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to have your point wait at the cross roads. If there was any danger of their taking the wrong road it would be a different matter, but here your mission requires you to push ahead. (Par. 1029.) The major is trying to get south of the trestle towards Salem before the cavalry can arrive and destroy it.

Sergeant Adams: I would march steadily along the road, ordering the last man to keep a lookout to the rear for signals from the connecting file (Par. 511a), and I would direct one of the leading men to watch for signals from Corporal Baker.

Captain: You should have given the direction about watching for signals earlier, as this is very important. You also should have ordered two men to follow along the timber by the creek to your south until you signaled for them to come in. The trees along the creek would obstruct your view over the country beyond the creek.

Sergeant Adams: But I thought, Captain, that the patrolling was to be done by the company.

Captain: Yes, the patrolling is to be done by the company, but the creek is only a quarter of a mile, about 400 yards, from the road you are following and the men sent there are merely flankers, not a patrol. You have eight men under your command and you are responsible for the ground within several hundred yards on either side of your route of march. Long Ridge is almost too far for you to send your men, because they would fall far behind in climbing and descending its slopes, but it would not be a great mistake if you sent two men there. As Long Ridge affords an extended view of the valley through which the Chester Pike runs, a patrol should go up on it and remain there until the battalion passes, and this would be more than the leading squad could be expected to attend to. The creek is almost too far from the road in places, but as it is open meadow land you can keep the men within easy touch of you and recall them by signal at any moment you desire. In this work you can see how much depends on good judgment and a proper understanding of one's mission.

Corporal Baker, explain how you would move out with Carter.

Corporal Baker: We would alternate the walk and double time until we had gotten about 200 yards ahead of the squad. I would then say, "Carter, walk along this side of the road (indicates side), keeping on the lookout for signals from the squad. I will go about fifty yards ahead of you." I would keep to the opposite side of the road from Carter, trying to march steadily at the regular marching gait, and keeping a keen watch on everything in front and to the flanks.

Captain: Very good. When you arrive at the cross roads you see a man standing in the yard of the Baker house.

Corporal Baker: I would not stop, but would continue on by the cross roads, as I have no time to question the man and the Sergeant will want to do that. I would call to him and ask him if he had seen any of the enemy about and how far it was to the Chester Pike. If anything looked suspicious around the house or barnyard, I would investigate.

Captain: Sergeant, you arrive at the cross roads, and see the Corporal and Carter going on ahead of you.

Sergeant Adams: I would have already signaled to the two men following the creek to come in and would send a man to meet them with the following order: "Tell Davis to move along the railroad fill with Evans, keeping abreast of us. Then you return to me." I would then say, "Fiske, look in that house and around the barn and orchard and then rejoin me down this road (pointing east)." I would have the civilian join me and walk down the road with me while I questioned him.

Captain: Do you think you have made careful arrangements for searching the house, etc., by leaving only one man to do the work?

Sergeant Adams: I have not sufficient men nor time enough to do much more. I simply want to make sure things are reasonably safe and I thought that a couple of men from the main body of the advance guard would do any careful searching, questioning, etc., that might be deemed necessary. I must not delay the march.

Captain: That is right. You learn nothing from the civilian and he does not arouse any suspicion on your part. You continue along the road. The fields to the north of the road are in wheat stubble; the ground to the south, between your road and the railroad, is rough, rocky grass land with frequent clumps of bushes. Davis and Evans, your right flankers on the railroad fill, are just approaching the cut; Fiske has rejoined; Corporal Baker and his men are about 200 yards from the road forks at Brown's, and you and your four men are 200 yards in their rear, at the turn of the road. At this moment a half dozen shots are fired down the road in your direction from behind the wall along the edge of the orchard on the Brown farm. This firing continues and your two leading men are lying down at the roadside returning the fire. Tell me quickly just what you are going to do?

Sergeant Adams: I order my four men to deploy as skirmishers in that field (pointing to the rough ground south of the road); I go under the fence with the men and lead them forward at a fast run, unless the fire is very heavy.

Captain (interrupting the Sergeant): Davis, you had just reached the cut on the railroad when this happened. What do you do?

Private Davis: I take Evans forward with me at a run through the cut. What do I see along the Chester Pike or Sandy Creek?

Captain: You see no sign of the enemy any place, except the firing over the wall.

Private Davis: I run down the south side of the fill and along towards the road with Evans to open fire on the enemy from their flank, and also to see what is in the orchard. I will probably cross the road so that I can see behind the stone wall.

Captain: That's fine and shows how you should go ahead at such a time without any orders. There is usually no time or opportunity at such a moment for sending instructions and you must use common sense and do something. Generally it would have been better to have tried to signal or send word back that there was nothing in sight along the road or in the valley, but in this particular case you could probably do more good by going quickly around in rear as you did, to discover what was there and assist in quickly dislodging whatever it was. If there had been no nose of the ridge to hide you as you came up and a convenient railroad fill to hurry along behind as you made for the road, your solution might have been quite different.

Sergeant, continue with your movements.

Sergeant Adams: I would attempt to rush the wall. If the fire were too heavy, I would open fire (at will) with all my men, and, if I seemed to get a little heavier fire than the enemy's, I would start half of my men forward on a rush while the others fired. I would try to rush in on the enemy with as little delay as possible, until it developed that he had more than a small detachment there. I assumed it was a delaying patrol in front of me, and as my mission requires me to secure the uninterrupted march of the main body, I must not permit any small detachment to delay me. If, however, it proves to be a larger force, for instance, the head of an advance guard, I will lose some men by plunging in, but as I understand it, that is the duty of the point. Then again, if it be the head of a hostile advance guard, I will want to rush them out of their favorable position under cover of the stone wall, buildings and orchard, before any more of their force can come up. This would give the favorable position to our force; by acting too cautiously we would lose the valuable moments in which the enemy's reënforcements (next elements of the advance guard) were coming up, with this desirable position being weakly held by a small part of the enemy.

Captain: That is all correct. What messages would you have sent?

Sergeant Adams: Up to the present time I would not have sent any. I could not have sent any. I could not afford to take the time to send a man back, nor could I spare the man. Besides, all I could say was that we were fired on, and you should be able to see and hear that from where the company is.

Captain: About the time you reached the position of Corporal Baker the firing ceases, and when you reach the wall you see five mounted men galloping northeast up Farm Lane. The Brown farm appears to be deserted.

Sergeant Adams: I would turn to one of the men and say, "Run back to the Captain and tell him we were fired on from this orchard by a mounted patrol of five men who are galloping off up a lane to the northeast. I am going south." When he had repeated the message I would start south down the Chester Pike, directing Corporal Baker to follow this road south and to tell Davis to follow the high ridge west of the road, going through the clump of woods just ahead. I would send one man as a left flanker to follow the west bank of Sandy Creek. This would leave me with two men, one watching for signals from the front and along Sandy Creek, the other from Davis and from the rear. I would expect to see a patrol from the company moving across towards Boling Woods. Had I not been mixed up in a fight as I approached the Brown farm I would have sent two men as left flankers across country to the cut on the Chester Pike on the western edge of the Boling Woods.

Captain: Very good. That is sufficient for this problem. All of you should have caught the idea of the principal duties of the point and flankers of an advance guard. You must watch the country to prevent being surprised and you must at the same time manage to push ahead with the least possible delay. The point cannot be very cautious so far as concerns its own safety, for this would mean frequent halts which would delay the troops in rear, but it must be cautious about reconnoitering all parts of the ground near the road which might conceal large bodies of the enemy.

The leader of the point must be careful in using his men or he will get them so scattered that they will become entirely separated and he will lose all control of them. As soon as the necessity for flankers on one side of the line of march no longer exists, signal for them to rejoin and do not send them out again so long as you can see from the road all the country you should cover.

Problem No. 2. (Infantry)

1034. Captain (to one platoon of his company): Let us assume that this platoon is the advance party of an advance guard, marching through Salem along the Chester Pike [Par. 1028 (b)]. One squad is 350 yards in front, acting as the point. The enemy is thought to be very near, but

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