Thoughts Of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus by Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (e book free reading TXT) 📖

For Certain Uses,  And On The Whole Man Performs These Uses,  Dies,

And Leaves Other Men In His Place. So Society Exists,  And A Social State

Is Manifestly The Natural State Of Man--The State For Which His Nature

Fits Him,  And Society Amidst Innumerable Irregularities And Disorders

Still Subsists; And Perhaps We May Say That The History Of The Past And

Our Present Knowledge Give Us A Reasonable Hope That Its Disorders Will

Diminish,  And That Order,  Its Governing Principle,  May Be More Firmly

Established. As Order Then,  A Fixed Order,  We May Say,  Subject To

Deviations Real Or Apparent,  Must Be Admitted To Exist In The Whole

Nature Of Things,  That Which We Call Disorder Or Evil,  As It Seems To

Us,  Does Not In Any Way Alter The Fact Of The General Constitution Of

Things Having A Nature Or Fixed Order. Nobody Will Conclude From The

Existence Of Disorder That Order Is Not The Rule,  For The Existence Of

Order Both Physical And Moral Is Proved By Daily Experience And All Past

Experience. We Cannot Conceive How The Order Of The Universe Is

Maintained: We Cannot Even Conceive How Our Own Life From Day To Day Is

Continued,  Nor How We Perform The Simplest Movements Of The Body,  Nor

How We Grow And Think And Act,  Though We Know Many Of The Conditions

Which Are Necessary For All These Functions. Knowing Nothing Then Of The

Unseen Power Which Acts In Ourselves Except By What Is Done,  We Know

Nothing Of The Power Which Acts Through What We Call All Time And All

Space; But Seeing That There Is A Nature Or Fixed Order In All Things

Known To Us,  It Is Conformable To The Nature Of Our Minds To Believe

That This Universal Nature Has A Cause Which Operates Continually,  And

That We Are Totally Unable To Speculate On The Reason Of Any Of Those

Disorders Or Evils Which We Perceive. This I Believe Is The Answer Which

May Be Collected From All That Antoninus Has Said.[A]

 

    [A] Cleanthes Says In His Hymn:--

 

    "For All Things Good And Bad To One Thou Formest,

    So That One Everlasting Reason Governs All."

 

    See Bishop Butler's Sermons. Sermon Xv.,  "Upon The Ignorance Of

    Man."

 

The Origin Of Evil Is An Old Question. Achilles Tells Priam (Iliad,

24,  527) That Zeus Has Two Casks,  One Filled With Good Things,  And The

Other With Bad,  And That He Gives To Men Out Of Each According To His

Pleasure; And So We Must Be Content,  For We Cannot Alter The Will Of

Zeus. One Of The Greek Commentators Asks How Must We Reconcile This

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Doctrine With What We Find In The First Book Of The Odyssey,  Where The

King Of The Gods Says,  Men Say That Evil Comes To Them From Us,  But They

Bring It On Themselves Through Their Own Folly. The Answer Is Plain

Enough Even To The Greek Commentator. The Poets Make Both Achilles And

Zeus Speak Appropriately To Their Several Characters. Indeed,  Zeus Says

Plainly That Men Do Attribute Their Sufferings To Their Gods,  But They

Do It Falsely,  For They Are The Cause Of Their Own Sorrows.

 

[Illustration: The Appian Way,  Rome]

 

Epictetus In His Enchiridion (C. 27) Makes Short Work Of The Question Of

Evil. He Says,  "As A Mark Is Not Set Up For The Purpose Of Missing It,

So Neither Does The Nature Of Evil Exist In The Universe." This Will

Appear Obscure Enough To Those Who Are Not Acquainted With Epictetus,

But He Always Knows What He Is Talking About. We Do Not Set Up A Mark In

Order To Miss It,  Though We May Miss It. God,  Whose Existence Epictetus

Assumes,  Has Not Ordered All Things So That His Purpose Shall Fail.

Whatever There May Be Of What We Call Evil,  The Nature Of Evil,  As He

Expresses It,  Does Not Exist; That Is,  Evil Is Not A Part Of The

Constitution Or Nature Of Things. If There Were A Principle Of Evil

([Greek: Archê]) In The Constitution Of Things,  Evil Would No Longer Be

Evil,  As Simplicius Argues,  But Evil Would Be Good. Simplicius (C. 34,

[27]) Has A Long And Curious Discourse On This Text Of Epictetus,  And It

Is Amusing And Instructive.

 

One Passage More Will Conclude This Matter. It Contains All That The

Emperor Could Say (Ii. 11): "To Go From Among Men,  If There Are Gods,  Is

Not A Thing To Be Afraid Of,  For The Gods Will Not Involve Thee In Evil;

But If Indeed They Do Not Exist,  Or If They Have No Concern About Human

Affairs,  What Is It To Me To Live In A Universe Devoid Of Gods Or Devoid

Of Providence? But In Truth They Do Exist,  And They Do Care For Human

Things,  And They Have Put All The Means In Man's Power To Enable Him Not

To Fall Into Real Evils. And As To The Rest,  If There Was Anything Evil,

They Would Have Provided For This Also,  That It Should Be Altogether In

A Man's Power Not To Fall Into It. But That Which Does Not Make A Man

Worse,  How Can It Make A Man's Life Worse? But Neither Through

Ignorance,  Nor Having The Knowledge But Not The Power To Guard Against

Or Correct These Things,  Is It Possible That The Nature Of The Universe

Has Overlooked Them; Nor Is It Possible That It Has Made So Great A

Mistake,  Either Through Want Of Power Or Want Of Skill,  That Good And

Evil Should Happen Indiscriminately To The Good And The Bad. But Death

Certainly And Life,  Honor And Dishonor,  Pain And Pleasure,  All These

Things Equally Happen To Good And Bad Men,  Being Things Which Make Us

Neither Better Nor Worse. Therefore They Are Neither Good Nor Evil."

 

The Ethical Part Of Antoninus' Philosophy Follows From His General

Principles. The End Of All His Philosophy Is To Live Conformably To

Nature,  Both A Man's Own Nature And The Nature Of The Universe. Bishop

Butler Has Explained What The Greek Philosophers Meant When They Spoke

Of Living According To Nature,  And He Says That When It Is Explained,  As

He Has Explained It And As They Understood It,  It Is "A Manner Of

Speaking Not Loose And Undeterminate,  But Clear And Distinct,  Strictly

Just And True." To Live According To Nature Is To Live According To A

Man's Whole Nature,  Not According To A Part Of It,  And To Reverence The

Divinity Within Him As The Governor Of All His Actions. "To The Rational

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Animal The Same Act Is According To Nature And According To Reason"[A]

(Vii. 11). That Which Is Done Contrary To Reason Is Also An Act Contrary

To Nature,  To The Whole Nature,  Though It Is Certainly Conformable To

Some Part Of Man's Nature,  Or It Could Not Be Done. Man Is Made For

Action,  Not For Idleness Or Pleasure. As Plants And Animals Do The Uses

Of Their Nature,  So Man Must Do His (V. 1).

 

    [A] This Is What Juvenal Means When He Says (Xiv. 321),--

 

    "Nunquam Aliud Natura Aliud Sapientia Dicit."

 

Man Must Also Live Conformably To The Universal Nature,  Conformably To

The Nature Of All Things Of Which He Is One; And As A Citizen Of A

Political Community He Must Direct His Life And Actions With Reference

To Those Among Whom,  Among Other Purposes,  He Lives.[A] A Man Must Not

Retire Into Solitude And Cut Himself Off From His Fellow-Men. He Must Be

Ever Active To Do His Part In The Great Whole. All Men Are His Kin,  Not

Only In Blood,  But Still More By Participating In The Same Intelligence

And By Being A Portion Of The Same Divinity. A Man Cannot Really Be

Injured By His Brethren,  For No Act Of Theirs Can Make Him Bad,  And He

Must Not Be Angry With Them Nor Hate Them: "For We Are Made For

Co-Operation,  Like Feet,  Like Hands,  Like Eyelids,  Like The Rows Of The

Upper And Lower Teeth. To Act Against One Another Then Is Contrary To

Nature; And It Is Acting Against One Another To Be Vexed And To Turn

Away" (Ii. 1).

 

    [A] See Viii. 52; And Persius Iii. 66

 

Further He Says: "Take Pleasure In One Thing And Rest In It In Passing

From One Social Act To Another Social Act,  Thinking Of God" (Vi. 7).

Again: "Love Mankind. Follow God" (Vii. 31). It Is The Characteristic Of

The Rational Soul For A Man To Love His Neighbor (Xi. 1). Antoninus

Teaches In Various Passages The Forgiveness Of Injuries,  And We Know

That He Also Practised What He Taught. Bishop Butler Remarks That "This

Divine Precept To Forgive Injuries And To Love Our Enemies,  Though To Be

Met With In Gentile Moralists,  Yet Is In A Peculiar Sense A Precept Of

Christianity,  As Our Saviour Has Insisted More Upon It Than On Any Other

Single Virtue." The Practice Of This Precept Is The Most Difficult Of

All Virtues. Antoninus Often Enforces It And Gives Us Aid Towards

Following It. When We Are Injured,  We Feel Anger And Resentment,  And The

Feeling Is Natural,  Just,  And Useful For The Conservation Of Society. It

Is Useful That Wrong-Doers Should Feel The Natural Consequences Of Their

Actions,  Among Which Is The Disapprobation Of Society And The Resentment

Of Him Who Is Wronged. But Revenge,  In The Proper Sense Of That Word,

Must Not Be Practised. "The Best Way Of Avenging Thyself," Says The

Emperor,  "Is Not To Become Like The Wrong-Doer." It Is Plain By This

That He Does Not Mean That We Should In Any Case Practise Revenge; But

He Says To Those Who Talk Of Revenging Wrongs,  Be Not Like Him Who Has

Done The Wrong. Socrates In The Crito (C. 10) Says The Same In Other

Words,  And St. Paul (Ep. To The Romans,  Xii. 17). "When A Man Has Done

Thee Any Wrong,  Immediately Consider With What Opinion About Good Or

Evil He Has Done Wrong. For When Thou Hast Seen This,  Thou Wilt Pity Him

And Wilt Neither Wonder Nor Be Angry" (Vii. 26). Antoninus Would Not

Deny That Wrong Naturally Produces The Feeling Of Anger And Resentment,

For This Is Implied In The Recommendation To Reflect On The Nature Of

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The Man's Mind Who Has Done