the world if such practices prevail? How could society subsist under such disorders?

Thus, then, Hume considers that, by an inductive determination, on the strict Newtonian basis, he has proved that the SOLE foundation of our regard to justice is the support and welfare of society: and since no moral excellence is more esteemed, we must have some strong disposition in favour of general usefulness. Such a disposition must be a part of the humane virtues, as it is the SOLE source of the moral approbation of fidelity, justice, veracity, and integrity.

Section IV. relates to POLITICAL SOCIETY, and is intended to show that Government, Allegiance, and the Laws of each State, are justified solely by Utility.

If men had _sagacity_ to perceive, and _strength of mind_ to follow out, distant and general interests, there had been no such thing as government. In other words, if government were totally useless, it would not be. The duty of Allegiance would be no duty, but for the advantage of it, in preserving peace and order among mankind.

[Hume is here supposing that men enter into society on equal terms; he makes no allowance for the exercise of the right of the stronger in making compulsory social unions. This, however, does not affect his reasoning as to the source of our approbation of social duty, which is not usually extended to tyranny.]

When political societies hold intercourse with one another, certain regulations are made, termed Laws of Nations, which have no other end than the advantage of those concerned.

The virtue of Chastity is subservient to the utility of rearing the young, which requires the combination of both parents; and that combination reposes on marital fidelity. Without such a utility, the virtue would never have been thought of. The reason why chastity is extended to cases where child-bearing does not enter, is that _general rules_ are often carried beyond their original occasion, especially in matters of taste and sentiment.

The prohibition of marriage between near relations, and the turpitude of incest, have in view the preserving of purity of manners among persons much together.

The laws of good manners are a kind of lesser morality, for the better securing of our pleasures in society.

Even robbers and pirates must have their laws. Immoral gallantries, where authorized, are governed by a set of rules. Societies for play have laws for the conduct of the game. War has its laws as well as peace. The fights of boxers, wrestlers, and such like, are subject to rules. For all such cases, the common interest and utility begets a standard of right and wrong in those concerned.

Section V. proceeds to argue WHY UTILITY PLEASES. However powerful education may be in forming men's sentiments, there must, in such a matter as morality, be some deep natural distinction to work upon. Now, there are only two natural sentiments that Utility can appeal to: (1) Self-Interest, and (2) Generosity, or the interests of others.

The deduction of morals from Self-Love is obvious, and no doubt explains much. An appeal to experience, however, shows its defects. We praise virtuous actions in remote ages and countries, where our own interests are out of the question. Even when we have a private interest in some virtuous action, our praise avoids that part of it, and prefers to fasten on what we are not interested in. When we hear of the details of a generous action, we are moved by it, before we know when or where it took place. Nor will the force of imagination account for the feeling in those cases; if we have an eye solely to our own _real_ interest, it is not conceivable how we can be moved by a mere imaginary interest.

But another view may be taken. Some have maintained that the public interest is our own interest, and is therefore promoted by our self-love. The reply is that the two are often opposed to each other, and still we approve of the preference of the public interest. We are, therefore, driven to adopt a more public affection, and to admit that the interests of society, _on their own, account_, are not indifferent to us.

Have we any difficulty to comprehend the force of humanity or benevolence? Or to conceive that the very aspect of happiness, joy, prosperity, gives pleasure; while pain, suffering, sorrow, communicate uneasiness? Here we have an unmistakeable, powerful, universal sentiment of human nature to build upon.

The author gives an expanded illustration of the workings of Benevolence or Sympathy, which well deserves to be read for its merits of execution. We must here content ourselves with stating that it is on this principle of disinterested action, belonging to our nature, that he founds the chief part of our sentiment of Moral Approbation.

Section VI. takes into the account QUALITIES USEFUL TO OURSELVES. We praise in individuals the qualities useful to themselves, and are pleased with the happiness flowing to individuals by their own conduct. This can be no selfish motive on our part. For example, DISCRETION, so necessary to the accomplishing of any useful enterprise, is commended; that measured union of enterprise and caution found in great commanders, is a subject of highest admiration; and why? For the usefulness, or the success that it brings. What need is there to display the praises of INDUSTRY, or of FRUGALITY, virtues useful to the possessor in the first instance? Then the qualities of HONESTY, FIDELITY, and TRUTH, are praised, in the first place, for their tendency to the good of society; and, being established on that foundation, they are also approved as advantageous to the individual's own self. A part of our blame of UNCHASTITY in a woman is attached to its imprudence with reference to the opinion regarding it. STRENGTH OF MIND being to resist present care, and to maintain the search of distant profit and enjoyment, is another quality of great value to the possessor. The distinction between the _Fool_ and the _Wise_ man illustrates the same position. In our approbation of all such qualities, it is evident that the happiness and misery of others are not indifferent spectacles to us: the one, like sunshine, or the prospect of well-cultivated plains, imparts joy and satisfaction; the other, like a lowering cloud or a barren landscape, throws a damp over the spirits.

He next considers the influence of bodily endowments and the goods of fortune as bearing upon the general question.

Even in animals, one great source of _beauty_ is the suitability of their structure to their manner of life. In times when bodily strength in men was more essential to a warrior than now, it was held in so much more esteem. Impotence in both sexes, and barrenness in women, are generally contemned, for the loss of human pleasure attending them.

As regards fortune, how can we account for the regard paid to the rich and powerful, but from the reflexion to the mind of prosperity, happiness, ease, plenty, authority, and the gratification of every appetite. Rank and family, although they may be detached from wealth and power, had originally a reference to these.

In Section VII., Hume treats of QUALITIES IMMEDIATELY AGREEABLE TO OURSELVES. Under this head, he dilates on the influence of CHEERFULNESS, as a social quality: on GREATNESS OF MIND, or Dignity of Character; on COURAGE; on TRANQUILLITY, or equanimity of mind, in the midst of pain, sorrow, and adverse fortune; on BENEVOLENCE in the aspect of an agreeable spectacle; and lastly, on DELICACY of Taste, as a merit. As manifested to a beholder, all these qualities are engaging and admirable, on account of the immediate pleasure that they communicate to the person possessed of them. They are farther testimonies to the existence of social sympathy, and to the connexion of that with our sentiment of approbation towards actions or persons.

Section VIII. brings forward the QUALITIES IMMEDIATELY AGREEABLE TO OTHERS. These are GOOD MANNERS or POLITENESS; the WIT or INGENUITY that enlivens social intercourse; MODESTY, as opposed to impudence, arrogance, and vanity; CLEANLINESS, and GRACEFUL MANNER; all which are obviously valued for the pleasures they communicate to people generally. Section IX. is the CONCLUSION. Whatever may have been maintained in systems of philosophy, he contends that in common life the habitual motives of panegyric or censure are of the kind described by him. He will not enter into the question as to the relative shares of benevolence and self-love in the human constitution. Let the generous sentiments be ever so weak, they still direct a preference of what is serviceable to what is pernicious; and on these preferences a moral distinction is founded. In the notion of morals, two things are implied; a sentiment common to all mankind, and a sentiment whose objects comprehend all mankind; and these two requisites belong to the sentiment of humanity or benevolence.

Another spring of our constitution, that brings a great addition of force to moral sentiment, is Love of Fame. The pursuit of a character, name, and reputation in the world, leads to a habit of surveying our own actions, begets a reverence for self as well as others, and is thus the guardian of every virtue. Humanity and Love of Reputation combine to form the highest type of morality yet conceived.

The nature of moral _approbation_ being thus solved, there remains the nature of _obligation_; by which the author means to enquire, if a man having a view to his own welfare, will not find his best account in the practice of every moral virtue. He dwells upon the many advantages of social virtue, of benevolence and friendship, humanity and kindness, of truth and honesty; but confesses that the rule that 'honesty is the best policy' is liable to many exceptions. He makes us acquainted with his own theory of Happiness. How little is requisite to supply the _necessities_ of nature? and what comparison is there between, on the one hand, the cheap pleasures of conversation, society, study, even health, and, on the other, the common beauties of nature, with self-approbation; and the feverish, empty amusements of luxury and expense?

Thus ends the main treatise; but the author adds, in an Appendix, four additional dissertations.

The first takes up the question started at the outset, but postponed, how far our moral approbation is a matter of _reason_, and how far of _sentiment_. His handling of this topic is luminous and decisive.

If the utility of actions be a foundation of our approval of them, _reason_ must have a share, for no other faculty can trace the results of actions in their bearings upon human happiness. In Justice especially, there are often numerous and complicated considerations; such as to occupy the deliberations of politicians and the debates of lawyers.

On the other hand, reason is insufficient of itself to constitute the feeling of moral approbation or disapprobation. Reason shows the means to an end; but if we are otherwise indifferent to the end, the reasonings fall inoperative on the mind. Here then a _sentiment_ must display itself, a delight in the happiness of men, and a repugnance to what causes them misery. Reason teaches the consequences of actions; Humanity or Benevolence is roused to make a distinction in favour of such as are beneficial.

He adduces a number of illustrations to show that reason alone is insufficient to make a moral sentiment. He bids us examine Ingratitude, for instance; good offices bestowed on one side, ill-will on the other. Reason might say, whether a certain action, say the gift of money,