The Psychology of Management by L. M. Gilbreth (latest books to read txt) 📖
- Author: L. M. Gilbreth
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Promotion May Be to Places Within or Without the Business. — In many lines of business, the business itself offers ample opportunity for promoting all men who can "make good" as rapidly as they can prepare themselves for positions over others, and for advancement; but under Scientific Management provision is made even in case the business does not offer such opportunities.5 This is done by the management finding places outside their own organization for the men who are so trained that they can be advanced.
Such Promotion Attracts Workers. — While at first glance it might seem a most unfortunate thing for the management to have to let its men go, and while, as Dr. Taylor says, it is unfortunate for a business to get the reputation of being nothing but a training school, on the other hand, it has a very salutary effect upon the men to know that their employers are so disinterestedly interested in them that they will provide for their future, even at the risk of the individual business at which they have started having to lose their services. This will not only, as Dr. Taylor makes clear, stimulate many men in the establishment whose men go on to take the places of those who are promoted, but will also be a great inducement to other men to come into a place that they feel is unselfish and generous.
Subdivisions of "Pay." — Under "Pay" we have included eight headings:
1. Wages
2. Bonus
3. Shorter hours
4. Prizes other than money
5. Extra knowledge
6. Method of attack
7. Good opinion of others
8. Professional standing.
Relation Between Wages and Bonus. — Wages and bonus are closely related. By wages we mean a fixed sum, or minimum hourly rate, that the man gets in any case for his time, and by bonus we mean additional money that he receives for achievement of method, quantity or quality. Both might very properly be included under wages, or under money received for the work, or opportunities for receiving money for work, as the case might be. In the discussion of the different ways of paying wages under Scientific Management, there will be no attempt to discuss the economic value of the various means; the different methods will simply be stated, and the psychological significance will be, as far as possible, given.
Before discussing the various kinds of wages advised by the experts in Scientific Management, it is well to pause a moment to name the various sorts of methods of compensation recognized by authorities. David F. Schloss in his "Method of Industrial Remuneration" divides all possible ways of gaining remuneration into three —
1. the different kinds of wages
1. time wage
2. piece wage
3. task wage
4. progressive wage
5. collective piece wage
6. collective task wage
7. collective progressive wage
8. contract work
9. coöperative work
with
2. profit sharing, and
3. industrial coöperation. These are defined and discussed at length in his book in a lucid and simple manner.
It is only necessary to quote him here as to the relationship between these different forms, where he says, page 11, — "The two leading forms of industrial remuneration under the Wages System are time wages, and piece wages. Intermediate between these principal forms, stands that known as task wage, while supplemental to these two named methods, we find those various systems which will here be designated by the name of Progressive Wages." 6
Day Work Never Scientific. — The simplest of all systems, says Dr. Taylor in "A Piece Rate System," paragraph 10, in discussing the various forms of compensation "is the Day Work plan, in which the employés are divided into certain classes, and a standard rate of wages is paid to each class of men," He adds — "The men are paid according to the position which they fill, and not according to their individual character, energy, skill and reliability," The psychological objection to day work is that it does not arouse interest or effort or hold attention, nor does it inspire to memorizing or to learning.
It will be apparent that there is no inducement whatever for the man to do more than just enough to retain his job, for he in no wise shares in the reward for an extra effort, which goes entirely to his employer. "Reward," in this case, is usually simply a living wage, — enough to inspire the man, if he needs the money enough to work to hold his position, but not enough to incite him to any extra effort.
It is true that, in actual practice, through the foreman or some man in authority, the workers on day work may be "speeded up" to a point where they will do a great deal of work; the foreman being inspired, of course, by a reward for the extra output, but, as Dr. Taylor says, paragraph 17 — "A Piece Rate System," this sort of speeding up is absolutely lacking in self-sustaining power. The moment that this rewarded foreman is removed, the work will again fall down. Therefore, day wage has almost no place in ultimate, scientifically managed work.
Piece Work Provides Pay in Proportion to Work Done. — Piece Work is the opposite of time work, in that under it the man is paid not for the time he spends at the work, but for the amount of work which he accomplishes. Under this system, as long as the man is paid a proper piece rate, and a rate high enough to keep him interested, he will have great inducements to work. He will have a chance to develop individuality, a chance for competition, a chance for personal recognition. His love of reasonable racing will be cultivated. His love of play may be cultivated.
All of these incentives arise because the man feels that his sense of justice is being considered; that if the task is properly laid out, and the price per piece is properly determined, he is given a "square deal" in being allowed to accomplish as great an amount of work as he can, with the assurance that his reward will be promptly coming to him.
Danger of Rate Being Cut. — Piece work becomes objectionable only when the rate is cut. The moment the rate is cut the first time, the man begins to wonder whether it is going to be cut again, and his attention is distracted from the work by his debating this question constantly. At best, his attention wanders from one subject to the other, and back again. It cannot be concentrated on his work. After the rate has been cut once or twice, — and it is sure to be cut unless it has been set from scientifically derived elementary time units, — the man loses his entire confidence in the stability of the rate, and, naturally, when he loses this confidence, his work is done more slowly, due to lack of further enthusiasm. On the contrary, as long as it is to his advantage to do the work and he is sure that his reward will be prompt, and that he will always get the price that has been determined as right by him and by the employers for his work, he can do this work easily in the time set. As soon as he feels that he will not get it, he will naturally begin to do less, as it will be not only to his personal advantage to do as little as possible, but also very much to the advantage of his fellows, for whom the rate will also be cut.
Task Wage Contains No Incentive to Additional Work. — What Schloss calls the Task Wage would, as he well says, be the intermediate between time or day wage and piece wage; that is, it would be the assigning of a definite amount of work to be done in definite time, and to be paid for by a definite sum. If the task were set scientifically, and the time scientifically determined, as it must naturally be for a scientific task, and the wage adequate for that work, there would seem to be nothing about this form of remuneration which could be a cause of dissatisfaction to the worker. Naturally, however, there would be absolutely no chance for him to desire to go any faster than the time set, or to accomplish any more work in the time set than that which he was obliged to, in that he could not possibly get anything for the extra work done.
Worth of Previous Methods in the Handling. — It will be noted in the discussion of the three types of compensation so far discussed, that there is nothing in them that renders them unscientific. Any one of the three may be used, and doubtless all are used, on works which are attempting to operate under Scientific Management. Whether they really are scientific methods of compensation or not, is determined by the way that they are handled. Certainly, however, all that any of these three can expect to do is to convince the man that he is being treated justly; that is to say, if he knows what sort of a contract he is entering into, the contract is perfectly fair, provided that the management keeps its part of the contract, pays the agreed-upon wage.
In proceeding, instead of following the order of Schloss we will follow the order, at least for a time, of Dr. Taylor In "A Piece Rate System"; this for two reasons:
First, for the reason that the "Piece Rate System" is later than Schloss' book, Schloss being 1891, and the "Piece Rate" being 1895; in the second place that we are following the Scientific Management side in distinction to the general economic side, laid down by Schloss. There is, however, nothing in our plan of discussion here to prevent one's following fairly closely in the Schloss also.
The Gain-sharing Plan. — We take up, then, the Gain-sharing Plan which was invented by Mr. Henry R. Towne and used by him with success in the Yale & Towne works. This is described in a paper read before the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, in professional paper No. 341, in 1888 and also in the Premium Plan, Mr. Halsey's modification of it, described by him in a paper entitled the "Premium Plan of Paying for Labor," American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 1891, Paper 449. In this, in describing the Profit-sharing Plan, Mr. Halsey says — "Under it, in addition to regular wages, the employés were offered a certain percentage of the final profits of the business. It thus divides the savings due to increased production between employer and employé."
Objections to This Plan. — We note here the objection to this plan: First, — "The workmen are given a share in what they do not earn; second, the workmen share regardless of individual deserts;
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