The Ethics by Benedictus de Spinoza (most important books of all time .txt) 📖

it that God

foresaw human imagination, and arranged everything, so that it

should be most easily imagined. If this be their theory, they

would not, perhaps, be daunted by the fact that we find an

infinite number of phenomena, far surpassing our imagination, and

very many others which confound its weakness. But enough has

been said on this subject. The other abstract notions are

nothing but modes of imagining, in which the imagination is

differently affected : though they are considered by the ignorant

as the chief attributes of things, inasmuch as they believe that

everything was created for the sake of themselves ; and,

according as they are affected by it, style it good or bad,

healthy or rotten and corrupt. For instance, if the motion which

objects we see communicate to our nerves be conducive to health,

the objects causing it are styled beautiful ; if a contrary

motion be excited, they are styled ugly.

Things which are perceived through our sense of smell are

styled fragrant or fetid ; if through our taste, sweet or bitter,

full-flavored or insipid ; if through our touch, hard or soft,

rough or smooth, &c.

Whatsoever affects our ears is said to give rise to noise,

sound, or harmony. In this last case, there are men lunatic

enough to believe, that even God himself takes pleasure in

harmony ; and philosophers are not lacking who have persuaded

themselves, that the motion of the heavenly bodies gives rise to

harmony-all of which instances sufficiently show that everyone

judges of things according to the state of his brain, or rather

mistakes for things the forms of his imagination. We need no

longer wonder that there have arisen all the controversies we

have witnessed, and finally skepticism : for, although human

bodies in many respects agree, yet in very many others they

differ ; so that what seems good to one seems bad to another ;

what seems well ordered to one seems confused to another ; what

is pleasing to one displeases another, and so on. I need not

further enumerate, because this is not the place to treat the

subject at length, and also because the fact is sufficiently well

known. It is commonly said : “So many men, so many minds ;

everyone is wise in his own way ; brains differ as completely as

palates.” All of which proverbs show, that men judge of things

according to their mental disposition, and rather imagine than

understand : for, if they understood phenomena, they would, as

mathematicians attest, be convinced, if not attracted, by what I

have urged.

We have now perceived, that all the explanations commonly

given of nature are mere modes of imagining, and do not indicate

the true nature of anything, but only the constitution of the

imagination ; and, although they have names, as though they were

entities, existing externally to the imagination, I call them

entities imaginary rather than real ; and, therefore, all

arguments against us drawn from such abstractions are easily

rebutted.

Many argue in this way. If all things follow from a

necessity of the absolutely perfect nature of God, why are there

so many imperfections in nature? such, for instance, as things

corrupt to the point of putridity, loathsome deformity,

confusion, evil, sin, &c. But these reasoners are, as I have

said, easily confuted, for the perfection of things is to be

reckoned only from their own nature and power ; things are not

more or less perfect, according as they delight or offend human

senses, or according as they are serviceable or repugnant to

mankind. To those who ask why God did not so create all men,

that they should be governed only by reason, I give no answer but

this : because matter was not lacking to him for the creation of

every degree of perfection from highest to lowest ; or, more

strictly, because the laws of his nature are so vast, as to

suffice for the production of everything conceivable by an

infinite intelligence, as I have shown in Prop. xvi.

Such are the misconceptions I have undertaken to note ; if

there are any more of the same sort, everyone may easily

dissipate them for himself with the aid of a little reflection.

 

Part II.

ON THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND

PREFACE

I now pass on to explaining the results, which must

necessarily follow from the essence of God, or of the eternal and

infinite being ; not, indeed, all of them (for we proved in Part

i., Prop. xvi., that an infinite number must follow in an

infinite number of ways), but only those which are able to lead

us, as it were by the hand, to the knowledge of the human mind

and its highest blessedness.

DEFINITIONS

DEFINITION I. By body I mean a mode which expresses in a certain

determinate manner the essence of God, in so far as he is

considered as an extended thing. (See Pt. i., Prop. xxv.,

Coroll.)

 

DEFINITION II. I consider as belonging to the essence of a thing

that, which being given, the thing is necessarily given also,

and, which being removed, the thing is necessarily removed also ;

in other words, that without which the thing, and which itself

without the thing, can neither be nor be conceived.

 

DEFINITION III. By idea, I mean the mental conception which is

formed by the mind as a thinking thing.

Explanation.-I say conception rather than perception, because

the word perception seems to imply that the mind is passive in

respect to the object ; whereas conception seems to express an

activity of the mind.

 

DEFINITION IV. By an adequate idea, I mean an idea which, in so

far as it is considered in itself, without relation to the

object, has all the properties or intrinsic marks of a true idea.

Explanation.-I say intrinsic, in order to exclude that mark

which is extrinsic, namely, the agreement between the idea and

its object (ideatum).

 

DEFINITION V. Duration is the indefinite continuance of

existing.

Explanation.-I say indefinite, because it cannot be

determined through the existence itself of the existing thing, or

by its efficient cause, which necessarily gives the existence of

the thing, but does not take it away.

 

DEFINITION VI. Reality and perfection I use as synonymous terms.

 

DEFINITION VII. By particular things, I mean things which are

finite and have a conditioned existence ; but if several

individual things concur in one action, so as to be all

simultaneously the effect of one cause, I consider them all, so

far, as one particular thing.

AXIOMS

I. The essence of man does not involve necessary existence, that

is, it may, in the order of nature, come to pass that this or

that man does or does not exist.

 

II. Man thinks.

 

III. Modes of thinking, such as love, desire, or any other of

the passions, do not take place, unless there be in the same

individual an idea of the thing loved, desired, &c. But the idea

can exist without the presence of any other mode of thinking.

 

IV. We perceive that a certain body is affected in many ways.

 

V. We feel and perceive no particular things, save bodies and

modes of thought.

 

N.B. The Postulates are given after the conclusion of Prop.

xiii.

PROPOSITIONS

PROP. I. Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking

thing.

Proof.-Particular thoughts, or this and that thought, are

modes which, in a certain conditioned manner, express the nature

of God (Pt. i., Prop. xxv., Coroll.). God therefore possesses

the attribute (Pt. i., Def. v.) of which the concept is involved

in all particular thoughts, which latter are conceived thereby.

Thought, therefore, is one of the infinite attributes of God,

which express God’s eternal and infinite essence (Pt. i., Def.

vi.). In other words, God is a thinking thing. Q.E.D.

Note.-This proposition is also evident from the fact, that we

are able to conceive an infinite thinking being. For, in

proportion as a thinking being is conceived as thinking more

thoughts, so is it conceived as containing more reality or

perfection. Therefore a being, which can think an infinite

number of things in an infinite number of ways, is, necessarily,

in respect of thinking, infinite. As, therefore, from the

consideration of thought alone, we conceive an infinite being,

thought is necessarily (Pt. i., Deff. iv. and vi.) one of the

infinite attributes of God, as we were desirous of showing.

 

PROP. II. Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an

extended thing.

Proof.-The proof of this proposition is similar to that of

the last.

 

PROP. III. In God there is necessarily the idea not only of his

essence, but also of all things which necessarily follow from his

essence.

Proof.-God (by the first Prop. of this Part) can think an

infinite number of things in infinite ways, or (what is the same

thing, by Prop. xvi., Part i.) can form the idea of his essence,

and of all things which necessarily follow therefrom. Now all

that is in the power of God necessarily is (Pt. i., Prop. xxxv.).

Therefore, such an idea as we are considering necessarily is, and

in God alone. Q.E.D. (Part i., Prop. xv.)

Note.-The multitude understand by the power of God the free

will of God, and the right over all things that exist, which

latter are accordingly generally considered as contingent. For

it is said that God has the power to destroy all things, and to

reduce them to nothing. Further, the power of God is very often

likened to the power of kings. But this doctrine we have refuted

(Pt. i., Prop. xxxii., Corolls. i. and ii.), and we have shown

(Part i., Prop. xvi.) that God acts by the same necessity, as

that by which he understands himself ; in other words, as it

follows from the necessity of the divine nature (as all admit),

that God understands himself, so also does it follow by the same

necessity, that God performs infinite acts in infinite ways. We

further showed (Part i., Prop. xxxiv.), that God’s power is

identical with God’s essence in action ; therefore it is as

impossible for us to conceive God as not acting, as to conceive

him as non-existent. If we might pursue the subject further, I

could point out, that the power which is commonly attributed to

God is not only human (as showing that God is conceived by the

multitude as a man, or in the likeness of a man), but involves a

negation of power. However, I am unwilling to go over the same

ground so often. I would only beg the reader again and again, to

turn over frequently in his mind what I have said in Part I from

Prop. xvi. to the end. No one will be able to follow my meaning,

unless he is scrupulously careful not to confound the power of

God with the human power and right of kings.

 

PROP. IV. The idea of God, from which an infinite number of

things follow in infinite ways, can only be one.

Proof.-Infinite intellect comprehends nothing save the

attributes of God and his modifications (Part i., Prop. xxx.).

Now God is one (Part i., Prop. xiv., Coroll.). Therefore the

idea of God, wherefrom an infinite number of things follow in

infinite ways, can only be one. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. V. The actual being of ideas owns God as its cause, only

in so far as he is considered as a thinking thing, not in so far

as he is unfolded in any other attribute ; that is, the ideas

both of the attributes of God and of particular things do not own

as their efficient cause their objects (ideata) or the things

perceived, but God himself in so far as he is a