The Ethics by Benedictus de Spinoza (most important books of all time .txt) 📖

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What have said in this Part concerning the right way of life

has not been arranged, so as to admit of being seen at one view,

but has been set forth piece-meal, according as I thought each

Proposition could most readily be deduced from what preceded it.

I propose, therefore, to rearrange my remarks and to bring them

under leading heads.

I. All our endeavours or desires so follow from the

necessity of our nature, that they can be understood either

through it alone, as their proximate cause, or by virtue of our

being a part of nature, which cannot be adequately conceived

through itself without other individuals.

II. Desires, which follow from our nature in such a manner,

that they can be understood through it alone, are those which are

referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is conceived to

consist of adequate ideas : the remaining desires are only

referred to the mind, in so far as it conceives things

inadequately, and their force and increase are generally defined

not by the power of man, but by the power of things external to

us : wherefore the former are rightly called actions, the latter

passions, for the former always indicate our power, the latter,

on the other hand, show our infirmity and fragmentary knowledge.

III. Our actions, that is, those desires which are defined

by man’s power or reason, are always good. The rest may be

either good or bad.

IV. Thus in life it is before all things useful to perfect

the understanding, or reason, as far as we can, and in this alone

man’s highest happiness or blessedness consists, indeed

blessedness is nothing else but the contentment of spirit, which

arises from the intuitive knowledge of God : now, to perfect the

understanding is nothing else but to understand God, God’s

attributes, and the actions which follow from the necessity of

his nature. Wherefore of a man, who is led by reason, the

ultimate aim or highest desire, whereby he seeks to govern all

his fellows, is that whereby he is brought to the adequate

conception of himself and of all things within the scope of his

intelligence.

V. Therefore, without intelligence there is not rational

life : and things are only good, in so far as they aid man in his

enjoyment of the intellectual life, which is defined by

intelligence. Contrariwise, whatsoever things hinder man’s

perfecting of his reason, and capability to enjoy the rational

life, are alone called evil.

VI. As all things whereof man is the efficient cause are

necessarily good, no evil can befall man except through external

causes ; namely, by virtue of man being a part of universal

nature, whose laws human nature is compelled to obey, and to

conform to in almost infinite ways.

VII. It is impossible, that man should not be a part of

nature, or that he should not follow her general order ; but if

he be thrown among individuals whose nature is in harmony with

his own, his power of action will thereby be aided and fostered,

whereas, if he be thrown among such as are but very little in

harmony with his nature, he will hardly be able to accommodate

himself to them without undergoing a great change himself.

VIII. Whatsoever in nature we deem to be evil, or to be

capable of injuring our faculty for existing and enjoying the

rational life, we may endeavour to remove in whatever way seems

safest to us ; on the other hand, whatsoever we deem to be good

or useful for preserving our being, and enabling us to enjoy the

rational life, we may appropriate to our use and employ as we

think best. Everyone without exception may, by sovereign right

of nature, do whatsoever he thinks will advance his own interest.

IX. Nothing can be in more harmony with the nature of any

given thing than other individuals of the same species ;

therefore (cf. vii.) for man in the preservation of his being and

the enjoyment of the rational life there is nothing more useful

than his fellow-man who is led by reason. Further, as we know

not anything among individual things which is more excellent than

a man led by reason, no man can better display the power of his

skill and disposition, than in so training men, that they come at

last to live under the dominion of their own reason.

X. In so far as men are influenced by envy or any kind of

hatred, one towards another, they are at variance, and are

therefore to be feared in proportion, as they are more powerful

than their fellows.

XI. Yet minds are not conquered by force, but by love and

highmindedness.

XII. It is before all things useful to men to associate

their ways of life, to bind themselves together with such bonds

as they think most fitted to gather them all into unity, and

generally to do whatsoever serves to strengthen friendship.

XIII. But for this there is need of skill and watchfulness.

For men are diverse (seeing that those who live under the

guidance of reason are few), yet are they generally envious and

more prone to revenge than to sympathy. No small force of

character is therefore required to take everyone as he is, and to

restrain one’s self from imitating the emotions of others. But

those who carp at mankind, and are more skilled in railing at

vice than in instilling virtue, and who break rather than

strengthen men’s dispositions, are hurtful both to themselves and

others. Thus many from too great impatience of spirit, or from

misguided religious zeal, have preferred to live among brutes

rather than among men ; as boys or youths, who cannot peaceably

endure the chidings of their parents, will enlist as soldiers and

choose the hardships of war and the despotic discipline in

preference to the comforts of home and the admonitions of their

father : suffering any burden to be put upon them, so long as

they may spite their parents.

XIV. Therefore, although men are generally governed in

everything by their own lusts, yet their association in common

brings many more advantages than drawbacks. Wherefore it is

better to bear patiently the wrongs they may do us, and to strive

to promote whatsoever serves to bring about harmony and

friendship.

XV. Those things, which beget harmony, are such as are

attributable to justice, equity, and honourable living. For men

brook ill not only what is unjust or iniquitous, but also what is

reckoned disgraceful, or that a man should slight the received

customs of their society. For winning love those qualities are

especially necessary which have regard to religion and piety (cf.

IV. xxxvii. notes. i. ii. ; xlvi. note ; and lxxiii. note).

XVI. Further, harmony is often the result of fear : but such

harmony is insecure. Further, fear arises from infirmity of

spirit, and moreover belongs not to the exercise of reason : the

same is true of compassion, though this latter seems to bear a

certain resemblance to piety.

XVII. Men are also gained over by liberality, especially

such as have not the means to buy what is necessary to sustain

life. However, to give aid to every poor man is far beyond the

power and the advantage of any private person. For the riches of

any private person are wholly inadequate to meet such a call.

Again, an individual man’s resources of character are too limited

for him to be able to make all men his friends. Hence providing

for the poor is a duty, which falls on the State as a whole, and

has regard only to the general advantage.

XVIII. In accepting favours, and in returning gratitude our

duty must be wholly different (cf. IV. lxx. note ; lxxi. note).

XIX. Again, meretricious love, that is, the lust of

generation arising from bodily beauty, and generally every sort

of love, which owns anything save freedom of soul as its cause,

readily passes into hate ; unless indeed, what is worse, it is a

species of madness ; and then it promotes discord rather than

harmony (cf. III. xxxi. Coroll.).

XX. As concerning marriage, it is certain that this is in

harmony with reason, if the desire for physical union be not

engendered solely by bodily beauty, but also by the desire to

beget children and to train them up wisely ; and moreover, if the

love of both, to wit, of the man and of the woman, is not caused

by bodily beauty only, but also by freedom of soul.

XXI. Furthermore, flattery begets harmony ; but only by

means of the vile offence of slavishness or treachery. None are

more readily taken with flattery than the proud, who wish to be

first, but are not.

XXII. There is in abasement a spurious appearance of piety

and religion. Although abasement is the opposite to pride, yet

is he that abases himself most akin to the proud (IV. lvii.

note).

XXIII. Shame also brings about harmony, but only in such

matters as cannot be hid. Further, as shame is a species of

pain, it does not concern the exercise of reason.

XXIV. The remaining emotions of pain towards men are

directly opposed to justice, equity, honour, piety, and religion

; and, although indignation seems to bear a certain resemblance

to equity, yet is life but lawless, where every man may pass

judgment on another’s deeds, and vindicate his own or other men’s

rights.

XXV. Correctness of conduct (modestia), that is, the desire

of pleasing men which is determined by reason, is attributable to

piety (as we said in IV. xxxvii. note. i.). But, if it spring

from emotion, it is ambition, or the desire whereby, men, under

the false cloak of piety, generally stir up discords and

seditions. For he who desires to aid his fellows either in word

or in deed, so that they may together enjoy the highest good, he,

I say, will before all things strive to win them over with love :

not to draw them into admiration, so that a system may be called

after his name, nor to give any cause for envy. Further, in his

conversation he will shrink from talking of men’s faults, and

will be careful to speak but sparingly of human infirmity : but

he will dwell at length on human virtue or power, and the way

whereby it may be perfected. Thus will men be stirred not by

fear, nor by aversion, but only by the emotion of joy, to

endeavour, so far as in them lies, to live in obedience to

reason.

XXVI. Besides men, we know of no particular thing in nature

in whose mind we may rejoice, and whom we can associate with

ourselves in friendship or any sort of fellowship ; therefore,

whatsoever there be in nature besides man, a regard for our

advantage does not call on us to preserve, but to preserve or

destroy according to its various capabilities, and to adapt to

our use as best we may.

XXVII. The advantage which we derive from things external to

us, besides the experience and knowledge which we acquire from

observing them, and from recombining their elements in different

forms, is principally the preservation of the body ; from this

point of view, those things are most useful which can so feed and

nourish the body, that all its parts may rightly fulfil their

functions. For, in proportion as the body is capable of being

affected in a greater variety of ways, and of affecting external

bodies in a great number of ways, so much the more is the mind

capable of thinking (IV. xxxviii., xxxix.). But there seem to be

very few things of this kind in nature ; wherefore for the due

nourishment of the body we must use many foods of diverse nature.

For the human body is