Criminal Psychology by Hans Gross (classic books for 10 year olds .txt) 📖

are important to witnesses and accused is undoubted. But this importance is manifest to still others. The intercourse between various examining judges and experts is a matter of daily observation. One judge puts the question according to law and expects to be respected. He does not make explicit how perfectly indifferent the whole affair is to him, but experts have sufficient opportunity to take note of that fact. The other narrates the case, explains to the experts its various particular possibilities, finds out whether and what further elucidation they demand, perhaps inquires into the intended manner and method of the expert solution of the problem, informs himself of the case by their means, and manifests especial interest in the difficult and far too much neglected work of the experts. It may be said that the latter will do their work in the one case as in the other, with the same result. This would be true if, unfortunately, experts were not also endowed with the same imperfections as other mortals, and are thus far also infected by interest or indifference. Just imagine that besides the examining magistrate of a great superior court, every justice and, in addition, all the chiefs and officials manifested equal indifference! Then even the most devoted experts would grow cool and do only what they absolutely had to. But if all the members of the same court are actuated by the same keen interest and comport themselves as described, how different the affair becomes! It would be impossible that even the indifferent, and perhaps least industrious experts, should not be carried out of themselves by the general interest, should not finally realize the importance of their position, and do their utmost.

 

The same thing is true of the president, the jurymen and their fellow-judges. It is observable that here and there a presiding justice succeeds in boring all concerned during even criminal cases interesting <p 15>

in themselves; the incident drags on, and people are interested only in finally seeing the end of the matter. Other presiding justices again, fortunately the majority, understand how to impart apparent importance to even the simplest case. Whatever office anybody may hold,—he and his mates are commissioned in the common task, and should the thing come up for judgment, everybody does his best. The difference here is not due to temperamental freshness or tediousness; the result depends only upon a correct or incorrect psychological handling of the participants. The latter must in every single case be led and trained anew to interest, conscientiousness and cooperation. In this need lies the educational opportunity of the criminal judge. Whether it arises with regard to the accused, the witness, the associate justice, or the expert, is all one; it is invariably the same.

 

That knowledge of human nature is for this purpose most important to the criminalist will be as little challenged as the circumstance that such knowledge can not be acquired from books. Curiously enough, there are not a few on the subject, but I suspect that whoever studies or memorizes them, (such books as Pockel’s, Herz’s, Meister’s, Engel’s, Jassoix’s, and others, enumerated by Volkmar) will have gained little that is of use. A knowledge of human nature is acquired only (barring of course a certain talent thereto) by persevering observation, comparison, summarization, and further comparison. So acquired, it sets its possessor to the fore, and makes him independent of a mass of information with which the others have to repair their ignorance of mankind. This is to be observed in countless cases in our profession. Whoever has had to deal with certain sorts of swindlers, lying horsetraders, antiquarians, prestidigitators, soon comes to the remarkable conclusion, that of this class, exactly those who flourish most in their profession and really get rich understand their trade the least. The horsedealer is no connoisseur whatever in horses, the antiquarian can not judge the value nor the age and excellence of antiquities, the cardsharp knows a few stupid tricks with which, one might think, he ought to be able to deceive only the most innocent persons. Nevertheless they all have comfortable incomes, and merely because they know their fellows and have practiced this knowledge with repeatedly fresh applications.

 

I do not of course assert that we criminalists need little scholarly knowledge of law, and ought to depend entirely upon knowledge of men. We need exactly as much more knowledge as our task exceeds <p 16>

that of the horsedealer, but we can not do without knowledge of humanity. The immense onerousness of the judge’s office lies in just the fact that he needs so very much more than his bare legal knowledge. He must, before all things, be a jurist and not merely a criminalist; he must be in full possession not only of the knowledge he has acquired in his academy, but of the very latest up-to-date status of his entire science. If he neglects the purely theoretical, he degenerates into a mere laborer. He is in duty bound not only to make himself familiar with hundreds of things, to be able to consort with all sorts of crafts and trades, but also, finally, to form so much out of the material supplied him by the law as is possible to human power.

 

Section 4. (b) Integrity of Witnesses.

 

One of the criminal judge’s grossest derelictions from duty consists in his simply throwing the witness the question and in permitting him to say what he chooses. If he contents himself in that, he leaves to the witness’s conscience the telling of the truth, and the whole truth; the witness is, in such a case, certainly responsible for one part of the untruthful and suppressed, but the responsibility for the other, and larger part, lies with the judge who has failed to do his best to bring out the uttermost value of the evidence, indifferently for or against the prisoner. The work of education is intended for this purpose,—not, as might be supposed, for training the populace as a whole into good witnesses, but to make that individual into a good, trustworthy witness who is called upon to testify for the first, and, perhaps, for the last time in his life. This training must in each case take two directions—it must make him *want to tell the truth; it must make him *able to tell the truth. The first requirement deals not only with the lie alone, it deals with the development of complete conscientiousness. How to face the lie itself can not be determined by means of training, but conscientious answers under examination can certainly be so acquired.

We are not here considering people to whom truth is an utter stranger, who are fundamentally liars and whose very existence is a libel on mankind. We consider here only those people who have been unaccustomed to speaking the full and unadulterated truth, who have contented themselves throughout their lives with “approximately,”

and have never had the opportunity of learning the value of veracity. It may be said that a disturbingly large number of <p 17>

people are given to wandering, in conversation, and in the reproduction of the past. They do not go straight, quickly, and openly to the point, they loiter toward it—“If I do not reach it in a bee line, I can get along on bypaths, if not to-day, then to-morrow; and if I really do not get to it at all, I do get somewhere else.” Such people have not homes but inns—if they are not in one place, another will do.

 

These persons are characterized by the event that whenever one has seen their loitering and puts the matter to them with just anger, they either get frightened or say carelessly, “Oh, I thought this was not so accurate.” This famine of conscience, this indifference to truth, does far-reaching damage in our profession. I assert that it does immensely greater harm than obvious falsehood, because, indeed, the unvarnished lie is much more easily discoverable than the probable truth which is still untruth. Moreover, lies come generally from people with regard to whom one is, for one reason or another, already cautious, while these insinuating approximations are made by people who are not mistrusted at all.[1]

 

The lack of conscientiousness is common to all ages, both sexes, and to all sorts and conditions of men. But it is most characteristically frequent and sharply defined among people who have no real business in life. Whoever romances in the daily life, romances when he ought to be absolutely truthful. The most dangerous of this class are those who make a living by means of show and exhibition.

They are not conscienceless because they do nothing worth while; they do nothing worth while because they are conscienceless.

To this class belong peddlers, street merchants, innkeepers, certain shopkeepers, hack-drivers, artists, etc., and especially prostitutes (cf. Lombroso, etc., etc.). All these people follow a calling perhaps much troubled, but they do no actual work and have chosen their profession to avoid regular, actual work. They have much unoccupied time, and when they are working, part of the work consists of gossip, part of loafing about, or of a use of the hands that is little more. In brief,—since they loiter about and make a profit out of it, it is no wonder that in giving evidence they also loaf and bring to light only approximate truth. Nor is it difficult to indicate analogous persons in the higher walks of life.

 

The most hateful and most dangerous of these people are the congenital tramps—people who did not have to work and faithfully pursued the opportunity of doing nothing. Whoever does not [1] Cf. L<o:>wenstimm, in H. Gross’s Archiv, VII, 191.

 

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recognize that the world has no place for idlers and that life on God’s earth must be earned by labor, is without conscience. No conscientious testimony need be expected from such. Among the few rules without exception which in the course of long experience the criminalist may make, this is one—that the real tramps of both sexes and all walks of life will never testify conscientiously;—hic niger est, hunc Tu, Romane, caveto.

 

Section 5. (c) The Correctness of Testimony.

 

The training of the witness into a *capacity for truth-telling must be based, (1) on the judge’s knowledge of all the conditions that affect, negatively, correct observations and reproductions; (2) on his making clear to himself whether and which conditions are operative in the case in question; and (3) on his aiming to eliminate this negative influence from the witness. The last is in many cases difficult, but not impossible. That mistakes have been made is generally soon noted, but then, “being called and being chosen”

are two things; and similarly, the discovery of *what is correct and the substitution of the essential observations for the opinionative ones, is always the most difficult of the judge’s tasks.

 

When the witness is both unwilling to tell the truth and unable to do so, the business of training may be approached from a few common viewpoints. Patience with the witness is perhaps the most important key to success. No doubt it is difficult to be patient where there is no time; and what with our contemporary overtasking, there is no time. But that must be altered. Justice must have strength to keep everybody’s labor proportional to his task.

A nation whose representatives do not grant money enough for this purpose must not expect satisfactory law courts—“no checkee no washee;” no money no justice. People who have time will acquire patience.

 

Patience is necessary above all while taking evidence. A great many witnesses are accustomed to say much and redundantly, and again, most criminal justices are accustomed to try to shut them off and to require brief statements. That is silly. If the witness is wandering on purpose, as many a